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This study deals with the interaction of vulnerability to shocks, conservation intervention and 
poverty reduction using a survey of households living along the margins of forests in the semi-arid 
region of Tigray, Ethiopia.  Five major conclusions that have wider policy implications are derived 
from this study. First, forest environmental resources provide a natural insurance for households 
vulnerable to idiosyncratic and covariate risks in rural Tigray, enforcing the widely held view that 
forests are important as economic buffer in hard times. Second, even if forests provide the food 
security and income they may perpetuate poverty. Third, households in rural Tigray are not driven 
into forest extraction for coping shocks only but also by diversification strategy, suggesting that 
the problem for local communities has both the characteristics of portfolio analysis and economics 
of insurance. Fourth, forest incomes decrease the incidence of poverty while it increases income 
inequality in rural Tigray. Finally, we find that the Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP) in 
Tigray contributes in pursuing the twin goals of poverty reduction and conservation of forests that 
have often been portrayed as opposing goals. 
One important policy implication of this study is that government, policy-makers and natural 
resource managers need to acknowledge the livelihood safety- net role that forests play in rural 
livelihoods and recognize that environmental protection policies limiting or banning access and 
use of forest resources can deepen rural poverty. However, while more intensive forest 
management to increase accessibility of forest resources is itself a possible strategy, we must be 
cautious as to who would gain and who would lose from such activities. Finally,  the study 
underlines the importance of promotion of public safety nets such as the Productive Safety Net 





productivity of agricultural production and support diversification into off-farm livelihood and 
income sources to provide positive incentives for forest conservation and sustainable use. 
Key Words: forests, shocks, safety nets, poverty trap, heterogeneity, counterfactual income, 
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1.1. Background of the Thesis 
Poor people often depend on biodiversity both for their livelihoods and as a safety net against 
deeper poverty (IIED, 2010).Moreover, of the 1.2 billion people estimated to live on less than US$ 
1 a day (i.e. those that are the target of MDG1), 70% live in rural areas with a high dependence on 
natural resources for all or part of their livelihoods 
(http://www.tanzaniagateway.org/docs/MDGs_and_natural_resources_management_sustaina
ble_livelihoods_resource.pdf). This direct dependence on services from ecosystems is highest 
amongst people living in arid and semi-arid lands such as Tigray where alternative livelihood 
options areoften limited and environments are particularlyfragile and risky (MA 2005b cited in 
Shackleton et al.2008).  
Forest environmental resources play a significant role in the livelihoods of rural communities in 
Ethiopia (Mamoet al.2007, Babulo et al., 2009). Forest environmental income also accounts for 
27% of the total household income on average, the second largest household income share next to 
crop income having a share of 43% in rural Tigray (Babulo et al. 2009). However, forests are also 
sensitive ecosystems that are threatened by human interventions. As in many other parts of the 
developing world, forests in Ethiopia, particularly in Tigray1, suffer from extreme land degradation 
                                                     
1Between 1990 and 2000, 141,000 ha of forest were lost every year, which equals an average annual deforestation rate 
of 0.93%. Then between 2000 and 2005, the rate of deforestation increased by 10.4% to 1.03% per year , which totals 






and deforestation. High population growth combined with conversion of forests to agricultural 
land (Nayssen et al., 2004; Mokria et al., 2009), high dependency on biomass energy (Hagoset 
al.1999; Gebreegziher 2007) and free grazing (Feoli et al.2002) are the major causes of forest 
degradation in the region. 
Since 1994, the current Ethiopian government has embarked on an economic development strategy 
known as Agricultural Development – Led industrialization (ADLI) (MOFED, 2002). In line with 
this national framework, the Tigray region is following a Conservation –Based Agricultural 
Development –Led Industrialization (CBADLI) strategy to achieve food security and reduce 
poverty (BOPED, 1995), while giving greater emphasis on community participation and 
mobilization of local resources in environmental rehabilitation (Tesfay , 2006)2.  
One of the major strategies of environmental rehabilitation in Tigray includes area enclosures and 
the establishment of community woodlots for ecological regeneration (Nyssen et al., 2009, 
Mokriaet al.,2003; Gebremedhin et al., 2000). In addition to enclosures, the regional government 
in Tigray created restrictions on the use of certain tree species that are enforced by the development 
agents who are assigned to each village for this purpose ( Howard and Smith, 2006;Tesfay 2006; 
Gebreegzabher, 2007).  However, despite many researchers such as those(Nyssen et al., 2009; and  
Mokria et al., 2009)and the international community alike3putting forward the positive 
environmental outcomes such a strategy , it is viewed by many as a constraint for achieving poverty 
reduction (Berhanu 2004; Howard and Smith 2006 and Geberemedhin et al. 2000), equity within 
                                                     
2A review of the recent history of devolution in forestry indicates undeniably that the area of land — although not 
necessarily forests — managed under devolved and community-based forest management (CBFM) systems has 
dramatically increased in many countries (White and Martin 2002). However, while devolution of forestry benefits 
the poor in some countries, it is also remained to be prone to be captured by local elites as any other valuable local 
resources (see for example,Malla et al., 2003 and Mahanty et al., 2006). 






and between communities (Chisholm, 2000; Howard and Smith, 2006 ;and Nedassa et al., 2005) 
which calls into question whether results achieved are sustainable from an economic or 
environmental stand point (Nedassa et al., 2005 cited in Howard and Smith, 2006). 
Over all, two overarching problems have been identified concerning the issues of common pool 
resources (CPR) management in Tigray (Howard and Smith, 2006): the first is the possibility to 
halt degradation and sustainably regenerate vegetative resources, and the second is the need to 
generate livelihood resources that can help to alleviate poverty, food insecurity and continued 
degradation in the area(Howard and Smith,2006). The general conclusion is that the conservation 
of common pool resources (CPR) and the poverty and food security aspects are linked.  The CPR 
has been depleted due to drought and overuse, and has been overused because of changes in 
institutional and individual access rights4 (Howard and Smith, 2006). However, this over use of 
the common pool resources such as forests may constitute a poverty trap as a result of a tragedy 
of the commons (Hardin 1968). Too many households in rural Tigray are in need of the resources 
and the resources cannot provide enough to properly insure all the population. They face thus the 
classic poverty- environment nexus, where poor people depend on the environment, and over use 
it (Delacote, 2007).The resultant increased pressure often has a negative feedback on the capacity 
of the ecosystems to deliver these services and create a downward spiral of increasing poverty and 
ecosystem degradation (Shackleton et al.2008) and this dependence of the poor on the fragile open 
access may confirm the suggestion in some recent literature (e.g. Angelsen and Wunder,  2003; 
Lavange, 2005,  Delacote, 2007) of a resource based “poverty trap”. The key issue is therefore, to 
                                                     
4With the exception of restrictions on certain woody species, most common land across the highlands is de-facto open 
access since rights regimes around them are lacking or ill-defined. On the other hand, the restrictions in place in 
enclosures, while increasing the availability of certain resources, generate greater pressure on these open areas 





present the conservation intervention and the dependence on forests as safety nets in locations 
where they are more than dead –end poverty traps. 
 Central to these issues is a greater  perception and nuanced appreciation of (a) what is meant by 
poverty alleviation in relation to natural resources , distinguishing between poverty prevention or 
mitigation ; (b) the links between natural resources dependence and the potential of the natural 
resource to provide the pathways out of poverty; (c) the safety net of the forest resources and when 
and how might translate into poverty trap, (d) the extent to which opportunities associated with 
forest management can be made more pro-poor and thus contribute to the efforts to combat poverty 
and vulnerability, and  (e) the role of social protection measures to provide win –win  outcomes 
for conservation and poverty reduction etc. This research is therefore to address these issues in the 
context of Tigray Regional state of Ethiopia. 
1.2.  Objectives of the Study 
The general objectives of the research are to contribute to the existing stock of knowledge on the 
contributions of forest environmental resources to the livelihood of rural households, on  managing 
the trade-offs between conservation of forests and poverty reduction and on the methodological 
challenges in reaching conclusions on the links between forest biodiversity and poverty using 
survey of households living along the margins of forests in the region of Tigray, northern Ethiopia.  
Specifically, the objectives of the research are: 
1) To investigate the role of forest environmental resources as natural insurance for coping 
with shocks 






3) To analysethe contribution of forest environmental resources for povertyreduction and 
distribution of income 
4) To investigate the role ofthe ProductiveSafetyNet Program (PSNP) in Ethiopia to reconcile 
poverty reduction and conservation of forest ecosystems.  
1.3. Research Issues 
The first topic deals withtherole of forests for coping with health related shocks. The question is 
how idiosyncratic health related shocks affect the allocation of labour into forests and the forest 
dependency of households living along the margins of forests in the semi-arid region of Tigray, 
Ethiopia. 
The second issue of this research addresses the link between forests and food security of 
smallholder farmers along the margins of forests. An attempt is made to explicitly focus on food 
security indicators, instead of restricting to annualized income in which the temporary contribution 
of forests do not always feature as significant. In addition, this research identifies the implication 
of forest - food security linkages on the long term livelihood outcome of the smallholder farm 
households. The main research questions in this respect are: Do forests contribute to food security 
of farm households? If yes, what are the characteristics of farm households who are dependent on 
forests for food security? Does diversification or coping strategy motivate farm households to 
participate in forest environmental resource extraction? What is the implication of forest 
dependency on the long term livelihood outcome of the smallholders?  
The third issue is related to the second issue but deals with the contribution of forest environmental 
resources commercialization to the annualized income of households and with the methodological 





on forest environmental resources claims that the poor tend to depend on forests 
disproportionately. However, where commercial production and sales are involved, this 
relationship may be reversed (Vira and Kontoleon, 2010). Moreover, the household decision to 
participate in forest environmental resource commercialization is one of the potential sources of 
endogeneity in household income. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effects of 
participation in forest environmental resource commercialization on welfare of households. We 
examine three empirical questions that are central to forests and the household welfare debate. 
First, does participating in forest environmental resource commercialization contribute to 
household income? If it does, then failing to account for differences in participation in income 
modelling will lead to biased parameter estimates and misleading information for policy analysis. 
Second, does household income actually differ between households that participated and did not 
participate in forest environmental resource commercialization? Third, would household income 
change if all households participated? While the answer to the second question is directly 
observable, the last question requires an analysis that accounts for the effects of participation in 
forest environmental resource commercialization and other unobservable factors that may 
influence household income. These unobservable factors may play an important role in 
anticipating the potential outcomes from policies designed to influence household income. 
The fourth issue that this study addresses relates to the contribution of forest environmental 
resources to poverty and distribution of income under the current conservation intervention in 
rural Tigray. It aims to consider the interdependency of participation in forest environmental 
resources extraction and other household characteristics before decomposing the poverty and 
inequality indicators that previous studies on the area of forest income, poverty and inequality have 





Finally, the fifth issue that this study deals withis the impact of social protection programs such as 
the Productive safety Net Program (PSNP) in Ethiopia to reduce the cost of ex-ante risk 
management such as depleting forests from commons in the semi-arid region of Tigray. It aims to 
investigate whether the PSNP could provide a win-win for the goals of poverty reduction and 
conservation of forest environmental resources.  
These five issues addressed in this study provide an in-depth insight into the poverty –environment 
nexus in the semi- arid region of Tigray and in finding a win- win for poverty reduction and 
conservation of the environment.   
1.4. Organization of the thesis 
The motivations for, and major issues addressed in this PhD thesis are explained briefly in the 
preceding sections of this chapter. The subsequent chapters of this study are organized as follows: 
Chapter 2 briefly provides the setting of the research area focusing on the economic situation, 
environment and the development and natural resource management policies and strategies in 
Ethiopia, and the Tigray region in particular. It also provides a description of the research 
methodology and analytical approaches of the research. 
Chapter 3 investigates household allocation of labour for coping with health related shock and 
forest dependency in rural Tigray. Because illness is not exogenous, the analysis uses an 
Instrumental Variables approach and the Propensity Score Matching (PSM) method that capture 
several dimensions of illness.  
Chapter 4 focuses on the forest-food security linkage in rural Tigray and its implication in the 





methods to account for a selection bias that normally occurs when unobservable factors influence 
both the participation in forest environmental resources extraction and food security outcomes.  
Chapter 5 investigates the driving forces behind rural households’ decisions to participate in forest 
environmental resource commercialization and the impact of the participation in 
commercialization of forests on the income of the households in rural Tigray. We estimate a 
simultaneous equations model with endogenous switching (following Di-falco and Veronesi, 
2010) to account for the heterogeneity in the decision to participate in forest environmental 
resource  commercialization or not, and for unobservable characteristics of households.  
Chapter 6 focuses on the contribution of income from forest environmental resources on poverty 
and distribution of income in semi-arid region of Tigray under the existing forest management 
regime. Counterfactual incomes are estimated based on the endogenous switching regression 
model applied in chapter five, taking into account what the participant group of households would 
have earned had they not participated. The results are compared with alternative income estimates 
in which forest income is treated simplistically as exogenous income.  
Chapter 7 investigates the potential of Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP) in Ethiopia to 
provide a win-win for poverty reduction and conservation of forests.  
Chapter 8 discusses the major findings and outlines the main conclusions from this study. It draws 








THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC SETTING OF THE STUDY AREA AND RESEARCH APPROACH 
2.1.  Location, Demography and Natural Conditions 
Tigray is the northern most region of Ethiopia located at latitude of 12 to 15 degree North and 
Longitude of 36 c 30” to 41 30” East and covers an area of 53,000 square kilometres (Hagos et al., 
1999; and Tesfay, 2006). Tigray’s population is around 4.3 million and growing at 2.5 percent, 
where 80.5 percent resides in rural areas (Howard and Smith, 2006). Administratively, the region 
has 35 woredas, 12 town woredas , and 665 tabias. Each woreda is subdivided into tabias and each 
tabia is divided into kushets(  Babulo, 2007) 
The landform of the region is complex, composed of highlands (2300-3200 meter a.s.l) ,Lowland 
plains (500-1500 M), mountain peaks (as high of 3935 m), and high to moderate relief hills(1600-
2200 m). By virtue of the complexities in topography, the region has diversified agro-ecological 
zones and niches, each with distinct soil, geology, vegetation cover, and natural resources (Taffere, 
2003). Tigray is relatively dry and is subject to frequent drought (Howard and Smith 2006). 
Average annual rainfall ranges between 500 and 900 mm yr-1, with a unimodal pattern except in 
the southern and eastern highlands where a second, smaller rainy season allows local growing of 
two successive crops within one year (Nyssen et al., 2005). Taking into account rainfall, 
atmospheric temperature, and evaporation, more than 90 % of the region is categorized as semi–







Figure 1. 1 Map of the study area 
2.2. Socio- Economic Aspects 
 2.2.1. The Economy 
Ethiopia has experienced strong economic growth in recent years. With real GDP growth at or 
near double digit levels since 2003/04, the country has consistently outperformed most other 
countries in Africa and expanded much faster than the continent –wide average (Figure 2). Real 
GDP growth averaged 11.2% per annum during the 2003/04 and 2008/09 period, placing Ethiopia 










Source:  ADB 2010 
Figure 1. 2 GDP Growth Rate Comparison 
Although the growth performance has been encouraging, the country exhibits the highest rate of 
inflation5 in its history (CIA, 2009) and low international reserves (ADB, 2010) in the same period. 
High inflation is not only constraining growth but also represents a heavy tax burden on the poor 
and is eroding the gains made under the donor-funded social protection and social safety net 
programs (World Bank 2011). In addition despite the performance of the economy in recent years 
a number of issues warrant attention. 
Ethiopia’s economy is highly dependent on primary commodities and rain fed agriculture and thus 
is highly vulnerable to the vagaries of weather. Ethiopia has experienced no less than five major 
national droughts since 1980 and several local droughts (Yosuf et al., 2008).  Agriculture accounts 
                                                     





for about 40 % of national GDP, 90 % of exports, and 85% of employment (Di-Falco et al.,2011). 
There is also a strong correlation between weather conditions and Ethiopian’s growth performance. 
A change of 1 percent in average annual rainfall is associated with a change of 0.3 percent in real 
GDP in the following year (ADB, 2010).  Only about  10 % of cereal crop lands are irrigated, and 
yield variability at the regional level is one of the highest in the developing world (WFP, 2009). 
As illustrated in Figure 3, the pace of agricultural sector growth during the 2003/04-2008/09 period 
declined, while the industrial and service sectors grew more rapidly (ADB, 2010).  Agricultural 
GDP and per capita cereal production has been falling over the last forty years with cereal yield 
stagnant at about 1.2 tons per hectare (Di-falco et al., 2010). However, the overall expansion of 
agricultural production has been driven by increases in the area of land cultivated, rather than 
major improvements in productivity (ADB, 2010).    
 
Source:  ADB 2010 





In Tigray, agriculture contributes 38.7 % of the regional GDP (TRBFB, 2010). Crop productivity 
is very low due to factors such as soil and water degradation and erratic rainfall. Average estimates 
of productivity loss due to soil degradation are estimated to be 2-3% annually, which explains 
most of the failure to realize the potential yields expected from agricultural intensification (World 
Bank, 2008). Cereal yields average less than one ton per hectare in the region (Pender and 
Geberemedhin, 2007). This is low compared to the national average of 1.2 tons per hectare (WFP, 
2009). The average land holdings in the region are around 1.25 hectare (MORAD, 2009). Major 
crops in the region include teff, barley, sorghum, wheat and maize (Tesfay, 2006). Rural 
households in Tigray do not produce enough food to feed themselves, and they get most of the 
balance from the market (MORAD, 2009). Given the heavy dependence of most households on 
buying basic food, even in years of relatively good rainfall and production, the question of how 
people get cash is important to food security and livelihood analysis in relation to forest 
environmental resources. 
Tigray has much livestock including 3.04 million cattle, 2.4 million sheep and goats, 2.3 million 
poultry, 187,000 beehives and good potential of lakes and river fishery (WFP, 2009). However, 
livestock production is secondary (Tesfay, 2006). In fact Babulo et al. (2009) challenged the 
traditional belief in Tigray that livestock is the major contributor of the household income. 
According to the authors forest environmental income contributes the second source of income 
share to rural households in Tigray.  
 2.2.2. Poverty Situation 
Conditions of poverty, food insecurity, and malnutrition in Ethiopia are well documented and have 
been the focus of development efforts for more than half a century (see for example, Dercon and 





appalling. Yet several surveys suggest that Ethiopians are better off than they have been. The 
general consensus is that Ethiopia remains one of the world’s poorest countries, but that economic 
growth trends are positive and living standards are finally starting to catch up – at least with the 
rest of Africa (Devereux and Sharp, 2003).   Out of 80 million (2008) people, 35 million people 
are living in abject poverty; most of them live in rural areas with agriculture as their main 
occupation, while food insecurity levels in the rural areas of the country rose from about 2 million 
people in 1995 to about 14 million in 2008, of which 7.5 million were covered by the safety net 
program of the government (WFP, 2009).   Increased poverty, water scarcity, and food insecurity 
are just some of the negative impacts set to hit small-scale farmers and pastoralists in Ethiopia as 
a result of climate change in the region. While Ethiopia is no stranger to climatic variability, having 
suffered droughts that have  contributed to hunger and even famine in the past, climate change is 
set to make the lives of the poorest even harder. The persistent lack of rainfall is a major factor in 
rural poverty. Recurring droughts leave poor farming families without food crops, causing periodic 
famines.  
In Tigray, poverty is extremely high.  More than 58% of the total population were living in absolute 
poverty (earning less than a dollar a day), which makes the region's situation more serious 
compared to the national average 44.4% (WFP, 2009).The average wealth breakdown for the 16 
livelihood zones taken together is 20% very poor, 30 % poor , 34% middle and 16% better off 
(MORAD 2009).  
A Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP) has been prepared at national level since 2011. The 
GTP aims to achieve the Millennium Development Goals in Ethiopia by 2015 and middle-income 
status for Ethiopia by 2020−2. Regional governments have also prepared similar documents based 





rate of 11.2 percent is required, the same level as the reported growth rate under the previous 5-
year plan (World Bank, 2011). In addition, climate resilient green economy is seen as a real 
opportunity to catalyse transformation, take advantage of international interest in funding, finance 
a new model of development (e.g., through the fast funding), and build a resource-based 
competitive advantage of the country, while protecting the country against the adverse effects of 
climate change (ECA, 2011). This will have a strong implication for the natural resource base of 
the country and the livelihood of the people who are mostly dependent on it.   
 2.2.3. Ethiopia’s Food Security Program 
Given Ethiopia’s history of chronic food insecurity and recurrent catastrophic famines, it is hardly 
surprising that food security has always featured strongly as a priority in successive government 
development plans and strategies. Ethiopia’s current Growth and Transformation Plan for the 
period 2011- 2015  takes forward a number of the same measures in its predecessor the Plan for 
Accelerated and Sustainable Development to End Poverty(PASDEP) which prioritized food 
security, rural development, human development and conservation of the environment. 
Meanwhile, the GTP also focused on a ‘Green Growth’ which gives more emphasis to climate 
resilient development strategy. In addition to its focus on agricultural commercialization, the GTP 
also renews the government’s commitment to the food security program (FSP), which was initiated 
by the ‘New Coalition for Food Security’ after the food crisis of 2002. 
The FSP aims to address food insecurity through a package of interventions that are intended to 
boost agricultural productivity for the estimated 8.3 million chronically (or ‘predictably’) food 
insecure, and to provide protection against agricultural vulnerability for estimated 6.7 million 





The food security program has three main components, which together are designed to attain 
household food security: (1)  the ‘Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP): with two sub- 
components – public works and direct support – which bridges the food gap with cash or food 
transfers while building community assets; (2) Household Extension Packages, which support a 
range of non-farm household activities through a variety of assets and input packages for 
agriculture and non- agricultural activities; (3) Voluntary Resettlement Program, which relocates 
people from the most vulnerable highland communities to more productive land.  
2.3. Land and Forest Policy Issues 
 2.3.1. Rural land administration 
Historically, institutions/property rights to land in Ethiopia were vested in the risti system, the gulti 
system/ private land holding, or the church (Gebreegzabher et al., 2011).The overthrow of Haile 
Selassie following the 1974 famine signalled the abrupt ending of an essentially feudal system in 
Ethiopian agriculture.  The Derg used its unfettered power to force a radical agrarian 
transformation on rural Ethiopia. Between 1976 and 1991, all farmland in the highlands was 
confiscated by the state and redistributed equally per capita within rural communities. This radical 
land redistribution was motivated by both egalitarian and efficiency concerns. The intention was 
not only to break the power of landlords over peasants, but to give all rural households the means 
to achieve sustainable increases in agricultural productivity and rural incomes (Devereux et al., 
2005).Importantly, land was conceptualized as a safety net for rural households by the Derg, a 
view which is shared by the current government of Ethiopia.  
The recent change in the land tenure system of Ethiopia came in the early 1990s following the 





Democratic Republic of Ethiopia proclaimed that ‘Land is a common property of the nations, 
nationalities and peoples of Ethiopia and shall not be subject to sale or to other means of transfer’. 
In 2005, the Government of Ethiopia issued a new Rural Land Administration and Land Use 
Proclamation (456/2005) (amended in 2007). The aim was to increase tenure security, improve 
productivity and avoid expectations of land re-distribution. Article 6(3) of the proclamation states 
that land holders will be issued with certificates that indicate the size and fertility of their holding 
as well as its borders (FDRE, 2005). Land certification is currently taking place in the Amhara, 
Oromia, SNNP and Tigray Regional States. However, the land registration activities have 
commenced without due regard for the sustainable use of forest resources because forests are not 
yet mapped and registered and rural households are able to clear land and stake a claim to it before 
the registration process begins(Abebe et al. 2009). Conditions of tenure security and its impact in 
various aspects in Ethiopia, particularly in Tigray region is well documented and has been the 
focus of research for decades (Pender et al., 2002; Pender and Gebremedhin, 2003;  Hagos and 
Holden 2006; Deininger  et al., 2009; Tenaw et al., 2009 and Ghebru and Holden, 2013). 
 2.3.2. Forest Policy 
The new federal Forest Development, Conservation and Utilization Proclamation 
(542/2007)provides the framework for making fundamental changes to forest resource 
management across the country. Both the proclamation and the country’s first policy and strategy 
on forest development that accompanies it demonstrate a much greater acceptance of community 
management, and the conceptual links being made between livelihoods and environmental 
resources (FDRE, 2007a; 2007b).  
The overall objective of the new policy is ‘…to meet public demand in forest products and foster 





conserving and developing forest resources.’ Significantly, this is to be achieved through an 
overall reduction in the role of the state, the promotion of private investment and the devolution 
of authority to regional administrations (FDRE, 2007b). To this end, the new proclamation allows 
for forests to be designated as either private or state owned. State forests constitute natural high 
forests preserved for biodiversity conservation and other purposes in which the property rights are 
vested in the state. It could be either national forestry area (NFPAs) or regional forestry priority 
areas (RFPAs). Cross boundary forest areas also fall within the category of state forests. The first 
priority within the context of these high forests is protection and conservation. State forests may 
be given as concessions for privately managed plantations or retained for conservation 
management by government organizations in participation with local communities (FDRE, 
2007a). 
The government of Ethiopia had classified 58 Forest Priority Areas (FPAs) covering  2.8 million 
hectares in the 1994 Ethiopian Forestry Action Programme (UNDP-GEF, 2005). Out of these 58 
FPAs, 2 of them are found in the Tigray Regional State (Gebreegziabher 2007). However, the state 
forests appear to function more like unmanaged state forests with multiple resource uses (grazing, 
settlements, agriculture, fuel wood gathering etc), with low priority given to conservation and 
preservation of wild life and habitats(USAID, 2008). No official maps exist, no management plans 
have been prepared, and none have been gazetted. Regional and federal resources to delineate state 
forests and prepare management plans are extremely limited. Currently, the land registration 
process does not register individually held land located within high forests on the assumption that 
these areas are state forests. The policies do not refer to the location of these forests or explain how 
they can be identified implying that  there are no legal grounds to resolve any conflict regarding 





 2.3.4. National Priority Areas (NPAs) in Tigray 
With about 120,000 hectares, Desse’a is probably the largest natural forest in Tigray National 
Regional state. The forest stretches in a narrow corridor along  the eastern escarpment from close 
to Senquata town near Adigrat to the east of Quiha town6. The topography in Dessa'a is varied and 
includes some flatter areas and gentle slopes as well as steep scarps. The forest extends in an 
easterly direction along and down the escarpment, and forms a climatic buffer zone between the 
cool highlands of Tigray and the hot lowlands in Afar Region. Most of the trees in the forest are 
found at the higher altitudes, and relatively undisturbed forest exists only on the steep eastern 
slopes.  It appears that there is currently no natural forest regeneration. Grazing by domestic 
animals is given as a main cause for this, but the area is now very dry and climatic changes should 
not be ruled out. 
 On the other hand, Hugumburda and Grat-Kahsu are two contiguous forests situated between the 
towns of Mai Chew and Alamata, Southern Zone. Local people make extensive use of any easily 
accessible areas of forest to provide fuel wood and construction materials. Until the early 1990s, 
this part of Tigray was better known for its huge camps of famine victims than its natural resources, 
so it is not surprising that the forests have not been properly managed.  Afforestation activities on 
the more accessible slopes began in the early 1970s, and the regional government is now helping 
to expand these further. Three tree nurseries in Korem, Ashenge and Addis-Fana are producing 
exotic species for the afforestation program.  
                                                     






2.4. Research Methodology 
 2.4.1. Data sources and Description 
Chapters 3 -7 of the thesis are based on household survey data. Primary data were collected via 
survey questionnaire. The primary sampling units were tabias within approximately 5 km radius 
of the National Priority Areas (NPAs). This distance is purposely chosen for convenience and  
since an empirical evidence from by (Guthiga and Mburu, 2006) also indicated that there were 
progressively fewer people that extract non-timber forest products beyond 5km stretch from forest 
in rural Kenya.  Accordingly, a total of ten tabias, namely Arato, Derga -ajen, Hugumrda, 
Meswaeti, Kara_adishawo, Worebayu, Kal_amin, Kelisha_emni,andFelege-woini were selected 
for the survey (see figure 2.1).  
Villages were randomly selected from each tabia. In each village 26 households were selected 
randomly, yielding a total sample of 260 households. However, due to budgetary and logistics 
problems the final survey ended up with 254 households.  A multi-purpose questionnaire was used 
to gather information on household income and expenditure, farm and off farm activities, 
household assets, vulnerability to idiosyncratic and covariate shocks,participation in local 
institutions and a host of other information related to production and sales, climate change 
adaptation, participation in the Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP) and social networks. The 
survey was conducted from June-August 2010. The survey paid special attention to labour 
allocation to forests, participation in forest environmental resource extraction from private sources, 
enclosures, woodlots, and other common pool resources. Eight experienced enumerators who had 
served in similar surveys were hired for the data collection. The enumerators were given two days 
intensive training and one day pilot testing was made. During the survey field work, close and 





significant inconsistencies were made to be filled again. Survey data was processed using STATA 
10 software. To determine the extent to which households in rural Tigray use forest environmental 
resources for their livelihood and their dependency in forests, we follow (Narrain et al., 2008) to 
calculate the income that each household obtained from major sources as follows. 
2.4.2. Income Accounting 
To determine the extent to which households in rural Tigray use forest environmental resources 
for their livelihood, we calculate the income that each household obtained from 8 major sources 
namely, (1) agriculture, (2) livestock, (3) forest environmental resources, (4) household business, 
(5) wage employment, (6) Productive safety net program, (7) financial transactions   and (8) 
transfers. 
Income from each source is calculated as the difference between total revenue obtained and total 
input costs incurred, where these totals include both market transactions and imputed values from 
non- market transactions.   
Income definitions  
Net crop Income: is defined as the difference between the revenue obtained from all crops and 
crop-residues harvested by the household using January-March 2010 local market price and the 
input costs incurred for crop production. Input costs, in turn are defined as the sum of wages paid 
to hired agricultural labour, cost of fertilizers, manure, pesticides; rent paid on land rented in; and 
rent paid for farm capital rented in. We also include income obtained by the household from trees 
on its private lands, equal to the revenues from fuel and construction wood, flowers, fruits 





Net livestock income: is defined as the difference between revenue  obtained from sales, products 
and services of the main types livestock found in Tigray, namely, cows, goats, sheep, donkeys, 
horse, camel and chickens and costs that include cost of veterinary services,  hired labour to graze 
them and the cost of fodder to feed them that includes the imputed value of fodder grown as a crop 
and not sold, residue from other crops used as fodder, fodder collected from village commons and 
not sold, and fodder bought from the market. 
Forest Environmental Income:  To identify the forest environmental resources that rural 
households in Tigray collect, we prepared an open ended question during the pre-testing of the 
household survey. Then we listed all the main forest resources that the households use in the 
questionnaire. Our survey also asked households to list other forest resources obtained if any. We 
follow an approach by Babulo (2007) as a basis of valuation. We relied on household’s own 
reported values for environmental goods from homestead, enclosures and other community owned 
forest resources and grazing fields. Respondents reported the weekly, monthly or yearly amount 
of each product harvested/ gathered by the household, the amount consumed/used, and the amount 
exchanged, the amount given to other households (gift), the amount sold, and the cash amount 
received from sales of these products. In case the forest products were bartered rather than sold, 
the retail sale price of the exchanged commodity was recorded as the cash income.  But only in 
rare instances did the barter occur in our survey.  
Income from Household Business: is defined as income from any non- agricultural business such 
as trade operated by the household. 
Wage income: is defined as  the sum of  income in cash and in-kind wages received  from in- 
village casual employment off the household’s own farm, off-village casual employment and 





Net income from financial transactions: Households in our sample own a variety of financial 
assets, including deposits at Dedebit micro finance, saving and credit associations, cooperatives, 
and loans given to relative or friends. They also owe debt to a number of sources - Dedebit micro 
finance, saving and credit associations/cooperatives, moneylenders, friends or relatives. During 
the survey year, households earned interest income on their deposits and paid out interest on their 
debts. Net interest (interest income earned less income paid out) constitute household’s income 
from financial transactions. 
Income from Transfer: is defined as the sum of PSNP and in-kind payments received by a 
household from its family, friends, the state, and any non–governmental organizations operating 
in the area.  
2.4.3. Analytical Approach 
The econometric analysis for this study mainly uses  cross-sectional data collected in the year 
2010. The hypotheses in each of the topics studied are derived from a review of theoretical and 
empirical literature on the respective subjects. For the econometric analysis the choice of feasible 
techniques is dictated by the nature of the dependent variable and research question. In each 
chapter an explanation is given for the choice of the econometric model. For example, in chapter 
3, we used a Heckman selection model. In chapter 4, we also use PSM approach to control for the 
selection problem and endogeneity of participation in forest environmental resource extraction. 
We use the Full Information Maximum Likelihood Estimation in chapter 5. In chapter 6 we use 
Foster, Greer and Thorbecke (1984) poverty indices (commonly known as FGT indices) and Gini 
decomposition (Stark et al., 1986). Applying these analyses for “with forest income”, “without 
forest income” and “counterfactual income” we were able to measure the contribution of forest 





not used, as a result of which their estimates of forest income –poverty and inequality may have 
been overestimated or underestimated. Finally, we use the Propensity Score Matching (PSM) in 







DO FORESTS HAVE A ROLE TO PLAY FOR COPING WITH IDIOSYNCRATIC 
HEATH SHOCKS IN RURAL ETHIOPIA? 
3.1. Introduction 
Low and volatile incomes coupled with the absence of or poor development of financial or risk 
sharing institutions make consumption smoothing an important issue in low – income countries 
like Ethiopia (Barrett et al. 2001). A typical household in rural areas of developing countries faces 
substantial idiosyncratic and covariate risk, resulting in high-income variability (Dercon et al., 
2005).  Covariate risks include uncertainties associated with nature, markets (both input and 
output), social unrest, policy and institutional failures etc. On the other hand, idiosyncratic risks 
include shocks related with income failure, illness, and shortage of agricultural inputs, 
(Weinberger and Jutting 2000). Usually, due to the absence of the first best solutions (formal risk 
sharing institutions), rural households in developing countries have developed their own risk 
reduction, mitigation, and coping strategies (Weinberger and Jutting 2000). Coping, broadly 
defined as a short-term strategy of households to prevent a negative effect of crises (Sauerborn et 
al., 1996) may take several forms.  Some of the most common coping mechanisms in rural areas 
include:  livestock husbandry (Reardon et al., 1992), reduction in consumption (Porter, 2008), sale 
of assets (Hoddinott, 2006), off-farm activities (Barrett et al. 2001) and social ties (Dercon et al., 
2005). 
In the livelihoods literature, forests are also identified as a prominent safety-net source, accessed 





because forest products are often available at times when other income sources are not, for 
example, when crops fail (Byron & Arnold, 1999; Pattanayak & Sills, 2001; Angelsen et al., 2007), 
and have better insurance properties than insurance markets in the presence of information and 
enforcement problems (Baland & Francois, 2005) which is a typical situation in developing 
countries like Ethiopia. The importance of resource extraction is amplified in the presence of risk, 
and such risk is expected to intensify as future climate change precipitates more extreme weather 
events, especially in marginal agricultural areas (Sivakumar et al., 2005 cited in Angelsen et al., 
2007) such as northern Ethiopia.  
Yet the empirical literature on biodiversity as a means of risk coping is ethnographic (McSweeney, 
2004), considerably smaller than that on biodiversity as a source of livelihood (CBD, 2010, Vira 
and Kontoleon, 2010) and typically relates only extraction volume, income, or income share with 
total income or asset holdings (e.g., Cavendish, 2000; Coomes et al., 2001; Godoy et al., 1995). 
As a result, there is very little systematic analysis to help guide conservation and development 
promoters in their efforts to understand how the poor (and others) deal with negative shocks 
(McSweeney, 2004).  
A few existing studies such as those by Pattanayak & Sills (2001), Takasaki et al.,(2004), 
McSweeney (2004), Debela et al., (2012) find positive correlation between shocks  and forest 
extraction. For instance, Pattanayak & Sills (2001) argued that forest environmental resource 
extraction is correlated positively with agricultural shortfalls and expected agricultural risk in their 
study of the Brazilian Amazon. In the same way, Debela et al. (2012) argued that shocks tend to 
lead rural households in Uganda to depend on forests to meet subsistence and cash needs. 
Similarly, Takasaki et al. (2004) conclude that forests serve households in Peru to cope with flood 





forest resources may be less important as a buffer between agricultural harvests and in times of 
unforeseen hardship than has been found in many case studies. Drawing overall conclusions from 
these literatures is difficult due to wide differences across studies in fieldwork method, variable 
definitions (e.g., the type of shock experienced), and empirical model (Angelsen et al, 2007). For 
example, nearly all studies devoted to the link between shocks and forests have centred on Latin 
America (Pattanayak & Sills, 2001; Takasaki et al., 2004 and McSweeny, 2005) and Asia (Shively, 
1997; Takasaki, 2009 and Volker & Waibel, 2010). Evidence from sub-Saharan Africa is much 
more limited. Important exceptions include Monica and Fisher, (2005); Debela et al. (2013). Thus, 
it is important to examine the role of forests as a risk coping strategy in an African setting. Our 
contribution here is that the present study was undertaken in another tropical ecosystem, dry 
deciduous woodlands, the dominant type in Southern and Eastern Africa (Campbell et.al, 2006 
and Fisher and Shively, 2005).  
There are also additional features that make this research work especially interesting. First, much 
of the research done on the insurance value of forests deals with covariate shocks (see for example 
Pattanayak & Sills, 2001; Takasaki et al., 2004; and Takasaki, 2009). Meanwhile, a growing body 
of empirical evidence suggests that idiosyncratic risk may be as important, or indeed may dominate 
covariate risk in rural Africa and Asia (Udry, 1990; Townsend, 1995; Deaton, 1997; Lybbert et 
al., 2004; Morduch, 2004; Dercon, 2005; Kazianga and Udry, 2006). This relative importance of 
idiosyncratic risk and the relative dearth of attention given to it by researchers and policymakers 
alike raise the possibility of significant untapped potential for improved local risk management in 
developing countries, and significant impact for high quality research that tackles this topic in the 
African setting. Many critical questions remain: for example, do rural households cope with 





if they do, what are the characteristics of households most reliant on forests for coping with 
idiosyncratic health shocks? Does reliance on forests for coping with idiosyncratic health shocks 
depend on the endowment of physical and human capital as well as access to institutional services?  
Answering these and other questions can enable us to develop recommendations that maximize 
the potential for “win – win” for both human and environmental health. Policy options on this front 
could be of two types, i.e. those policies to mitigate interactions that both aggravate the impacts of 
health shocks on households and concomitantly affect forests negatively. Thus, the primary 
objective of this paper is to examine the potential role of forests for coping with  idiosyncratic 
health shocks of farm households living at the margins of protected forests, found in the north 
highlands of Ethiopia. 
Dealing with health shocks is an important issue through which to view the poverty-environment 
nexus in many ways. First, many of the environmental hot spots in the world are located in 
impoverished regions where individuals live under the constant threat of serious illness (Rasmus 
and Lund, 2009). Second, the environmental impacts of health shocks are theoretically ambiguous 
(Volker and Waibel, 2010).Resource extraction and activities that use these resources for 
production tend to be labour intensive, suggesting greater environmental conservation in the face 
of significant morbidity. On the other hand, health may also affect discount rates households use 
when making trade-offs over time. Altered planning horizons due to shortened life expectations 
can undermine incentives to conserve, while increased medical costs and caloric needs can force 
households to liquidate capital, both physical and natural. As morbidity and mortality also decrease 
income, families may increasingly turn to less sustainable activities such as hunting, logging, and 
charcoal making for subsistence needs, precipitating environmental degradation (Joshua et al., 





household member than wealthier households (Tongruksawattana et al., 2008; Rasmus and Lund, 
2009). In some circumstances, these households are even more fragile to health shocks than to 
crop income shocks (Kochar, 1995). As such, this poverty-health-environment link seems to limit 
the prospects for win-win outcomes of conservation-development initiatives proposed by policy 
makers and NGOs, especially if negative shocks of various sorts are likely to propel the poor to 
hit nature hard (Barrett and Arcese, 1998). Knowledge about the mechanisms is important for 
policy purposes. For instance, if differential access to health service were the main reason for the 
observed gradient, then improved access to health care for people around the forest margin would 
be one policy option one could use in order to weaken the gradient.  
This chapter is structured as follows: section 3.2 provides an overview of the health and 
environment nexus in Ethiopia. Section 3.3 outlines the econometric procedure. Section 3.4 
discusses the empirical results, while the final section draws concluding remarks. 
3.2. Overview of the Health and Environment Nexus in Ethiopia 
Millions of poor people in Ethiopia still depend on ecosystems and natural resources for their 
income and livelihoods. However, economic and political processes, often beyond their control, 
continue to degrade these resources in much of the region (Howard and Smith, 2006). There has 
been progressive degradation of forest resources in Ethiopia. Between 1990 and 2000, 141,000 ha 
of forest were lost every year, which equals an average annual deforestation rate of 0.93% (Babulo, 
2007). Between 2000 and 2005, the rate of deforestation increased by 10.4% to 1.03% per year, 
which totals to 14% (or around 2,114,000 hectares) of forest cover loss in the 15 years between 
1990 and 2005 (FAO 2007). 
The challenge of poverty alleviation, promoting the conditions of improved health, securing the 





country is home to about 94 million people many of whom still live in poverty despite recent 
economic growth. The health system of Ethiopia is still in a transitory stage and hence fragile. The 
Ethiopian population faces high rates of morbidity and mortality mainly resulting from a high 
prevalence of communicable infections (WHO 2009). About 75% of the population suffers from 
some type of communicable disease and malnutrition, which are potentially preventable. The 
leading causes of disease and death are malaria, bronchopneumonia and tuberculosis. Widespread 
poverty, along with generally low income levels, low educational levels (especially among 
women), inadequate access to clean water and sanitation facilities, and poor access to health 
services, have contributed to the high burden of ill-health in the country. Health expenditure in 
Ethiopia is still high and out of pocket payment for health care in relation to incomes and the total 
health expenditure is catastrophic7.  
Moreover, health care is predominantly a forest – based service in Sub-Saharan Africa (Barany et 
al. 2001) including Ethiopia. Traditional healers are the dominant providers of medical care in 
forested areas, often providing between 70 and 95 % of primary health care (Colfer et al., 2006). 
Because of remoteness of many rural, and particularly forest dependent, communities, a lack of 
access to health care could be the primary cause for increased reliance on forest medicines and 
traditional healers.  Whether the change in forest resource availability is sudden or gradual, forest 
degradation has potentially negative implications for households affected by illness. Such impacts 
could include: loss of income generating options; increase in labour required to collect forests; 
reduction in use of firewood (possibly leading to inadequate energy to meet household needs 
including cooking and sanitation); and reduced access to medicines (Barany et al.2005). For 
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example, if important medicinal plant species become scarce, the results for an ill individual could 
be a loss of stamina and a compromised immune system. The repercussions of this cycle then could 
be a continued decrease in stamina, increased vulnerability to further infections and other diseases, 
and fewer livelihoods and food security as well as a reduced natural resource base. Thus, in rural 
areas such as Ethiopia, developmental and human health gains depend on ecosystem services 
(Costanza et al., 1997; Daily, 1997) and environmental sustainability is a criterion for population 
health (McMichael, 2002). 
3.3. Theoretical model for Shocks and Labour allocation to Forests 
The theoretical framework underlying the empirical analysis of forest extraction as a coping 
mechanism is based on “new home economics” theory (Becker, 1965) adapted after Volker and 
Waibel (2010) and Ellis (1993). The emphasis of the “new home economics” theory is on the 
household's time allocation assuming that labour is the major factor of production.  Assuming there 
is no access to off-farm wage employment opportunities, figures 3.1 and 3.2 give a graphical 
presentation of the basic home economics household model showing household output in relation 
to available time. Time, depicted on the horizontal axis of the graphs, is divided into labour for 
agriculture (0TA), forest extraction (TATF) and leisure (TFT).The time constraint is determined 
by the total number of person days available for agricultural production, forest extraction and 
leisure. The graphs depict two scenarios of household labour allocation comparing a situation with 
and without shocks. Figure 3.1 represents a weather shock scenario with effects on agricultural 
output while Figure 3.2 represents a scenario where a family member is falling sick with 






Adapted after Ellis (1993) and Volker and Waibel (2010) 
Figure 3. 1 The Household Production Model under a weather Shock Scenario 
To explore in more details the effects of a covariate weather shock on the time allocation of the 
household Figure. 3.1 is used as a framework. Weather shocks such as heavy rain or flooding lower 
agricultural output. A key assumption of the model is that weather risk associated with agricultural 
production is uncorrelated with forest extraction risk (as also suggested by McSweeney, 2004) and 
that even for weather risks like storms the effect on forests is comparatively small (unless it is an 
extremely strong typhoon) due to the diversity of products which can be extracted. Therefore the 
effect of a weather shock is modelled solely by its effect on the household's agricultural production 
function while the household's average returns to forest extraction (ARF) remain unaffected. 
Weather shocks reduce the household's agricultural production output in the form of crop yields 





production function changes (APF to APF') and reflects a relatively poor input-output response as 
compared to the baseline scenario. Using the same amount of time for farm work, the household 
produces less output because the marginal productivity of time allocated to agricultural production 
has decreased. This results in a new equilibrium of the household in agricultural production (point 
A′ instead of point A), which shows that the household allocates less time to agriculture (0TA′ 
instead of 0TA) and accordingly more time to forest extraction (TA′TF instead of TATF). The 
time allocated to leisure remains the same as neither the indifference curve nor the average returns 
to forest extraction are assumed to be altered by the weather shock. Consequences of ex-ante 
weather risk can be modelled accordingly by assuming that households make time allocation 
decisions based on expected states of nature, meaning that pessimistic households face a relatively 
poor subjective ex-ante input– output response curve regarding agricultural production as 






Adapted after Ellis (1993) and Volker and Waibel (2010) 
Figure 3. 2  The Household Production Model under a health shock scenario 
Figure 3.2 analyses the effects of a health shock. Health shocks relate to active household members 
who become ill. Illnesses of household members are assumed to have two effects. On the one hand, 
they reduce the total household time capacity if the affected household member is not able to carry 
out the normal amount of work. This is reflected by a shortening of the horizontal axis to the left. 
On the other hand, the household faces additional needs for health care which increases the family's 
preferences for consumption goods instead of leisure. This is reflected by the shape and position 





scenario (I′ instead of I). Provided the household is able to reallocate leisure time to forest 
extraction, a new equilibrium in the consumption of goods emerges (point B′), which shows that 
the household allocates less time to leisure (TF′T′ instead of TFT) and accordingly more time to 
forest extraction (TATF ′ instead of TATF). The optimal production level of consumption goods 
(point A) remains the same as both the agricultural production function and the average returns to 
forest extraction are assumed to remain unaffected by the health shock. Again, consequences of 
respective ex-ante risk can be modelled accordingly. Households who have pessimistic 
expectations about future health shocks might face a shallower income–leisure indifference curve 
as they may want to accumulate savings for future times of hardship. The theoretical model 
suggests the hypothesis that a covariate weather shock and an idiosyncratic health shock, as well 
as decision makers' future expectations of such risks will make the household allocate more labour 
to forest extraction. 
3.4. Econometric Methodology 
 3.4.1. Instrumental Variables (IV) Approach 
Our main objective in this chapter is to measure the role of forests in coping with idiosyncratic 
shocks. The main econometric issue that arises in attempting to identify this role is the potential 
endogeneity of those shocks. For instance the standard probit estimate of the effect of weather  
shocks on forest labour supply could suffer from endogeneity bias as forest extraction in previous 
periods may determine both the frequency of weather shocks (because forest extraction 
deteriorates the erosion protection function of forests) and the probability of engaging in forest 
extraction (Volker and Waibel,2010). In addition, the perception of being sick or being healthy 





not need to worry about this. However, it is possible that the likelihood of reporting illness is 
closely related to the socio-economic status of the household (for example the income of the 
household or the education level of the most educated member of the family).  In fact, Dercon et 
al. (2005) argued that illness shocks appear more important for richer households as measured by 
relative landholding in Ethiopia.   
Additionally, our sample consists of households who have been exposed to the treatment (a health 
shock) and those who have not been. If households in the treatment group have a better knowledge 
about how to prevent sickness, or have better coping strategies because of training provided by the 
health service provider, then we could expect that either households in the treatment group are 
systematically less exposed to shocks or even when they experience such a shock we would not 
observe significant difference in coping strategies because of the specific awareness given to them.   
The presence of this unobserved heterogeneity could bias our results, so to deal with it we need to 
search for a variable that is correlated with the shock but does not directly affect participation in 
forest environmental resource extraction, and is not correlated with the idiosyncratic and covariate 
error term. Accordingly, we follow an instrumental variables (IV) approach to overcome this 
problem. The instrumental variables that we use are (1) Kebele (Tabia) rainfall, and (2) distance 
to health center. Rainfall is a good instrument because it is  an exogenous variable to the 
households and cannot directly affect the outcome variable.  Distance to clinic is also selected as 
an instrument, as it is assumed to be a significant determinant of households’ reporting of illness 
shocks. However, it is unlikely that distance to clinic has a significant direct effect on forest 
activity.  
 For the participation in forest sales, we used an IV Probit since the dependent variable is binary: 





However, forest dependency and number of trips for forest collection can take a value of zero with 
positive probability, as many households do not participate in forest environmental resource 
extraction (in our sample almost 15% of the households do not participate in forest extraction). In 
order to deal with a censored sample we conducted estimation using instrumental variables two-
stage least squares.   
 3.4.2. Using Alternative Estimation Techniques 
To supplement the results from IV, we also chose to adopt the propensity score matching (PSM) 
strategy of Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) that is now widely used in the program evaluation 
literature8. Typically, we would expect that the likelihood of reporting illness is closely related to 
individual/household characteristics. We therefore match households based on demographic, asset 
and institutional variables. This is essentially the route taken by Smith (2004) in that the onset of 
health shock is assumed exogenous (conditional on a set of observed covariates) in the labour 
outcomes equation.  
Our empirical strategy relies on the possibility of conditioning on sufficient observable 
information to obtain a credible counterfactual against which we may measure the impact of the 
health shock. Let T =1, 0 indicate treatment (health shock) and control (no health shock) 
respectively and let 𝑌𝑌1 and 𝑌𝑌0  denote the outcome of interest (number of trips to forest) for 
households with treatment and without treatment respectively. Since we observe households to be 
                                                     
8  In our case, PSM compares households who reported illness to those that did not, with the same (or similar) values 
of those variables thought to influence both illness and coping strategy. We can thinkof households reporting illness 
in our sample as the treatment group and the households that did not as the control group, following the program 
evaluation literature. Under the matching assumption, the only remaining difference between the two groups is 
reported sickness. Any difference in outcome between these two groups can be entirely attributed to the sickness effect 
provided we  have made sufficient arguments to guarantee that there are no further systematic differences between 





either with treatment or without treatment, we cannot observe the causal effect of interest: 𝑌𝑌1 - 𝑌𝑌0 
. Some features of this distribution are estimable, nevertheless. In particular, we may consider the 
Average Treatment Effect of the Treated (ATT): 
ATT = 𝐸𝐸�𝑌𝑌1 −  𝑌𝑌0 │𝑇𝑇 = 1�                                                                                          (3.1) 
This magnitude measures how much the outcome of interest changes on average for those 
households who undergo the treatment (who suffer the health shock to be defined below). Clearly, 
simply computing the difference in the average outcomes of those under treatment and those not 
under treatment is open to bias, as there are observed and unobserved characteristics that determine 
whether the household undergoes the treatment. That is,  
𝐸𝐸�𝑌𝑌1│𝑇𝑇 = 1� - 𝐸𝐸�𝑌𝑌0│𝑇𝑇 = 0� = 
𝐸𝐸�𝑌𝑌1│𝑇𝑇 = 1� - 𝐸𝐸�𝑌𝑌0│𝑇𝑇 = 1� + 𝐸𝐸�𝑌𝑌0│𝑇𝑇 = 1� - 𝐸𝐸�𝑌𝑌0│𝑇𝑇 = 0� = 
𝐸𝐸�𝑌𝑌1 − 𝑌𝑌0│𝑇𝑇 = 1� + 𝐸𝐸�𝑌𝑌0│𝑇𝑇 = 1� - 𝐸𝐸�𝑌𝑌0│𝑇𝑇 = 0� =                                                          (3.2) 
𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 �
𝐸𝐸�𝑌𝑌1−𝑌𝑌0│𝑇𝑇=1�
   +   𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵���
�𝑌𝑌0│𝑇𝑇=1� − 𝐸𝐸�𝑌𝑌0│𝑇𝑇=0�
 
Only if we can guarantee that outcomes of the control group are equal on average to what the 
outcomes of the treatment group would have been in the absence of treatment does this consistently 
estimate the ATT. With non-random sorting into treatment and control, this condition is rarely 
met. 
Now suppose that by conditioning on an appropriate set of observables, X, the non-participation 
outcome 𝑌𝑌0 is independent of the participation status T. This is the weak version of the un-





1983) or conditional assumption (Lechner, 2000) or selection on the observables, which suffices 
when the parameter of interest is the ATT, as only assumptions about the potential outcomes of 
comparable individuals are needed to estimate counterfactuals. 
𝑌𝑌0 ┴ 𝑇𝑇│X                                                                                                               (3.3) 
This implies that  
𝐸𝐸�𝑌𝑌0│𝑇𝑇 = 1,𝑋𝑋� - 𝐸𝐸�𝑌𝑌0│𝑇𝑇 = 0,𝑋𝑋� = 0                                                                 (3.4)         
In order to identify the ATT, the overlap or common–support condition is also assumed. It ensures 
that, for each treated household, there are control households with the same X. 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃�𝑇𝑇 = 1│𝑋𝑋� < 1                                                                                                 (3.5) 
Therefore, under the assumptions stated in equation (3.3) and (3.5) above, we could estimate the 
ATT from the differences in outcomes between treated and controls within each cell defined by 
the conditioning variables (Blundell and Costa Dias, 2002). Using the law of iterated expectations 
and the conditional independence assumption, the ATT can be retrieved from observed data in the 
following way:  
ATT   = 𝐸𝐸�𝑌𝑌1│𝑇𝑇 = 1� - 𝐸𝐸�𝑌𝑌0│𝑇𝑇 = 1� 
          =  𝐸𝐸𝑋𝑋 ��𝐸𝐸�𝑌𝑌1│𝑋𝑋,𝑇𝑇 = 1� − 𝐸𝐸�𝑌𝑌0│𝑋𝑋,𝑇𝑇 = 1�� │𝑇𝑇 = 1� 
          = 𝐸𝐸𝑋𝑋 ��𝐸𝐸�𝑌𝑌1│𝑋𝑋,𝑇𝑇 = 1� − 𝐸𝐸�𝑌𝑌0│𝑋𝑋,𝑇𝑇 = 0�� │𝑇𝑇 = 1�                                    (3.6) 
The estimate of ATT as shown in equation (3.6) turns out to be prohibitive in terms of data when 





Rubin (1983, 1984) and condition on the probability of treatment as a function of X, the propensity 
score  𝑃𝑃(𝑋𝑋) , since the conditional independence assumption also implies that 
𝐸𝐸 �𝑌𝑌0│𝑇𝑇 = 1,𝑃𝑃(𝑋𝑋)� - 𝐸𝐸 �𝑌𝑌0│𝑇𝑇 = 0,𝑃𝑃(𝑋𝑋)� = 0                                                      (3.7) 
Therefore, we could estimate ATT from the differences in outcomes between treated and controls 
within each cell defined by values of P(X). 
ATT   = 𝐸𝐸�𝑌𝑌1│𝑇𝑇 = 1� - 𝐸𝐸�𝑌𝑌0│𝑇𝑇 = 1� 
          =  𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃(𝑋𝑋) ��𝐸𝐸�𝑌𝑌1│𝑃𝑃(𝑋𝑋),𝑇𝑇 = 1� − 𝐸𝐸�𝑌𝑌0│𝑃𝑃(𝑋𝑋),𝑇𝑇 = 1�� │𝑇𝑇 = 1� 
              = 𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃(𝑋𝑋) ��𝐸𝐸�𝑌𝑌1│𝑃𝑃(𝑋𝑋),𝑇𝑇 = 1� − 𝐸𝐸�𝑌𝑌0│𝑃𝑃(𝑋𝑋),𝑇𝑇 = 0�� │𝑇𝑇 = 1�                   (3.8) 
Provided that the conditional participation probability can be estimated using a parametric method 
such as a probit model, matching on the univariate propensity score reduces the dimensionality 
problem. 
To estimate the propensity score we estimate a probit model with binary dependent variable 
whether a member of household was reported to be sick (=1) or not (=0) using our sample data. 
So, we control for unobservables that may influence households’ reporting of sickness. We then 
discard observations that do not have any common support and observations with households 
having very low or very high probability of sickness. We consider nearest neighbourhood and 
kernel matching. Thus we combine matching with the IV approach (due to measurement error) to 
estimate the effects of health shocks, and the role of forests in mitigating the consequences of 





3.5. Results and Discussion 
3.5.1. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3.1 presents the definitions and sample statistics of the variables used in the analysis. Panel 
A (Table 3.7) shows the treatment variable. We use self- reported health shocks: respondents in 
our survey were asked about new or ongoing and past illness of all household members in the 
household. This measure, while being simple to understand and compute is not particularly 
informative because of its binary nature. The problem is that an individual’s self-reported health 
status is subjectively affected by an individual’s social and cultural background, given the 
individual’s subjective health. Schultz and Tansel (1997) argue that this is because of “cultural 
conditioning”: the threshold of what is considered good health varies systematically across society, 
controlling for their subjective health status. For example, individuals who are more educated are 
wealthier and from socially advantaged groups, are typically more aware of the limitations 
imposed on them by their health status and are more likely to report themselves (and their family) 
as being of poor health.  To control these unobservable characteristics of reporting health related 
shocks to the researcher, we used a rich data set of control variables based on the literature.  19 % 
of sample households report that some member of their household was affected by health related 
shocks in the survey year.  The average frequency of shocks due to illness was 2.12. 
<< INSERT TABLE 3.1 ABOUT HERE >> 
Table 3.1 also presents descriptive statistics on other socio-economic and demographic factors. On 
average the age of the household head is 46.7 years and she/he has less than 2 years of formal 
education. Almost 85% of the households in the sample are male headed. The average size of the 





respectively. In terms of asset holdings, the average size of land holding in Tsimdi (= 0.25 hectare) 
is 4.36 while the average number of livestock owned in TLU is 3.11.  
<< INSERT TABLE 3.2 ABOUT HERE >> 
 Also presented in table 3.2 is the difference in means of the variables for households affected by 
health related shocks and those that were not, alongside their significance levels. The significance 
levels suggest that there are some differences between the two groups with respect to socio-
demographic characteristics. With regard to the outcome variables, there appear to be statistically 
significant differences between both groups. For example, the average forest income for 
households that have been affected by health related shocks was 3427 Ethiopian Birr, while the 
corresponding figure for households that did not report the same shock was 2534 Ethiopian Birr. 
In terms of forest dependency, households affected by the shock earn 31 % of their income from 
forests, while the same figure for the latter was only 24%. Finally, there is also a significant 
difference in the average trips for collection of forest environmental resources. On average 
households affected by health related shocks made 92.9 trips to collect forest environmental 
resources, while the corresponding figure for the control groups was 70.6.  
<<INSERT TABLE 3.2>> 
The findings from the previous section that simply compare mean differences in the outcome 
variables and other socio-demographic variables between the two groups suggest that households 
that are affected by health related shocks are generally more dependent on forest environmental 
resources than their counterparts. Given that comparisons of mean differences do not account for 
the effect of other characteristics of farm households, they may confound the effect of health 





approaches, that account for the selection bias arising from the fact that households reporting 
illness shocks and those that did not may be systematically different, are essential in providing 
sound estimates of the health shocks and participation in forest environmental resource extraction.   
 
 3.5.2. Instrumental Variable Results 
The results of the IV Probit model9 for participation in forest commercialization are shown in table 
3.3.  Our parameter estimate indicates that age of the household head is negatively correlated with 
forest environmental resource commercialization. This is expected since the physical demands of 
forest activities should make forest commercialization less accessible to elderly households. The 
number of adult male households and dependency ratio are positively correlated with  participation 
in forest related activities. With more adult members, households may have access to labour that 
could be involved in forest activity. Households with more dependents have higher food demand 
above what they produce, and depend on forest income to fill this gap. Households who have 
jewellery are less likely to participate in forest resources commercialization. This is also expected 
since jewellery is a relatively liquid asset that can be sold in response to price signals to smooth 
consumption, or to provide financial capital to start business. Households who are members of the 
household extension package, and have their own business, are less likely to participate in forest 
resource commercialization. These highly and statistically significant results of the two variables 
                                                     
9The instrumental variable regression is a two-stage regression where the first –stage regresses health shock on the 
instruments, in addition to other covariates. The second stage IV regression uses predicted values of health shocks 






support the idea that the household extension package that provides credit in cash or in kind helps 
poor households to diversify income and free up other sources of financing that can be used to 
directly smooth consumption.  Access to irrigation was found to have a negative and significant 
effect on forest resource commercialization. This may be because with irrigation households can 
harvest more and  engage themselves in high yielding agricultural activities instead of forest 
resources extraction which has been termed “ an activity of the last resort” (Angelson and Wunder 
2003).  
<< INSERT TABLE 3.3 ABOUT HERE >> 
  Results from table 3.4 also show that forest dependency (share of forest income to the total 
household income) is negatively correlated with age and education of the household head, access 
to irrigation and liquid assets, ownership of business, access to transfers, extension package and 
awareness of climate change, while it is positively correlated with the number of dependents at the 
household level.  A similar trend was also observed in table 3.5.  
The final step of the empirical analysis is to examine the effect that health-related shocks have on 
the probability of participating in forest resources commercialization.  To do so we include in the 
estimations a dummy variable (ill_hhs)  that takes the value of one, if according to the information 
obtained from the household questionnaire,  the household were affected by health related shocks. 
Nevertheless, it could be argued that the causality could go the other way as participation in forest 
resource commercialization might affect the probability that a given household member is affected 
by health related shocks. For example, one could think that forest resource commercialization in a 





deteriorates the quality of forests10 and causes deforestation11) and the probability of engaging in 
forest resource commercialization. Simply put, there is a potential endogeneity12 problem when 
the variable (ill_hhs) is included in the econometric analysis. In fact, the Wald test for the variable 
(ill_hhs) shows that the variable is endogenous. 
Turning to our variable of interest, health shocks, we find that health shocks related to a household 
member has a highly significant positive impact on participation in forest environmental resources 
sales. This echoes  previous studies of the “Natural Insurance” literature (Pattanayak and Sills, 
2001; McSweeney 2004; Takasaki et al.2004; Fisher et al. 2010) and may reflect that good health 
signals to prospective employers an individual’s potential productivity, increasing the likelihood 
of being hired in relatively remunerative labour markets rather than engaging in  forest related 
activities.  
<< INSERT TABLE 3.4 and 3.5 ABOUT HERE >> 
 3.5.3. Propensity Score Matching Results 
  3.5.3.1. Propensity Scores   
                                                     
10Villages with a greater percentage of their forests under primary forest cover (as opposed to regenerating, or 
secondary forests, or agricultural lands) have lower incidence of child malaria when compared with villages with 
lower percentages of primary forests. 
11Deforestation can also affect the local climate and thereby affect the spread of diseases by reducing moisture held 
by the vegetation, and raising ground temperatures.  
12A wald test examines evidence of the correlation between unobserved explanatory variables from the equation to 
test the null hypothesis that there is no endogeneity bias (ill_hhs is not influenced by unobserved heterogeneity) i.e. ρ 
= 0. If the test shows that ρ is insignificant, then ill_hhs is not endogenous in the regression and the model can be 
estimated separately. However, if ρ is significant (i.e.ρ≠0) then endogeneity of the variable (ill_hhs) is confirmed. 
 
Regarding the relevance of the instruments, the weak identification F-statistic is way greater than the usual accepted 
(F≥ 10) for all specifications. This is an indication of strong instruments and the over-identification test result of 0.009 






Measuring forest dependency as the difference in mean outcomes between all households reporting 
to have been affected by health related shocks and those not affected by the same shock may give 
biased estimates of the health related shocks. This bias arises if there are unobserved characteristics 
that affect the probability of reporting health related shocks in the household. One important source 
of this bias includes reporting of health related shocks based on the characteristics unobservable 
to the researcher. The Propensity Score Matching (PSM) estimator used in this analysis helps to 
control for  these sources of selection bias and provides reliable, low – bias estimators of the impact 
of illness provided sufficient control variables relevant to modelling health related shocks are used 
(Heckman et al. 1997). Our data set contains a rich data set of conditioning variables to control for 
households reporting illness or health related shocks.  
 It has been widely documented that people of higher socio-economic position enjoy better health. 
This socio-economic gradient in health seems to hold up irrespective of what health measures are 
used (see e.g. Marmot 1999 and Smith 1998). People with higher education and income report 
worse health for a given condition (Etile and Milcent 2006).On the other hand, Pattanayak 
et.al.(2011) reported that individuals from lower socio-economic groups not only suffer from 
frequent health shocks but also suffer disproportionately  for a given health shock.  To capture this 
effect we include control variables which include whether the household head is educated or not, 
total asset value owned by the household, financial value owned, access to transfer, financial 
saving, and total expenditure per adult equivalent. 
Access to credit can improve households’ ability to cope with risks and reduce the risks they face. 





access to credit on reporting health shocks. We also include awareness to climate change13 and 
membership in local institutions to indicate the breadth and depth of household social 
connectedness to identify the role of these connections and access to information in reporting 
health shocks.   
Finally, we include demographic factors (such as age of household head, number of adult male  
and number of adult female household members) associated with vulnerability to health shocks 
and our outcome variables. Adult household members, for example, may be correlated with 
exposure to participate in forest extraction because as a household member reaches adulthood, 
he/she participates in a greater number of chores, such as fuel wood and water collection, that 
involve going into forests. In addition, many cultures are preferential to boys so it is possible that 
girls will suffer from more diseases than boys will (Akin et al. 1985). Different behaviours between 
boys and girls could also lead to differences in disease rates (Kondrashin and Orlov 1989) and thus 
in reporting of vulnerability to health related shocks. With this rich set of control variables one can 
capture many of the determinants of reporting health related stocks that are typically unobservable 
to the researcher, which helps to reduce  potentially significant sources of bias in the propensity 
score matching estimators. 
Table 3.6 presents the empirical results of reporting illness used to create propensity scores for the 
matching algorithm. Results of the econometric analysis confirm that education level of the 
household, access to credit and membership in household extension packages and access to 
transfer (remittances) were associated with a higher probability of reporting illness. This echoes 
the findings of Etile and Milcent (2006); d’Uva et al.(2008) that people with higher education and 
                                                     
13  We believe that households who are aware of  climate change may take adaptation measures to avoid health related 





income report worse health for a given condition. Similarly, number of adult female household 
members had a significant and positive effect on reporting illness. As argued before, many cultures 
are preferential to boys so it is possible that girls suffer more from diseases than boys do (Akin et 
al., 1985). Interestingly, the number of months that the household had enough food stock is 
associated with a lower probability of reporting illness. Arguably, households with enough food 
stock have access to better nutrition and are less likely to be prone to disease.   
Remoteness from basic infrastructure, measured by the distance to the nearest health post as well 
as distance to seasonal road, increases the probability of being sick. This is in line with the findings 
by Klemick et al, (2007) that in rural Tanzania, improvements in roads have a greater impact on 
health care access than improvements in health facilities because travel costs are one of the major 
impediments to health care access. Similarly, villages in Indonesia, the Philippines, and SriLanka 
participating in rural roads projects reported better access to health services based on several 
indicators compared with non-project villages (Hettige 2006). 
<< INSERT TABLE 3. 6 ABOUT HERE>> 
  3.5.3.2. Average Treatment Effect  
Table 3.7 below shows results of the Average Treatment Effects (ATT)  estimated by the nearest 
neighbour and kernel matching techniques for the outcome variables, along with average 
differences and T-values for treated and control groups, where treatment is defined as a binary 
variable which equals one if the household has been affected by health related shocks in 2010, 0 
otherwise. The results from both the matching algorithms produced consistent estimates of the 
treatment effects of health shocks. Focusing first on number of forest collection trips, the ATT 





significant effect on the number of trips for forest collection. The difference in ATT for treated 
and control groups from nearest neighbourhood and the kernel matching results is found to be 18.3 
and 22.4 days per year respectively, These results are significant at 5% and 1% level respectively. 
<< INSERT TABLE 3.7 ABOUT HERE >> 
As shown in panel B of table 3.7 the second outcome estimated for treated and control groups was 
forest dependency (forest income as a proportion of total household income). This was also found 
to be positive and statistically significant, again implying that households affected by health shocks 
are more dependent on forest environmental resources than their counterpart households who were 
not affected by the same shock. The difference in ATT for treated and control groups is 1.5% and 
5.9% for nearest neighbour and kernel matching respectively and both results are significant at the 
10 % level of significance. However, despite a positive difference in the ATT for both groups, we 
found the difference in forest commercialization to be non-significant for non-poor households. 
3.6. Conclusions and Policy Recommendations 
Low and volatile incomes coupled with the absence of or poor development of financial or risk 
sharing institutions make consumption smoothing an important issue in low – income countries 
like Ethiopia (Barrett et al. 2001). One of the most common coping mechanisms in rural areas is 
forest extraction. Yet the empirical literature on forests as a means of risk coping is relatively 
limited, in some cases is qualitative/ethnographic (McSweeney, 2004), considerably smaller than 
that on biodiversity as a source of livelihood (CBD, 2010, Vira and Kontoleon, 2010) and typically 
relates only extraction volume, income, or income share with total income or asset holdings (e.g., 
Cavendish, 2000; Coomes et al., 2001; Godoy et al., 1995). As a result, there is  little systematic 





the poor (and others) deal with negative shocks (McSweeney, 2004).  In this study, we analyse the 
role of forests for coping with idiosyncratic health shocks using sample data from Tigray Region 
in the northern highlands of Ethiopia.  Previous studies used either forest sales or forest collection 
trips to show the role of forests in buffering misfortune. In this paper, we use a  broader approach  
of outcome variables to analyse the issue. In addition, most of the previous economic studies on 
the impact of health effects and coping mechanisms treat them as exogenously given. In our study, 
we employ the Instrumental Variable Approach (IV) techniques and Propensity Score Matching 
(PSM) and thereby account for endogenous factors at the household level that may be associated 
with underlying health and labour allocation to forests. 
In terms of conclusions, first, on a broader and quite positive note, forests appear to play a 
significant role in insuring households against idiosyncratic health shocks. This is in line with 
evidence from a number of different developing countries around the world regarding the role of 
forests in providing “natural insurance” (Pattanayak and Sills, 2001; McSweeney 2004; Takasaki 
et al.2004, Fisher et al .2010).  
Second, access to institutional support and social capital are significantly and negatively related  
to forest dependency, forest sales and forest collection trips. In this regard access to credit, transfer, 
irrigation and ownership of jewellery were found to play a significant role. In addition, households 
who are aware of the change in their local climate tend to have lower trips to forest collection and 
lower forest sales. Finally, our results are robust to  the econometric method  used, i.e. results from 
the IV and PSM models are consistent.  
These findings suggest that in order to achieve a win – win for human and environmental health, 
policies are needed which ensure that local values for forest resources (such as medicinal plants) 





addition, policy makers need to examine rural health delivery to determine the environmental 
consequences of access, or lack thereof, to health services. Also, policy makers need to promote a 
range of development measures such as improved access to credit through household extension 






Table 3. 1 Variables and summary statistics of the sample households 
Variables Descriptions and measurements Mean S.D 
Ill_hhs 1 if the household is affected by health shock, 0 otherwise 0.19 0.39 
Hhh_sex Sex of the household head (1 if male,0 otherwise) 0.85 0.36 
Age_hh_1 Age of the household head in years  46.7 12.5 
Edu_hhh Education of the household head in years  1.17 2.18 
Family_size Number of household members per adult equivalent  5.74 2.11 
Aware_cc Awareness of Climate change in the household( 1= yes, 0 otherwise) 0.35 0.47 
Male_adults Number of male adult labour in the household 1.37 0.91 
Female_adults Number of female adult labour in the household  1.49 0.87 
P_size _tsimdi Plot size of land owned by the household in Tsimdi 4.36 2.93 
Tlu Number of livestock owned by the household in TLU 3.11 2.59 
t_assets Total value of assets owned by the household 1315 2099 
t_hh_income Total household income in Ethiopian Birr 11859 9054 
Fooda_months Number of months in a year that the household had enough food stock 5.7 3.42 
Jewellery Ownership of Jewellery in the household ( 1= yes, 0 otherwise) 0.33 0.47 
D_health_post Distance in minutes to the nearest health center  40.1 42.9 
D_seasonal_road Distance in minutes to the nearest seasonal road  9.1 14.6 
M_hh_package Household is a member of household package (1= yes, 0 otherwise) 0.18 0.37 
Access_extension Access to extension service (=1 yes, 0 otherwise ) 0.84 0.36 
N_ext_visit Number of extension visit per year  7.79 9.92 
D_transfer Dummy if the household access to transfer (=1 yes, 0 otherwise) 0.31 0.46 
Access_irrigation 1 if the household has access to irrigation, 0 otherwise 0.14 0.34 
Log_dis_forests Log transformed distance to forests in minutes 1.71 0.83 
Log_dis_market Log transformed distance to markets in minutes  1.24 1.33 
Southern Zone 1 if the household lives in southern zone, 0 otherwise 0.41 0.49 
South_Eastern 1 if the household lives in southern eastern zone, 0 otherwise 0.20 0.40 
Eastern Zone 1 if the household lives in Eastern zone, 0 otherwise 0.39 0.48 
Average Rainfall in 
mm  








Table 3. 2 Mean Separation Test of households affected by health shock and households that did not 
Variable definition Households 
reported health 
shock  (n= 47) 
Households did 
not report health 
shock (n= 204) 
T-value 
Age of Household head in years  48 (1.660) 46(0.894) 0.446 
Sex of Household Heads (=1 if male, 0, otherwise) 0.89(0.045) 0.83(0.03) 0.342 
Family size of the household  6.1 (0.14) 5.7(0.30) 0.252 
Number of Female Adult household Members  1.83(0.153) 1.42(0.056) 0.003*** 
Number of male Adult household numbers  1.43(0.113) 1.36(0.066) 0.646 
Education of the household head in years  1.45(0.32) 1.10(0.15) 0.331 
Ownership of land in Tsimdi (equals 0.25 hectare) 3.80(0.40) 4.48(0.21) 0.146 
Log total household expenditure per adult equivalent  7.48(0.006) 7.52(0.034) 0.638 
Access to irrigation (=1 if yes , 0 otherwise ) 0.26(0.064) 0.11(0.022) 0.007*** 
Number of months that the household had enough food in a year  4.79(0.480) 5.91(0.240) 0.042** 
Ownership of Land in TLU  3.24(0.36) 3.08(0.18) 0.694 
Forest income in Ethiopian Birr 3427(397.1) 2534(170.2) 0.027** 
Participation in Forest Resource Extraction (=1 if yes, 0, otherwise) 0.91(0.04) 0.83(0.02) 0.160 
Participation in forest Resource Commercialization (=1 if yes, 0 otherwise) 0.40(0.07) 0.31(0.03) 0.236 
Forest Dependency (Share of forest income to overall household income) 0.31(0.035) 0.24(0.014) 0.036** 
Average number of trips to forest per annum  92.9(7.50) 70.6(3.52) 0.006*** 
Access  to any transfer  (=1 if yes, 0, otherwise) 0.43(0.07) 0.28(0.03) 0.051* 
Access to household extension package loans  (=1 if yes, 0, otherwise) 0.32(0.07) 0.13(0.02) 0.002*** 
Participation in the Productive  safety net program (=1 if yes, 0, otherwise) 0.55(0.07) 0.70(0.03) 0.061* 
Access to extension visit (=1 if yes, 0, otherwise) 0.81(0.06) 0.86(0.02) 0.397 
Membership in any organization ((=1 if yes, 0, otherwise) 0.57(0.07) 0.49(0.04) 0.272 
Mean Annual Rainfall in MM 558(12.13) 596(7.21) 0.020** 
Awareness of climate change (=1 if yes, 0 otherwise) 0.47(0.074) 0.33(0.329) 0.071* 
Distance to the nearest health centre in minutes  63.0(7.8) 34.8(2.7) 0.000*** 
Log distance to local Market  3.98(0.177) 3.39(0.100) 0.010** 
Distance to fuel wood collection   7.42(0.66) 10.39(0.47) 0.004*** 
Distance to Seasonal Road  17.8(3.39) 7.09(0.762) 0.000*** 





Significant level: *** = 1%; ** = 5% and * = 10%.  
 
Table 3. 3  IV Probit estimates of health shocks and forest sales 
Variable definition Coefficient  S.E T-value 
Age of the household head  -0.020 0.009 0.023** 
Education of the household head in years  -0.032 0.045 0.478 
Gender of the household head (= 1 if Male, 0 otherwise)  0.009 0.350 0.979 
Average grade of education in the household -0.057 0.051 0.260 
Number of Male Adult household member   0.511 0.240 0.033** 
Number of Female Adult household member   0.248 0.256 0.332 
Number of dependent household members   2.050 0.950 0.031** 
Land owned by the household in Tsimdi -0.037 0.051 0.467 
Number of livestock owned in TLU   0.004 0.042 0.934 
Family size   -0.194 0.119 0.102 
Ownership of Jewellery -0.512 0.208 0.014** 
Dummy if the household is receiving any transfer (=1 if yes, 0 otherwise) -0.284 0.190 0.135 
Access to Irrigation ( = 1 if yes, 0 otherwise) -0.583 0.252 0.020** 
Membership in the Household Extension package(=1 if yes, 0 otherwise)  -0.682 0.272 0.012** 
Awareness of  climate change in the household(=1 if yes, 0 otherwise) -0.062 0.184 0.738 
Access to Extension service (=1 if yes, 0 otherwise) 0.379 0.268 0.157 
Dummy if the household has own business  ( = 1 if yes, 0 otherwise) -0.670 0.240 0.005*** 
Shock related to illness of a household member (=1 if yes, 0 otherwise ) 2.191 0.522 0.000*** 
Constant  -0.270 0.658 0.681 
    
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%,   *** significant at 1 % 
 
 






Table 3. 4  IV2sls estimates of health shocks and forest dependency 
Variable definition Coefficient  S.E T-value 
Age of the household head  -0.004 0.001 0.003*** 
Education of the household head in years  -0.019 0.008 0.017** 
Gender of the household head (= 1 if Male, 0 otherwise) -0.006 0.574 0.918 
Average grade of education in the household  0.003 0.007 0.660 
Number of Male Adult household member  -0.303 0.343 0.376 
Number of Female Adult household member    0.009 0.388 0.822 
Number of dependent household members   0.266 0.164 0.017* 
Land owned by the household in Tsimdi  0.004 0.007 0.580 
Number of livestock owned in TLU  -0.006 0.007 0.410 
Family size   -0.023 0.019 0.230 
Ownership of Jewellery -0.065 0.034 0.056* 
Dummy if the household is receiving any transfer (=1 if yes, 0 otherwise) -0.078 0.039 0.049** 
Access to Irrigation ( = 1 if yes, 0 otherwise) -0.154 0.048 0.002*** 
Membership in the Household Extension package(=1 if yes, 0 otherwise)  -0.156 0.063 0.015** 
Awareness of  climate change in the household(=1 if yes, 0 otherwise) -0.111 0.032 0.001*** 
Access to Extension service (=1 if yes, 0 otherwise) 0.139 0.043 0.749 
Dummy if the household has own business  ( = 1 if yes, 0 otherwise) -0.158 0.034 0.000*** 
Shock related to illness of a household member (=1 if yes, 0 otherwise ) 0.735 0.250 0.003*** 
Constant  0.470 0.106 0.000*** 
    


















Table 3. 5  IV 2slsestimates of health shocks and forest trips 
Variable definition Coefficient  S.E T-value 
Age of the household head  -0.509 0.272 0.061* 
Education of the household head in years  -6.196 1.637 0.000*** 
Gender of the household head (= 1 if Male , 0 otherwise) -1.581 1.671 0.111 
Average grade of education in the household  0.435 1.491 0.771 
Number of Male Adult household member  -6.800 6.970 0.329 
Number of Female Adult household member   1.399 7.883 0.859 
Number of dependent household members   1.475 3.233 0.599 
Land owned by the household in Tsimdi  0.269 1.485 0.856 
Number of livestock owned in TLU  -0.451 1.491 0.762 
Family size    2.872 3.907 0.462 
Ownership of Jewellery -1.663 1.908 0.034** 
Dummy if the household is receiving any transfer (=1 if yes, 0 otherwise) - 2.309 8.016 0.773 
Access to Irrigation ( = 1 if yes, 0 otherwise)  0.409 9.953 0.967 
Membership in the Household Extension package(=1 if yes, 0 otherwise)   1.904 1.793 0.186 
Awareness of  climate change in the household(=1 if yes, 0 otherwise) -1.325 1.601 0.267 
Access to Extension service (=1 if yes, 0 otherwise) 1.853 0.836 0.265 
Dummy if the household has own business  ( = 1 if yes, 0 otherwise) 3.910 2.998 0.576 
Shock related to illness of a household member (=1 if yes, 0 otherwise ) 1.149 0.744 0.063* 
Constant  3.126 1.634 0.001*** 
    





Table 3. 6  Probit estimation of reporting illness 
Variable definition Coefficient  S.E T-value 
Age of the household head   0.01 0.01 0.263 
Education of the household head in years   0.11 0.05 0.049** 
Number of Male Adult household member   0.01 0.13 0.932 
Number of Female Adult household member   0.25 0.13 0.041** 
Total value of Durable  assets owned by the household -0.00 0.00 0.233 
Financial Value of assets owned by the household  3.87 0.00 0.999 
Log total expenditure per adult equivalent   0.27 0.28 0.334 
Membership in social organization ((=1 if yes, 0 otherwise)  0.23 0.22 0.306 
Access to Extension service (=1 if yes, 0 otherwise)  0.15 0.32 0.640 
Membership in the Household Extension package(=1 if yes, 0 otherwise)  1.01 0.31 0.001*** 
Awareness of  climate change in the household(=1 if yes, 0 otherwise)  0.30 0.24 0.219 
Dummy if the household is receiving any transfer (=1 if yes, 0 otherwise)  0.52 0.24 0.029** 
Number of  months that the household had enough food in 2010 -0.08 0.04 0.064* 
Log distance to Forests in minutes   0.21 0.15 0.165 
Distance to the nearest health service in minutes   0.01 0.00 0.077* 
Distance to all weather road in minutes   0.00 0.00 0.558 
Distance to seasonal road in minutes   0.02 0.00 0.077* 
Constant  -4.25 2.17 0.117 
    





Table 3. 7 Differences in ATT for treated and control groups 
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%,   *** significant at 1 % 




   E(Y) 
   H=1 
      E(Y) 
      H=0 
Differences in 
Average outcome 
     (ATT) 
P –Value  
PANEL A:  Number of trips to forests per year  
Treatment : Dummy =1 if the household was affected by health related shocks, 0 otherwise 
Impact       : Mean Impact  
Forest_trips N-neighbor  92.9 74.6 18.3 0.010** 
 K-matching 94.7 72.3 22.4 0.005*** 
PANEL B:  Forest Dependency (Ratio of forest income to overall household income) 
Treatment :  Dummy =1 if the household was affected by health related shocks , 0 otherwise 
Impact       : Mean Impact 
Forest_dep N-neighbor  31.0 29.5 1.5 0.086* 
 K-matching 33.8 27.9 5.9 0.059* 
PANEL C:  Non-Poor Households 
Treatment :  Dummy =1 if the household was affected by health related shocks , 0 otherwise 
Impact       : Mean Impact 
Forest_sales N-neighbor  61.7 40.4 21.3 0.242 






FOREST – FOOD SECURITY LINKAGES IN NORTH HIGHLANDS OF ETHIOPIA: SAFETY 
NETS OR POVERTY TRAPS? 
4.1. Introduction 
The importance of NTFP (non-timber forest products) captured the imagination of conservationists 
around the world, when an article by Peters et al (1989) published in Nature claimed that more 
money could be earned from tropical forests by collecting these products than from logging 
(Kaimowitz, 2004). The perception that NTFPs are more accessible to rural populations, especially 
to the rural poor (Saxena 2003) and that their exploitation is more benign than timber harvesting 
(Myers 1988) favored NTFP collection becoming an ecologically acceptable economic option for 
development. There was also an assumption, often implicit, that making forests more valuable to 
local users can encourage forest conservation (Plotkin and Famolare, 1992). As a result NTFP-
based development was born as a new development paradigm capable of accommodating many 
potentially conflicting needs: of local livelihoods and of global markets;  of balancing regional 
developmental aspirations with that of national growth; and above all that of reconciling 
environmental and development goals.  
These developments initiated an increased level of research investigations and publications in the 
last two decades on different aspects of NTFP and in the process supported the global NTFP 
discussion leading to policy changes in many countries. However, the NTFP statistics in the form 
of macro and micro-economic indicators, portrayed in these discourses with varied degrees of 





refocusing of the development agenda on poverty has led to recent reassessment of the role that 
bio-diversity plays in livelihoods and poverty alleviation. A profusion of new commentary has 
emerged. This poses many fresh questions, and, to some extent, tempers previous optimism 
regarding the ability of this sector to make a difference by providing a more subtle and complex 
picture of livelihood – biodiversity linkages.  For example, Neumann and Hirch(2000) present 
evidence from an array of studies that show NTFP extraction is an activity of the poor, and Wunder 
(2001) and Angesen and Wunder(2003) argue that optimism about a win – win for development 
and conservation is unwarranted, and that NTFP extraction is generally a low- income activity that 
may even result in a poverty trap. The general conclusion is that the safety net and poverty trap 
aspects of NTFPs are linked, in as much as features that make non-timber forest products attractive 
to the poor also limit their potential for generating higher income and escaping their poverty 
(Angelson et al, 2007).  However, many of the existing arguments and conclusions made on the 
link between poverty and biodiversity do not support their claims with strong evidence. Full 
understanding of the links between biodiversity and poverty require the ability to make causal 
inferences about the counterfactual, and few of the previous studies do this14. As a result, they 
have limitations in shedding light on the nature and the extent of linkages between biodiversity 
and poverty and hence miss opportunities for identifying common causes and common solutions 
to the two issues (Roe, 2005). 
In a wide ranging review on the research done on the link between poverty and biodiversity, (CBD, 
2010) reported that if nature’s resources help to temporarily smooth consumption and incomes, 
their impacts may be better captured through an explicit focus on this temporality as part of our 
                                                     
14Delacote (2007) analyzes the role of the commons as insurance and how it might be linked to a 





poverty measure, instead of annualized income or consumption (in which these temporary 
contributions do not always feature as significant) (CBD, 2010). This relative importance of the 
temporality contribution of forests and the relative dearth of attention given to it by researchers 
and policy makers alike raise the possibility of significant untapped potential of forests to rural 
livelihoods, and provides an opportunity to increase our understanding about the specific roles of 
forests in different contexts and a significant impact for high quality research that tackles this topic. 
The main objective of this research is therefore to investigate the role of forest environmental 
resources in household food security and its implications on the long-term livelihood of farm 
households living along the margins of protected forests in the northern high lands of Ethiopia.  
Our study contributes to the existing literature on biodiversity and poverty in two ways: first unlike 
the previous works done we are explicitly focusing on the temporality contribution of forests along 
with annualized consumption; second, we employ the Propensity Score Matching (PSM) method 
to consider the causal relationship between participation in forest environmental resource 
extraction and food security indicators,  to address the counterfactual questions that may be 
significant in informing policy makers on the impact of forest environmental resources on the 
welfare of rural households in developing countries such as Ethiopia. 
The chapter is structured as follows: Section 4.2 provides a review of literature on the role of 
forests as safety nets. Section 4.3 provides an overview of food security and forest environmental 
resources in Ethiopia. Section 4.4 provides a description of data. Section 4.5 discusses 
thetheoretical framework and empirical procedure of the study. Section 4.6 presents the empirical 
results, while section 4.7 explains households’ choice of participation in forest environmental 





4.2. Review of Related Literature on the safety net role of Forests 
Several studies have examined the extent to which poor people depend upon biodiversity as means 
of subsistence or income to the poor and as insurance to the poor from risks and shocks(CBD, 
2010).A substantial amount of the existing literature examines the dependency of the poor on 
biodiversity reflected in the proportion of income that is derived from forests (Vira  and Kontoleon 
2010), on income equity effects (e.g. Babulo et al., 2009) and on correlations rather than causal 
effects of income from forest environmental resources on household welfare (Pattanayak and Sills 
2001). A few studies assess the role of tropical forests (and hence biodiversity rich ecosystems) as 
an insurance against food security (and income) variability (CBD, 2010; Vira and Kontoleon 
2010). 
Forest resources, such as non-timber forest products (NTFPs), have long served as safety nets or 
“natural insurance” to help cope with environmental and economic shocks (Angelsen & Wunder, 
2003; Shively, 1997, Fisher et al., 2010), and are an important part of livelihood strategies in sub-
Saharan Africa (Cavendish, 2000; Paumgarten, 2005; Shackleton &Shackleton, 2004; Mamo et 
al., 2007 Babulo et al., 2009). Rural households, which have limited credit and insurance options, 
choose a diversification of their activities in order to reduce aggregate risk (Delacote, 2007). For 
example, Fisher et al, (2010) in their study of southern Malawi found that forests are providing a 
source of cash for coping with weather related crop failure. They also found that   households most 
reliant on forests have low income per person, are located close to forests, and are headed by 
individuals who are older, more risk averse, and less educated than their counterparts who are less 
forest-dependent. Similarly, Volker and Waibel (2010) found that households in Vietnam who are 
affected by idiosyncratic health shocks, experienced by economically active household members, 





argued that shocks tend to lead rural households in Uganda to depend on forests to meet subsistence 
and cash needs. In Kenya and Tanzania, six out of 16 strategies for dealing with drought involved 
the use of indigenous plant species found in forests (Eriksen et al., 2005). Forest gathering was 
also an important strategy for coping with covariate flood shocks in Peru, particularly in 
households with few physical assets and more adult members (Takasaki et al., 2004). Similar 
findings are reported in Pattanayk and Sills (2001); McSweeney (2003); Fisher and Shively 
(2005).Hence, at least for the case of poor communities living close to tropical forests, there 
appears to be support for conjecture that forests act as a safety net against food insecurity (and 
income) variability (CBD, 2010; Vira and Kontoleon, 2010).  
However, even if the above papers studied the insurance role of common property resources, many 
other researchers argued that resource reliance may represent a strategy that prevents the poor from 
participating fruitfully in other activities and escaping their poverty (Angelsen et al., 2007). Indeed 
existing overviews (Byron and Arnold 1999; Neumann and Hirsch 2000) suggest that most NTFPs 
produce low returns (particularly in terms of return per ha and often, also per labour unit), are 
primarily used for subsistence and often fill income gaps.  They are accessible to the poor people 
precisely because no one else wants them. In economic terms, many are inferior goods which are 
substituted by superior products when incomes rise (Arnold and Perez 2001), and/or become 
intensively cultivated, in which case poorer people may be less well-placed to benefit (Homma 
1996, Ruiz-Perez et al. 2003).  
Delacote (2007) analyses the use ofthe commons as insurance, exploring whether the commons 
are a safety net or poverty trap. However, his work is applied theoretic, and was not tested 





it is a safety net or a poverty trap in the context of rural households who are dependent on forest 
environmental resources as part of their livelihood strategy.  
4.3. Food Security and Common Pool Resources use in Ethiopia 
Chronic food insecurity has been a defining feature of the poverty that has affected millions of 
Ethiopians for decades. The vast majority of these very poor households live in rural areas that are 
heavily reliant on rain fed agriculture and thus, in years of poor rainfall, the threat of widespread 
starvation is high (Hoddinott et al., 2009). Moreover, many smallholder farmers in the region need 
to supplement the income derived from rain fed agriculture. Income from forest products 
contributes as high as 27% and 39% for rural households living close to natural forests in Northern 
and Central Ethiopia, respectively (Babulo et al., 2009; Mamo et al., 2007). Studies have also 
shown that forest dependent people are poorer, live close to the forest, are younger, and have lower 
livestock and crop income (Illukpitiya and Yanagida, 2008; McElwee, 2008; Mamo et al., 2007). 
These factors often interact with one another resulting in a reinforcing cycle of the “poverty, food 
insecurity and natural resources degradation trap”. This problem is most acute in the Ethiopian 
highlands (where over 85 percent of the country’s population lives), which is affected by recurrent 
drought and famine affecting millions of people (FAO 2003).    
To mitigate  this poverty and  resource degradation, closing degraded land areas from human and 
livestock intervention to promote natural regeneration of plants, commonly termed as enclosures, 
is among the major  efforts to constrain resource use practiced in the highland areas of Tigray, 
northern Ethiopia (Tewelde-Berhan, 2002; Babulo, 2007).However, the adoption of restrictive use 
rules and the limitation in allowable harvests have led many local residents to view enclosures as 
a less favoured land use option (Babulo, 2007). There is also consensus in the relevant literature 





most people are so far minimal (Howard and Smith, 2006).  These arguments are partly because 
of a lack of clear understanding about the contribution of forest environmental resources to the 
food security of rural households in the region.  
4.4. Data Description 
A household survey was conducted in 2010/11 on 254 households in Tigray region of northern 
Ethiopia. A two stage sampling design was made in the study. The primary sampling units (PSUs) 
were tabias. Sample tabias were selected on the basis of secondary information collected from all 
the Woredas. In this category, a total of ten tabias namely Arato, Derga _ajen, Hugumrda, 
Meswaeti, Kara_adishawo, WorebayuKal_amin, Kelisha_emni,andFelege_woini were selected 
for the survey (see Figure 2.1). The tabias selected are representative of the three different agro-
ecological zones of the region identified on the basis of altitude. Areas with altitude ranging from 
1500- 2300 m.a.s.l. are locally termed as woinadouga i.e. midland areas, areas above 2300 m.a.s.l. 
are locally known as dougai.e. Highland areas and areas with altitude less than 1500 m.a.s.l. are 
termed as kola i.e., lowland. A multi-purpose questionnaire was used to gather information on 
household income, expenditure, household assets, vulnerability to shocks, labor allocation and 
local institutions alongside a host of other information related to production and sales. 
The purpose of this part of the analysis is to examine the relationship between forest dependency 
and food security. The dependent variable used in the study is a dummy variable that takes the 
value of one, if the household participated in forest environmental resource extraction, and a value 
zero, if no participation was recorded. The outcome variables used in this study are log transformed 
total per capita expenditure per adult equivalent (Log_tot_exp_aue), the number of months in a 
year that the household had enough food stock available (Fooda_months), and one binary indicator 





the farming season, zero otherwise. These food security indicators were chosen to be in line with 
those suggested in  the literature (Owusu and Abdulai, 2011). 
<< INSERT TABLES 4.1 AND 4.2 ABOUT HERE >> 
Table4.1 presents the definitions and sample statistics of the variables used in the analysis. Table 
4.2 presents differences in means of the variables used in the matching analyses along with their 
significance levels. The significance levels suggest that there are some differences between 
participants and non-participants with respect to household and outcome variables. With regards 
to the outcome variables, there appear to be statistically significant differences in household total 
per capita expenditure per adult equivalent, distress sales and in the number of months in a year 
that the household had enough food stock available between participants and non-participants. 
There are also significant differences in sex and education of household head, household size, 
awareness of climate change, net financial assets, total assets, off farm income and total farm 
income. 
There is a significant difference between participants and non-participants regarding awareness of 
climate change. 31% of the participants have awareness of climate change compared to 58% of 
non-participants;this suggests awareness of climate change might reduce participation in extractive 
activities. There are also significant differences between participants and non-participants in terms 
of education:on average, participants have a lower number of years of formal education than non-
participants. With more education, households may access a broad variety of livelihood activities, 
have higher opportunity cost of time (Adhikari et al., 2004) and may disregard the collection of 
forest resources. In addition, participants have lower value of total assets, net financial assets and 
durable assets compared to their non-participant counterparts. As argued by Angelsen and Wunder 





may give less priority to environmental resource incomes, which are often considered 
“employment of the last resort”. 
Many researchers argued that female-headed households may exhibit greater dependence on forest 
resources (Cavendish, 2000; Shackleton and Shackleton, 2006a, b), possibly because they often 
are poorer, have less access to adult labor (Vedeld et al., 2004), and may lack the means to seek 
employment away from their families (Shackleton and Shackleton, 2004). In contrast to this view, 
our survey indicated that male-headed households participate more in forest environmental 
resource collection;this finding is similar to Adhikari (2005).  Furthermore, there is a significant 
difference between participants and non-participants in terms of family size:participants have 
higher family size than the corresponding figure of the non-participant counterparts. Larger 
households may collect forest resources for two reasons: they have more labor to allocate to this 
activity, but may also be forced to do so by greater dependence and consumer burdens (Godoy et 
al., 1997). 
The findings from the previous section that simply compare mean differences in the outcome 
variables and other household variables between participants and non-participants suggest that 
non-participants are generally better off than participants. Given that the comparisons of mean 
differences do not account for the effect of other characteristics of farm households, they may 
confound the impact of participation in forest environmental resource extraction on food security 
status with the influence of other characteristics. Multivariate approaches that account for selection 
bias arising from the fact that participants and non-participants may be systematically different are 
essential in providing sound estimates of the impact of participation in forest extraction on 
household income and food security. The independent variables used in the probit regression 





participation in forest environmental resource extraction (Cavendish, 2000; Shackleton and 
Shackleton, 2006a,b, Vedeld et al., 2004 Adhikari et al., 2004 Adhikari, 2005, Babullo et al, 2009). 
4.5. Theoretical Framework and Empirical Procedure 
4.5.1. Theoretical issues 
The conditions of the study area, where households live in relatively remote areas on forest margins 
and where household time endowments are their main factor input, are well matched to the basic 
assumptions of household production theory. The fundamental issue in household production 
theory is the non-separability of production and consumption decisions, and arises when markets 
are missing or incomplete.  
Sills et al (2003) discuss some of the theoretical considerations in applying the household 
production model to households living on forest margins. The following briefly describes the main 
components of the theoretical model developed by Sills et al: their approach essentially provides 
the theoretical underpinning for the analysis conducted in this chapter. Their model assumes that 
a household engages in agriculture (𝐴𝐴) and collection of NTFPs(𝐹𝐹). It also assumes complete 
markets for agricultural products and for market goods(𝑀𝑀), but incomplete markets for NTFPs 
and labour. The amount of labour and leisure available are constrained by the value of agricultural 
output plus any exogenous income(𝐵𝐵) such as remittances. The household seeks to maximize a 
single utility function, which depends on consumption of agricultural goods(𝐴𝐴𝐻𝐻), market 
goods(𝑀𝑀𝐻𝐻), forest goods(𝐹𝐹𝐻𝐻), and home time 𝑇𝑇𝐻𝐻, (including leisure, childcare, etc.). Household 
utility is conditioned on preferences (Ф).  
Max  𝑈𝑈(𝐴𝐴𝐻𝐻,𝑀𝑀𝐻𝐻 ,𝐹𝐹𝐻𝐻 ,𝑇𝑇𝐻𝐻;Ф) 





(1)𝑇𝑇 ≥  𝑇𝑇𝐻𝐻 + 𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴 +  𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹 
(2)𝐴𝐴 = 𝑎𝑎(𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴,𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴,𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴;  Ѱ) 
(3)𝐹𝐹 = 𝑓𝑓�𝑇𝑇𝑓𝑓;𝐵𝐵,𝐻𝐻,Ѱ�                                                                                                        (4.1) 
(4)𝐹𝐹 ≥ 𝐹𝐹𝐻𝐻  + 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴 
(5)𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴(𝐴𝐴 − 𝐴𝐴𝐻𝐻) + 𝐵𝐵 ≥ 𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀(𝑀𝑀𝐻𝐻 +  𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴) 
The constraints apply to (1) household income, (2) agricultural production, (3) non-timber forest 
production, (4) forest output allocation, and (5) budget. The choice variables are   𝑇𝑇𝐻𝐻 , 
𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹 ,𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴,𝑀𝑀𝐻𝐻 ,𝐹𝐹𝐻𝐻, 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴 , and   𝐴𝐴𝐻𝐻. 
Agricultural production is a function (a) of household time allocated to agriculture (𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴) and other 
inputs collected from the forest (𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴) or purchased in the market (𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴), conditioned on fixed 
household production endowments (e.g., land, livestock) and technology (Ѱ). Forest production 
(𝑓𝑓) is also conditioned on fixed production endowments. However, the model also assumes that it 
does not compete with agriculture for land, but rather takes place in public forest, conditioned by 
its biophysical state (B) and household knowledge of the forest (H).The only variable input in 
forest product collection is household time (𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹). Forest products are either consumed (𝐹𝐹𝐻𝐻) or used 
as inputs to agriculture (𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴). 
  
 
Sills et al (2003) go on to derive first order conditions for utility maximisation. These include (i) 
that marginal cost equals marginal benefit in forest collection; (ii) the marginal utility of increased 
agricultural production arising from inputs of forest products must equal the marginal utility of 
household consumption of forest products. Taken together, these conditions imply that the shadow 
value of time must also equal the marginal utility of increased agricultural production due to forest 






Generally Sills et al (2003) demonstrate that the shadow values in their model – of time, income, 
increased agricultural production, and the “price” of NTFPs governing collection and consumption 
decisions - which are internal to each household, depend on all exogenous variables in the system. 
“This dependence of production decisions on preference and endowments is termed 
nonseparability in the household production literature and results whenever key markets are 
missing or incomplete”(Sills et al., 2003, pg 264). 
As noted by Sills et al, if markets are incomplete, household behavior can be modeled “as a 
function of socioeconomic and environmental characteristics reflecting preferences, technology, 
and input endowments, rather than prices.”(Sills et al, pg 267). No specific restrictions on the 
functional form of models are warranted under these conditions. Exogenous variables used in 
empirical estimation generally represent household demographics, assets, income 
opportunities/sources, possible substitutes, and Regional/locational characteristics.  
 
 
4.5.2. Empirical estimation issues and procedures 
The above theoretical considerations provide a guide for the empirical estimation procedures used 
in this chapter. In the analysis in this chapter, which is focused on factors influencing  the decision 
to participate in forest environmental resource extraction, and the relationship between 
participation and food security status, the independent variables used in the analysis (Table 4.1) 
comprise demographic variables, asset variables, access to other employment, location dummies, 






The decision to participate (Pi*) can be specified as an index function as follows: 
 
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖∗ = 𝛽𝛽𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖′ + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 = 1 if 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖∗ > 0                                                                                      (4.2) 
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 = 0 if 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖∗ ≤ 0 
 
Where𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖′ denotes a vector of variables such as household and location characteristics that influence 
decision to participate, and𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 is the random disturbance term. 
To analyse the relationship between participation in forest environmental resource extraction and 
outcomes such as household income and food security status, following Osuwu et al (2011) we 
can specify a  linear function 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 = 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖′ + 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖                            (4.3)                                                   
 
Where 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖is household income or food security status, P denotes a dummy variable representing 
one if the household participates in forest related activity and zero otherwise;  𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖′ is a vector of 
household characteristics, 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖 is a vector of unknown parameters, and 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 is a random error term.  
Participation in forest related activity is treated as an exogenous variable on the basis that 
households participate in forest related activity to increase their income or improve their food 
security status. However, participation in forest environmental resource extraction may not be 
random, with the group of participants and non-participants being systematically different: if this 
is the case the measured return to participation in forest environmental resource collection may be 





may measure the impact of participation in forest environmental resource extraction on food 
security. Following Owusu et al (2011) we can resort in these circumstances to using the propensity 
score matching approach to overcome potential problems of selection bias. The steps involved in 
this approach are further discussed below. 
Let P =1, 0 indicate treatment (participation in forest environmental resource extraction) and 
control (non-participation) respectively and let 𝑌𝑌1 and 𝑌𝑌0  denote the outcome of interest (food 
security) for households with treatment and without treatment respectively. Since we observe 
households to be either with treatment or without treatment, we cannot observe the causal effect 
of interest:    𝑌𝑌1 - 𝑌𝑌0 . Some features of this distribution are estimable, nevertheless. In particular, 
we may consider the Average Treatment Effect of the Treated (ATT): 
 
ATT = 𝐸𝐸�𝑌𝑌1 − 𝑌𝑌0 │𝑇𝑇 = 1�                     (4.4) 
The ATT measures how much the outcome of interest changes on average for those households 
who undergo the treatment (in this case, those who participated in forest environmental resource 
extraction). Clearly, simply computing the difference in the average outcomes of those households 
who are participating in forest environmental resources and those who did not is open to bias, as 
there are observed and unobserved characteristics that determine whether the household undergoes 
the treatment. That is,  
𝐸𝐸�𝑌𝑌1│𝑃𝑃 = 1� - 𝐸𝐸�𝑌𝑌0│𝑃𝑃 = 0� = 
𝐸𝐸�𝑌𝑌1│𝑃𝑃 = 1� - 𝐸𝐸�𝑌𝑌0│𝑃𝑃 = 1� + �𝑌𝑌0│𝑃𝑃 = 1� - 𝐸𝐸�𝑌𝑌0│𝑃𝑃 = 0� = 







   +   𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵���
�𝑌𝑌0│𝑃𝑃=1�−𝐸𝐸�𝑌𝑌0│𝑃𝑃=0�
                            (4.5) 
Only if we can guarantee that outcomes of the control group are equal on average to what the 
outcomes of the treatment group would have been in the absence of treatment does this consistently 
estimate the ATT. With non-random sorting into treatment and control, this condition is rarely 
met. 
Now suppose that by conditioning on an appropriate set of observables, X, the non-participation 
outcome 𝑌𝑌0 is independent of the participation status P. This is the weak version of the un-
confoundness assumption, also called ignorable treatment assignment (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 
1983) or conditional assumption (Lechner, 2000) or selection on the observables, which suffices 
when the parameter of interest is the ATT, as only assumptions about the potential outcomes of 
comparable individuals are needed to estimate counterfactuals. 
 
𝑌𝑌0 ┴ 𝑃𝑃│X                                                                                                                (4.6) 
This implies that  
𝐸𝐸�𝑌𝑌0│𝑃𝑃 = 1,𝑋𝑋� - 𝐸𝐸�𝑌𝑌0│𝑃𝑃 = 0,𝑋𝑋� = 0                                                                 (4.7)         
In order to identify the ATT, the overlap or common –support condition is also assumed. It ensures 
that, for each treated household, there are control households with the same X. 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃�𝑃𝑃 = 1│𝑋𝑋� < 1                                                                                                (4.8) 
Therefore, under the assumptions stated in equation (4.6) and (4.8) above, we could estimate the 





the conditioning variables (Blundell and Costa Dias, 2002). Using the law of iterated expectations 
and the conditional independence assumption, the ATT can be retrieved from observed data in the 
following way:  
ATT   = 𝐸𝐸�𝑌𝑌1│𝑃𝑃 = 1� - 𝐸𝐸�𝑌𝑌0│𝑃𝑃 = 1� 
          =  𝐸𝐸𝑋𝑋 ��𝐸𝐸�𝑌𝑌1│𝑋𝑋,𝑃𝑃 = 1� − 𝐸𝐸�𝑌𝑌0│𝑋𝑋,𝑃𝑃 = 1��│𝑃𝑃 = 1� 
          = 𝐸𝐸𝑋𝑋 ��𝐸𝐸�𝑌𝑌1│𝑋𝑋,𝑃𝑃 = 1� − 𝐸𝐸�𝑌𝑌0│𝑋𝑋,𝑃𝑃 = 0��│𝑃𝑃 = 1�                           (4.9) 
The estimate of ATT as shown in equation (4.9) turns out to be prohibitive in terms of data when 
the set of conditioning variables X is large. An alternative is to use the results of Rosenbaum and 
Rubin (1983, 1984) and condition on the probability of treatment as a function of X, the propensity 
score𝑃𝑃(𝑋𝑋), since the conditional independence assumption also implies that 
𝐸𝐸 �𝑌𝑌0│𝑃𝑃 = 1,𝑃𝑃(𝑋𝑋)� - 𝐸𝐸 �𝑌𝑌0│𝑃𝑃 = 0,𝑃𝑃(𝑋𝑋)� = 0                                                      (4.10) 
Therefore, we could estimate ATT from the differences in outcomes between treated and controls 
within each cell defined by values of P(X). 
ATT   = 𝐸𝐸�𝑌𝑌1│𝑃𝑃 = 1� - 𝐸𝐸�𝑌𝑌0│𝑃𝑃 = 1� 
          =  𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃(𝑋𝑋) ��𝐸𝐸�𝑌𝑌1│𝑃𝑃(𝑋𝑋),𝑃𝑃 = 1� − 𝐸𝐸�𝑌𝑌0│𝑃𝑃(𝑋𝑋),𝑃𝑃 = 1��│𝑃𝑃 = 1� 
              = 𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃(𝑋𝑋) ��𝐸𝐸�𝑌𝑌1│𝑃𝑃(𝑋𝑋),𝑃𝑃 = 1� − 𝐸𝐸�𝑌𝑌0│𝑃𝑃(𝑋𝑋),𝑃𝑃 = 0��│𝑃𝑃 = 1�                (4.11) 
Provided that the conditional participation probability can be estimated using a parametric method 






To estimate the propensity score we estimate a probit model with the binary dependent variable -  
whether a member of household participated in forest environmental resource extraction (=1) or 
not (=0) - using our sample data. Using this approach, we are able to control for unobservable 
factors that may influence households’ reported participation in forest environmental resource 
extraction. A number of matching algorithms are suggested in econometric literature: in this study 
we consider nearest neighbour and kernel matching methods. 
 
4.6. Empirical Results and Discussions 
 4.6.1. Propensity Score Results 
To construct the propensity score used to match participants and non-participants in forest 
environmental resource extraction, a probit regression model was estimated, where the dependent 
variable is a binary variable indicating whether the household participates in forest environmental 
resource collection or not, using a broad set of control variables. In propensity score matching, it 
is important to condition the match on variables that are highly associated with the outcome 
variables (Heckman and Navarro-Lozano, 2004). However, Smith and Todd (2005) argued that 
there is little guidance on how to select the set of conditioning variables used to construct the 
propensity score. As stated in the empirical strategy section, we focused on finding a set of 
conditioning variables that on theoretical grounds and information in the survey should be highly 
associated with the probability of participating in forest environmental resource extraction and 
with the outcomes of interest. In general the control variables were chosen based on empirical 
studies of rural households’ reliance on forest environmental resources (Angelsen and 
Wunder,2003; Vedeld et al., 2004; Adhikari et al., 2004; Fisher and Shively, 2005; Cavendish, 





Table 4.3 presents the empirical results of participation in forest environmental resource extraction 
used to create propensity scores for the matching algorithm.  The control variables chosen include 
household demographic variables (sex, age and education of the household head and the number 
of students in the household, number of male and female  adult labor), whether the household is 
aware of climate change or not, whether the household experienced weather related shocks, death 
or illness of a household member, loss of livestock, whether the household earns off-farm income, 
whether the household has access to private forest, land holding in tsimdi, number of livestock 
owned in TLU and number of donkeys owned, log distance to market and to forest in minutes,  
and location dummies.  
<<INSERT TABLE 4.3 ABOUT HERE>> 
Results of the econometric analysis in  table 4.3 confirm that education of household head is a 
significant determinant of participation in forest environmental resources extraction. Higher 
education levels of a household head are associated with lower probability of participating in forest 
environmental resource extraction. With more education, households may access a broad variety 
of livelihood activities, have higher opportunity cost of time (Adhikari et al., 2004) and may 
disregard the collection of forest resources. Second, our result indicated that the probability of 
participating in forest environmental extraction is significantly higher for male-headed households 
compared to female-headed households. This result is different from many other studies that have 
concluded that forest extraction isparticularly an activity of female headed households (Cavendish, 
2000; Shackleton and Shackleton, 2006a, b), possibly because they often are poorer, have less 
access to adult labour (Vedeld et al., 2004), and may lack the means to seek employment away 
from their families (Shackleton and Shackleton, 2004). Our finding is similar to that of Adhikari 





forest extraction,which usually has lower returns on labor effort and typically requires quite 
strenuous physical activity (Angelsen and Wunder, 2003). It is interesting to note the negative and 
significant impact of awareness of climate change:farm households that are aware of climate 
change are less likely to participate in forest extraction. 
The density distribution of the propensity score for households that are participating in forest 
extraction and those that did not shows a good overlap (see figure 4.1) suggesting that the common 
support condition is satisfied. The bottom half of the graph shows the propensity score distribution 
for the untreated, while the upper –half refers to treated households. 
<< INSERT FIGURE 4.1 ABOUT HERE>> 
Table 4.4 demonstrates how matching restricts the control sample in order to increase the similarity 
of the subsample of control cases that are directly compared with treated cases, in order to estimate 
the consequences of treatment. Table 4.4 presents the balancing information for the propensity 
scores and for each covariate before and after matching. We used the standardized bias differences 
between treatment and control samples as a convenient way to quantify the bias between treatment 
and control samples. In many cases, we found that sample differences in the unmatched data 
significantly exceed those in the samples of matched cases.  The process of matching thus creates 
a high degree of covariate balance between the treatment and control groups that are used in the 
estimation procedure.  
The imbalances between the treatment and control samples in terms of the propensity score had 
been more than 100 % before matching as shown in table 4.4.  This bias was significantly reduced 





variables exhibit statistically significance differences, while after matching the covariates are 
balanced.   
The low pseudo 𝑅𝑅2 and the insignificance likelihood ratio tests also support the hypothesis that 
both groups have the same distribution in covariates after matching (see table 4.5). These results 
clearly show that the matching procedure is able to balance the characteristics in the treated and 
the matched comparison groups. We therefore used these results to evaluate the impact of forest 
extraction on food security among groups of households having similar observed characteristics. 
This allows us to compare outcomes for households participating in forest related activities with 
those of a comparison group showing common support.  
4.6.2. Average Treatment Effects 
Having looked at the determinants of the probability of participating in forest environment 
resource extraction in rural Tigray, we now examine the size of consumption expenditure per adult 
equivalent, distress sale and food availability during the critical periods between participants and 
non-participant households. We then split the sample into two sub samples: the poor (households 
belonging to the first and second quintiles) and the non – poor (households belonging to the two 
upper quintiles), and we do the same comparisons. This split enables us to see the extent to which 
participation in forest environmental resource is pro- poor or otherwise.  
Table 4.6 presents estimates of the average impact of participation in forest environmental resource 
extraction. The outcomes considered include total expenditure per adult equivalent, distress sale 
of assets for immediate consumption and the number of months in a year that the household had 
enough food available. Panel A of table 4.6 shows the average level of food security outcomes 
defined above along with the average differences and P-values for treated and control variables, 





whole sample, while panels B (table 4.7) and C (table 4.8) present the same outcome for poor and 
non-poor households respectively.   
The results indicate that the difference in household expenditure per adult equivalent between 
treated (participants in forest environmental resource extraction) and untreated (non-participants) 
households for the whole sample is substantial when households are matched based on 
demographic, assets and other covariates,usingnearest neighbor and kernel matching respectively. 
Participants in the matched sample have on average 0.11 and 0.18 lower per capita log expenditure 
per adult equivalent than non-participants in the same sample as shown by the nearest neighbor 
and kernel matching respectively. This suggests that participation in forest environmental resource 
extraction has a causal (negative) influence on total expenditure per adult equivalent when 
households are matched on relevant socio-demographic, assets and other covariates.  
<< INSERT TABLE 4.6 ABOUT HERE>> 
For the number of months that the household had enough stocks of food available (fooda_months), 
a similar trend is reflected. Treated households in the matched sample have fewer months of having 
enough food available during the year than non-participants in the same sample. The participants 
have enough food stock available on average for 1.74 months (24%) lower than non-participants 
and the difference is statistically significant at 5% levels of significance.  
The third outcome estimated for participants and non-participants is distress sale of assets for 
immediate consumption (distress sale). Again, participants have higher levels of distress sale than 
non-participants in the same sample do. Participants have a distress sale level that is on average 
0.05 points (i.e 13%) higher than non-participants and the difference is statistically significant at 





To sum up, Panel A (table 4.6) indicated that treated households (those participating in forest 
resource extraction) have significantly lower food security outcomes than the untreated households 
in rural Tigray, and  the finding is robust to whether we use different food security indicators  or 
to the matching methods used. 
In Panel B (table 4.7) and C (table 4.8), we split the sample into two sub samples: the poor 
(households belonging to the first and second quintiles) and the non–poor (households belonging 
to the two upper quintiles), and we do the same comparisons as panel A. This split enables us to 
see if the average impacts in panel A (table 4.6) mask significant impacts of participation in forest 
environmental resource extraction for some participants and to see the extent to which participation 
in forest environmental resource extraction is pro- poor or otherwise.  
<< INSERT 4.7 ABOUT HERE>> 
The results show that both poor and non-poor participants (treated) have lower total expenditure 
per adult equivalent than poor and non-poor untreated households (non-participants).Conversely, 
we find that the poor and non-poor households that are participating in forest extraction had lower 
distress sale of assets for immediate consumption than non-participants in the same 
sample,supporting the widely held view that forests are important as an economic buffer in hard 
times.  Finally while we find that the non-poor participants had higher number of months of food 
stock available compared to non-participants in the same sample,there was no significant different 
in the number of months thatpoor households had enough food available,between participants and 
non-participants. These results need to be treated with some caution due to the relatively small 
number of non-participants in the sample, but they do suggest the importance of conducting such 
disaggregated analysis to identify differences in the functions of forest resource utilization for 





<< INSERT 4.8 ABOUT HERE >> 
4.7. Does Diversification or Coping Strategy explain households’ choice of Participation? 
It is now generally established that the safety net use of NTFP extraction may take two forms, 
corresponding to two kinds of risk–management strategies: first, the diversification strategy, 
because the households use NTFP extraction as a risk-free asset (Alderman and Paxson, 1994);  
second, the coping strategy which consists of extracting NTFP only when agricultural output is 
too low, working as a “natural” insurance mechanism. Therefore, the problem for local 
communities has both the characteristics of portfolio analysis and economics of insurance 
(Delacote 2007). In the latter case, while NTFP extraction insures against a bad outcome (in case 
a household relied on just one risky activity) as discussed in section 4.2, it also potentially excludes 
the household from engaging in high return activities that come from specialization.  
We therefore further explore the idea that participation in forest environmental resource collection 
is motivated by mitigation or reduction of the potentially high risk in agriculture. We measure the 
risks that households face in agriculture through the predicted probability that the farm households 
have zero or negative profits from their agricultural activities15. We compare this outcome across 
comparable groups of participant and non –participant households. Next, we matched participants 
and non-participants on the propensity score. Having obtained groups of comparable households, 
we calculate the average differences in the predicted probabilities of having zero and/or negative 
profit from farming across the participants and non-participants. These predicted probabilities are 
                                                     
15Farming profits are calculated as net income from farming. Net income is obtained even for households which do 
not sell on the market by applying to their farm production the average prices faced by the households in the same 





obtained through a probit model where having negative or zero profit from farming is a function 
of sets of variables which normally influence farming profits (see table 4.9). 
Our results in Panel A of table 4.10 suggest that households in rural Tigray are not driven into 
NTFP extraction by risks in farm output. This finding is consistent with the diversification strategy 
usually observed in Latin American countries (Alderman and Paxson, 1994) that involves 
households raising ex ante the number of their activities, choosing possible activities that have low 
covariance. 
However, the average pair-wise differences for poor and non-poor (panel B and C) of table 4.10 
revealed that participants and non-participants are significantly different in their predicted 
probabilities of negative profit from farming. For example, results from panel B indicate that the 
difference in poor households’ farming profit between treated (participants) and control (non-
participants) is substantial (-0.05) and (-0.15) for the nearest neighbour and kernel matching 
respectively, i.e. participants in the matched sample from poor households have on average higher 
negative profit from farming than non-participants. Moreover, while participants from the 
subsample of non-poor households in panel C have on average 0.15 negative profits from farming, 
the non-participant households have on average zero negative farming profits.  In this regard, our 
analysis suggests that the poor and non –poor farm households in Tigray are also driven into forest 
environmental resource extraction by risks in farm output or being more prone to volatile 
agricultural income. This finding is also consistent with the coping strategy which is observed in 
African countries (Alderman and Paxson, 1994) and which suggests that agricultural risk 
mitigation partially explains participation in forest resource extraction (Delacote, 2007, Pattanayak 
and Sills, 2001).Overall, it appears that the decision to participate in forest environmental resource 





4.8. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
In this chapter, we investigate the differences in food security outcomes (total expenditure per 
adult equivalent, distress sale of assets for immediate consumption and number of months that the 
household had enough food stock available in a year) between households that participate in forest 
environmental resource extraction and those who do not, using 251 sample farm households from 
ten Peasant associations (tabias) living in Tigray Regional State Ethiopia. We use a propensity 
score matching method to account for selection bias that normally occurs when unobservable 
factors influence both participation in forest environmental resources extraction and food security 
outcomes. The paper also addresses household heterogeneity by explicitly providing separate 
estimates of the average treatment effect (ATT) for poor and non-poor households.   
Our analysis leads to several interesting results.  First we find that education, age and sex of 
household head, access to off–farm employment, shocks related to death or illness of a household 
member and awareness of climate change significantly affects participation in forest 
environmental resources. Second, we find that participation in forest environmental resource 
extraction in rural Tigray has significantly lower food security outcomes than farm households 
that are not participating. Third, we find that the poor and non-poor households that are 
participating in forest extraction had lower distress sale of assets for immediate consumption than 
non-participants in the same sample, enforcing the widely held view that forests are important as 
an economic buffer in hard times. Fourth, households in rural Tigray are not driven into forest 
extraction by risks in farm output only but also by a diversification strategy, suggesting that the 
problem for local communities has both the characteristics of portfolio analysis and economics of 





The implications of the above findings are that forests serve as a safety net by mitigating distress 
sale of assets for immediate consumption; at the same time households that are participating in 
forest resources are relatively poor in the sense that they have lower food security outcomes, 
supporting the widely held view that the poor appear to be linked with nature-based resource use, 
but that these may serve to perpetuate poverty and food insecurity (CBD, 2010). Thus, examining 
and promoting alternative livelihood strategies such as off-farm work and other social protection 
programs such as the productive safety net program in Ethiopia are warranted to solve the problems 








Table 4. 1 Variables and summary statistics of the sample households 
Variables Descriptions and measurements Mea
n 
S.D 
Forest_extraction Dummy =1 if the household participates in forest extraction, 0 otherwise 0.85 0.36 







Log total expenditure of the household per adult equivalent units  
Food insecurity (Dummy =1 if the household reported distress sale of assets for immediate 
consumption, 0 otherwise  













Hhh_sex Sex of the household head (1 if male ,0 otherwise) 0.85 0.36 
Age_hh_1 Age of the household head in years  46.8 12.5 
Edu_hhh Education of the household head in years  1.17 2.18 
Student number  Number of students in the household 1.51 1.43 
Aware_cc Awareness of Climate change in the household( 1= yes, 0 otherwise) 0.35 0.48 
Male_adults Number of male adult labour in the household 1.37 0.91 
Female_adults Number of female adult labour in the household  1.49 0.87 
P_size _tsimdi Plot size of land owned by the household in Tsimdi 4.36 2.93 
Tlu Number of livestock owned by the household in TLU 3.11 2.59 
N-donkey Number of donkey owned by the household 0.75 0.84 
Private_forest Access to private forest (1 if male,0 otherwise) 0.45 0.50 
Off_farm Access to off farm employment by the household (1 if male,0 otherwise) 0.32 0.47 
Log-dis_forests Log distance to forests in minutes  1.24 1.33 
Log_dis_market Log distance to woreda market in minutes 1.71 0.82 
S_wheather  Household experienced to any weather related shock ( 1= yes, 0 otherwise) 0.80 0.40 
S-death_ill Household experienced death or illness of a member ( 1= yes, 0 otherwise) 0.23 0.42 
S_livestock_loss Household experienced shock due to loss of livestock ( 1= yes, 0 otherwise) 0.45 0.50 
PANEL G: Location variables  
Southern Zone Household lives in southern zone( 1= yes, 0 otherwise) 0.41 0.49 
South_Eastern Household lives in southern eastern zone( 1= yes, 0 otherwise) 0.20 0.40 






Table 4. 2 Mean separation tests of participants and non-participants in forest environmental resource extraction 






(n=  38) 




Mean (SE) Mean (SE) 
Log per capita expenditure per adult equivalent  7.84 (0.09) 7.45(0.03) 0.0000*** 
Distress Sale  0.45(0.82) 0.76(0.03) 0.0001*** 
Number of months with enough stock of food  6.77(0.56) 5.51(0.23) 0.0378** 
Sex of household head  0.68(0.76) 0.88(0.22) 0.0020*** 
Ag e of household head  47.3(2.26) 46.7(0.84) 0.7584 
Education of household head 2.42(0.48) 0.944(0.13) 0.0001*** 
Family Size 4.60(0.33) 5.95(0.14) 0.0003*** 
Awareness of Climate Change 0.58(0.08) 0.31(0.03) 0.0016** 
Number of livestock in TLU 2.65(0.47) 3.29(0.16) 0.2341 
Number of adult household member 2.53(0.20) 2.92(0.08) 0.0784* 
Land holding in tsimdi 3.76(0.38) 4.46(0.21)  
Non-farm income 3352(1647) 733.92(137) 0.0007*** 
Food consumption expenditure per adult equivalent  7.55(0.08) 7.20(0.03)              0.0000*** 
Access to irrigation 0.21(0.07) 0.12(0.02) 0.1433 
Off farm employment  0.55(0.08) 0.28(0.03) 0.0009*** 
Frequency of shocks (2005-2010) 1.82(0.21) 2.18(0.08) 0.0770* 
Total Asset Value  2182(645) 1160(103) 0.0055*** 
Durable Asset Value  1882(617) 808.5(97) 0.0021*** 






Table 4. 3 Propensity score of participation in forest environmental resource extraction 
Variable definition Coefficient  S.E P-value 
Sex of the household head (=1 if male, 0, otherwise)  1.02 0.36 0.004*** 
Age of the household head in years -0.03 0.01 0.006*** 
Education of the household head in years -0.20 0.06 0.000*** 
Number of students in the household   0.12 0.98 0.230 
Awareness of  climate change in the household(=1 if yes, 0, otherwise) -0.77 0.26 0.003*** 
Number of male adult household member  -0.04 0.14 0.808 
Number of female adult household member   0.21 0.17 0.233 
Land Holding in Tsimdi (= 0.25 hectare)   0.03 0.05 0.633 
Number of Livestock owned in TLU -0.02 0.07 0.752 
Number of Donkey owned by the household   0.02 0.18 0.896 
Access to private forest (=1 if yes , 0, otherwise)  0.12 0.07 0.613 
Death or illness of a household member (=1 if yes, 0, otherwise)  0.56 0.33 0.091* 
Weather related shocks (=1 if yes, 0, otherwise) -0.11 0.40 0.790 
Loss of livestock  shocks (=1 if yes, 0, otherwise)  0.39 0.26 0.133 
Access to off farm employment  (=1 if yes, 0, otherwise) -0.55 0.29 0.055* 
Log transformed distance to forest  0.02 0.16 0.923 
Log transformed distance to market -0.04 0.10 0.671 
South-Eastern (=1 if the household lives in South-Eastern zone, 0, otherwise) -0.28 0.38 0.459 
Eastern Zone  (=1 if the household lives in Eastern zone, 0, otherwise)  0.04 0.31 0.890 
Constant   1.83 0.78 0.020** 
Number of Observations   251   
Pseudo R2  0.2685   
Log likelihood  -78.057317   
    

































Table 4. 4 Propensity score and covariate balances 





               Mean      % reduction            t- test  
Treated  Control % bias |bias|      t p>|t| 
Propensity Score  Unmatched  0.88783 0.62147 135.5  9.75 0.000 
 Matched  0.88783 0.87932 4.3 96.8 0.67 0.502 
Hhh_sex Unmatched  0.8774 0.6842 47.5  3.10 0.002 
 Matched  0.8774 0.9067 -7.2 84.8 -0.97 0.332 
Age_hh_1 Unmatched  46.604 47.342 -5.6  -0.33 0.739 
 Matched  46.604 46.722 -0.9 84.0 -0.09 0.925 
Edu_hhh Unmatched  0.9481 2.4211 -59.1  -3.93 0.000 
 Matched  0.9481 1.2910 -13.8 76.7 -1.61 0.109 
Student_number Unmatched  1.5708 1.1842 26.0  1.53 0.127 
 Matched  1.5708 1.0229 36.9 -41.7 4.37 0.349 
Dep_ratio Unmatched  0.4882 0.4294 28.0  1.66 0.097 
 Matched  0.4882 0.4739 6.8 75.7 0.78 0.436 
CC_aware Unmatched  0.3160 0.5789 -54.4  -3.17 0.002 
 Matched  0.3160 0.4710 -32.0 41.1 -3.30 0.024 
Male_adult Unmatched  1.4057 1.1842 23.6  1.38 0.168 
 Matched  1.4057 1.5585 -16.3 31.0 -1.69 0.091 
Female_adult Unmatched  1.5236 1.3421 22.1  1.19 0.237 
 Matched  1.5236 1.4235 12.2 44.9 1.26 0.209 
Land_size Unmatched  4.4723 3.7625 26.2  1.38 0.170 
 Matched  4.4723 4.8177 -12.8 51.4 -1.41 0.160 
Livestock_TLU Unmatched  3.1945 2.6468 20.1  1.20 0.231 
 Matched  3.1945 3.2366 -1.5 92.3 -0.16 0.874 
N_Donkey Unmatched  0.7925 0.5526 28.4  1.63 0.104 
 Matched  0.7925 0.8099 -2.1 92.7 -0.21 0.831 
Private_forest Unmatched  0.4670 0.3421 25.5  1.43 0.155 
 Matched  0.4670 0.5074 -8.2 67.6 -0.83 0.406 
Transfer Unmatched  0.3113 0.2895 4.7  0.27 0.789 





Death_ill Unmatched  0.2359 0.1316 27.0  1.43 0.154 
 Matched  0.2359 0.2250 2.8 89.6 0.26 0.792 
Weather_shock Unmatched  0.8113 0.7105 23.6  1.42 0.157 
 Matched  0.8113 0.7399 16.7 29.1 1.79 0.178 
Livestock_loss Unmatched  0.4856 0.2632 46.9  2.56 0.011 
 Matched 0.4856 0.4621 5.0 89.3 0.49 0.625 
Off_farm Unmatched  0.2830 0.5526 -56.4  -3.33 0.001 
 Matched 0.2830 0.1733 22.9 59.3 2.71 0.015 
Distance_forest Unmatched  1.7119 1.7303 -2.3  -0.13 0.899 
 Matched 1.7119 1.4009 38.4 -1586.0 4.17 0.677 
Distance _market Unmatched  1.3029 0.9392 24.8  1.55 0.122 
 Matched 1.3029 1.6204 -21.7 12.7 -2.59 0.110 
        
 
Table 4. 5 Other covariate balance indicators before and after matching 











Indicator  Sample  
Pseudo R2 Unmatched  0.27 
 Matched  0.14 
LR X2  (p-value) Unmatched  58.46(0.001)*** 
 Matched  29.02 (0.341) 





Table 4. 6 Differences in food security outcomes for participants and non-participants for the whole sample 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%,   *** significant at 1 % 
 
Table 4. 7 Differences in food security outcomes of poor households 







   E(Y) 
Participants 





     (ATT) 
P –Value  
PANEL A: All Households 
Treatment : Participation in Forest resource extraction 
Impact       : Mean Impact  
Log_t_exp_aeu N-neighbor  7.45 7.56 -0.11 0.000*** 
 K-matching 7.45 7.63 -0.18 0.000*** 
Distress_sale N-neighbor  0.75 0.70  0.05 0.000*** 
 K-matching 0.75 0.67  0.09 0.000*** 
Fooda_months N-neighbor  5.51 6.37 -0.85 0.046** 
 K-matching 5.51 7.18 -1.67 0.045** 
      
Outcome Matching 
Algorism 
   E(Y) 
Participants 





     (ATT) 
P –Value  
PANEL B: Poor Households 
Treatment : Participation in Forest resource extraction 
Impact       : Mean Impact  
Log_t_exp_aeu N-neighbor  7.27 7.48 -0.21 0.002*** 
 K-matching 7.27 7.47 -0.20 0.002*** 
Distress_sale N-neighbor  0.67 0.84 -0.17 0.039** 
 K-matching 0.66 0.81 -0.15 0.037** 
Fooda_months N-neighbor  5.15 6.73 -1.58 0.410 
 K-matching 5.16 6.90 -1.74 0.281 





Table 4. 8 Differences in food security outcomes of non-poor households 






   E(Y) 
Participants 





     (ATT) 
P –Value  
PANEL C:  Non-Poor Households 
Treatment : Participation in Forest resource extraction 
Impact       : Mean Impact  
Log_t_exp_aeu N-neighbor  7.63 7.99 -0.36 0.001*** 
 K-matching 7.63 7.95 -0.32 0.001*** 
Distress_sale N-neighbor  0.84 0.93 -0.83 0.002*** 
 K-matching 0.84 0.91 -0.07 0.001*** 
Fooda_months N-neighbor  5.86 5.15  0.71 0.036** 
 K-matching 5.86 4.94  0.92 0.046** 






Table 4. 9 Determinants of the predicted probability of zero and or negative farming profits 
Variable definition Coefficient  S.E P-value 
Dependent Variable : Dummy equals 1 if farming profit is negative , 0 otherwise    
Explanatory Variables     
Age of the household head in years  0.004 0.013 0.744 
Education of the household head in years  0.072 0.073 0.325 
Number of Adult Males in the household  -0.040 0.182 0.828 
Participation in other business activities ((=1 if yes, 0, otherwise) -0.102 0.354 0.772 
Value of seed in Ethiopian Birr  0.001 0.000 0.007*** 
Land Holding in Tsimdi (= 0.25 hectare) -0.081 0.083 0.327 
Number of Livestock owned in TLU -0.517 0.462 0.001*** 
Value of Fertilizer in Ethiopian Birr   0.001 0.001 0.327 
Number of crops grown  -0.462 0.175 0.008*** 
Death or illness of a household member (=1 if yes, 0, otherwise) -0.081 0.405 0.842 
Loss of livestock  shocks (=1 if yes, 0, otherwise)  0.755 0.326 0.020** 
Access to credit  ((=1 if yes, 0, otherwise) -0.314 0.341 0.358 
Number of Agricultural Extension Visit -0.002 0.027 0.913 
Log transformed distance to market  0.134 0.142 0.345 
Distance to DA office in Munities   0.011 0.005 0.021** 
South-Eastern (=1 if the household lives in South-Eastern zone, 0, otherwise)  0.798 0.397 0.044** 
Eastern Zone  (=1 if the household lives in Eastern zone, 0, otherwise)  0.420 0.241 0.890 
Constant  -1.253 0.831 0.132 
Number of Observations     
Pseudo R2  0.3230   
Log likelihood  -52.047128   
    









Table 4. 10 Differences in farming profit between participants and non-participants 






   E(Y) 
Participants 






     (ATT) 
P –Value  
PANEL A:  All Households 
Treatment :  Dummy =1if the household  participates in forest extraction, zero otherwise     
Impact       : Mean Impact  
Farming profit (=1 if 
zero or negative) 
N-neighbour  0.15 0.06 -0.09 0.408 
 K-matching 0.14 0.08 -0.06 0.425 
PANEL B:  Poor Households 
Treatment :  Dummy =1if the household  participates in forest extraction, zero otherwise     
Impact       : Mean Impact 
Farming profit (=1 if 
zero or negative) 
N-neighbour  0.14 0.09 -0.05 0.071* 
 K-matching 0.15 0.00 -0.15 0.009*** 
PANEL C:  Non-Poor Households 
Treatment :  Dummy =1if the household  participates in forest extraction, zero otherwise     
Impact       : Mean Impact 
Farming profit (=1 if 
zero or negative) 
N-neighbour  0.15 0.00 -0.15 0.008*** 






WELFARE IMPACTS OF FOREST ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCE COMMERCIALIZATION: 
A MICRO- SIMULATION APPROACH FOR TIGRAY, ETHIOPIA 
 
5.1. Introduction 
 Poverty in the developing world is concentrated in rural areas, and rural households, particularly 
in developing countries, depend on the environment for at least some of their income (Cavendish, 
2000; Angelsen et al., 2001; World Bank, 2002). In this regard,  commercialization of  Non-Timber 
Forest Products (NTFPs) have been given a prominent role in many conservation and development 
projects based on the proposition that supporting the production and trade of NTFPs leads to 
livelihood improvements without compromising the environment. The attention given to the 
commercial extraction of NTFPs as a conservation strategy comes from three implicit 
assumptions: (1) commercial NTFP production can provide economically attractive options to 
farmers helping to increase their income and offering development opportunity (Peters et al., 1989; 
Clay & Clement, 1993); (2) NTFP production is a more benign way to use tropical forests than 
most land use alternatives, allowing for the conservation of key forest values (Myers, 1988); and 
(3) increased monetary value of the NTFPs will prevent people from converting the lands into 
other land uses (Evans, 1993). Accordingly, expectations have been raised that this sub-sector will 
play a significant role in reducing rural poverty, addressing international concerns for poverty 





While the “picture” of the significance of natural product trade for livelihoods exists, the situation 
in reality is complex and variable, and limited empirical data from across a range of regions, 
vegetation types, and socio-economic contexts are available to assess the ability of these products 
to create lasting opportunities for local livelihood enhancement (FAO, 2003; Sunderlin  et al., 
2005). In fact, refocusing of the development agenda on poverty has led to recent reassessment of 
the role that biodiversity plays in livelihoods and poverty alleviation. This poses many fresh 
questions, and, to some extent, tempers previous optimism regarding the ability of this sector to 
make a difference by providing a more subtle and complex picture of livelihood –biodiversity 
linkages (e.g.  Arnold, 2002a; Belcher, 2005; Koziell, 2001; Lawrence, 2003; Ros-Tonen and 
Wiersum, 2005; Scherr et al., 2004; Wunder, 2001). Central to these new enquiries is a more 
perceptive and nuanced appreciation of (a) what is by poverty alleviation in relation to natural 
resources, distinguishing between poverty prevention or mitigation and poverty elimination; (b) 
the links between natural resource dependence and the potential of natural product trade to provide 
pathways out of poverty ; and  (c)  the extent to which opportunities associated with natural product 
production and sale can be made more pro-poor and thus contribute to the efforts to combat poverty 
and vulnerability (FAO, 2003; Koziell,2001). A key area of debate is whether the trade in natural 
products can assist in improving livelihoods and income, or alternatively, whether it offers limited 
options serving only as a last resort, possibly contributing to persistent poverty ( Belcher, 2005; 
Ros-Tonen and Wiersum, 2005; Wunder, 2001). 
Yet most literature on natural product commercialization focuses on international value chains for 
charismatic products with high levels of external intervention (Taylor, 1999). In addition, few case 
comparisons to date (e,g, Belcher et al., 2005; Marshall et al., 2006) have sought to systematically 





produced and marketed within the same geographic setting. Moreover, most of the referred studies 
examine total forest or environmental income which includes critical subsistence products such as 
medicinal plants and wild foods (see e.g. Jodha, 1986; Reddy & Chakravarty, 1999; Belcher et al., 
2005; Babulo et al., 2009). In addition, although there are a number of commercial non-timber 
forest products in Ethiopia16, there is no systematic study to our knowledge that investigates 
whether commercialization of forest products enhances the welfare of the rural poor.  
Moreover, although several studies have explored the role of forest income in reducing poverty 
and inequality and established empirical regularities about the positive impact of forests on the 
welfare of rural households (e.g. Jodha 1986; Reddy & Chakravarty, 1999; Belcher et al., 2005; 
Babulo et al., 2009; Lopez-Feldman, 2011), they have some methodological shortcomings. One 
such limitation is that none of the studies examine the question of whether participants and non-
participants have inherent different income potentials, all things being equal. Their method 
provides a direct and simple measure of how forest income contributes to the total income under 
the simplifying assumption that the differences in income between households who are 
participating in forest environmental resource commercialization and those households that did 
not participate in forest commercialization could be due to observed heterogeneity. They therefore 
shed little light on the important policy issue of who might gain or lose from potential changes in 
forest policy. 
To provide more accurate and policy-relevant results it is important to estimate what the 
households’ income situation would have been in the absence of participation –the counterfactual 
income level- and then to compare that with the actual household income situation with forest 
                                                     
16The most commercial non-timber forest products in Tigray include, honey, bee wax, gums and resins, cactus, 





income included as part of total income. Previous studies on the contribution of forests in Ethiopia 
and elsewhere have neglected this issue, choosing instead to compare actual income excluding 
forest income with income including forest income rather than estimating the counterfactual 
without-participation scenario. This could result in overestimation of the contribution of forests to 
household income.  
 Indeed, not distinguishing between the causal effect of forest commercialization and the effect of 
unobserved heterogeneity could lead to misleading policy implications (Di-falco and Veroseni, 
2010;Carter and Milon, 2005). To this end, we used a simultaneous equation model with 
endogenous switching by full information maximum likelihood estimation (Di-falco and Veroseni, 
2010;Di-Falco et al. 2011, Asfaw and Shiferaw, 2010;Carter and Milon, 2005) to account for the 
endogeneity of the participation in forest environmental resource commercialization.  For the 
model to be identified, we use selection instruments such as distance to forest, distance to market 
and awareness of climate change. We have access to a particularly rich data set, which contains 
both households that did and did not participate in forest resource commercialization plus a very 
large set of control variables.  
           Our results are interesting in a number of respects. First, they show that the choice of 
methodology can have a significant impact on the estimated impacts and conclusions made about 
the impact of participation in forest environmental resource commercialization on the welfare of 
rural households. Second, the estimated heterogeneity revealed that, independent of participation, 
participant households would have less income on average than non- participants, implying that 
the group of farm households that are actually participating  in forest environmental resource 
commercialization has systematically different characteristics than the group that did not 





non- participant groups in the counterfactual case that they did participate, while it improved the 
income of households that actually participated. This suggests that participation in the forest 
environmental resource commercialization seems to be particularly important for the most 
vulnerable group of farm households by helping them to fill the income gap with the less 
vulnerable households in the same locality. 
The following section presents an overview of forest conservation and poverty alleviation in rural 
Tigray, Ethiopia. Section 5.3 presents a brief description of the study area and descriptive statistics. 
Section 5.4 introduces the econometric model and estimation procedure. We describe a “treatment 
effects” approach (Heckman 2001; Di-Falco et al 2011) to evaluate the contribution of forest 
environmental resources commercialization on the household income per adult equivalent. Section 
5.5 describes the estimated econometric results followed by discussion. We conclude with a 
summary and observations on the contribution of forest environmental resource commercialization 
to the household income and its implications for development policy in Ethiopia and similar 
developing countries. 
5.2. Overview of forest Conservation and poverty Alleviation in Rural Tigray 
Environmental degradation in Tigray has been well documented in the literature see for example 
(Chisholm 2000 and 2004; Gebremedhin et al., 2000; Howard and Smith, 2006). Forest resources 
of the region were overexploited and today forests and woodlots cover less than 2 percent of the 
region’s total area (TFAP, 1996 cited in Babulo, 2007). Efforts to contain the problem of land 
degradation have been made at several levels (Nedessa et al., 2005).Closing degraded land areas 
from human and livestock intervention to promote natural regeneration of plants, commonly 
termed as enclosures, is among the major constraint efforts practiced in the highland areas of 





regional government created restrictions on the use of certain tree species and the restrictions apply 
to all common land areas, regardless of whether they are open access or enclosed (FAO, 2006). 
This strategy is meant to benefit the environment and is a conservation effort that the community 
itself is operating (Gebrehiwot and van der Veen, 2010). The immediate positive environmental 
effects of the enclosures and the species restrictions are nearly universally acknowledged both by 
researchers and by local populations (Howard and Smith, 2006) and the international community 
alike.  
However, the adoption of restrictive use rules and the limitation in allowable harvests have led 
many local residents to view enclosures as a less favoured land use option (Babulo, 2007). There 
is also consensus in the relevant literature that benefit streams from enclosures to date are largely 
environmental and economic benefits for most people are so far minimal (FAO, 2006).  However, 
the arguments from both sides have been based essentially on qualitative narratives of the pros and 
cons of enclosure establishment and have not been backed up by quantitative reasoning and 
indicators (Babulo, 2007). This paper is therefore an attempt to quantitatively measure the welfare 
impacts of forest environmental resources commercialization for rural households living in Tigray 
and to provide some policy recommendations that can promote a win-win for conservation of 
forest environmental resources and poverty reduction in the region.  
5.3. Data Description and Study Sites 
A household survey was conducted in 2010/11 on 254 households in Tigray region of northern 
Ethiopia. However, because of missing data on some key variables for 3 households, our final 
estimating sample consists of 251.  A two stage sampling design was made in the study. The 
primary sampling units (PSUs) were tabias. Sample tabias were selected on the basis of secondary 





that affect socio economic condition such as nearness to market, geographical location, the 
availability of both rain fed agriculture and irrigation, size of tabias based on population etc were 
considered so as to make the sampled tabias representative. In this category, a total of ten tabias 
namely Arato, Derga _ajen, Hugumrda, Meswaeti, Kara_adishawo, WorebayuKal_amin, 
Kelisha_emni,andFelege_woini were selected for the survey. The tabias selected are representative 
of the three different agro-ecological zones of the region identified on the basis of altitude. Areas 
with altitude ranging from 1500- 2300 m.a.s.l. are locally termed as woinadougai.e midland areas, 
areas above 2300 m.a.s.l. are locally known as dougai.e highland areas and areas with altitude less 
than 1500 m.a.s.l. are termed as kola i.e., lowland. A multi-purpose questionnaire was used to 
gather information on household income, expenditure, off-farm income, household assets and local 
institutions alongside a host of other information related to production and sales. 
<< INSERT FIGURE 2.1 ABOUT HERE >> 
The dependent variable used in this study is a dummy variable that takes the value of one, if the 
household participated in forest environmental resources commercialization, and a value of zero, 
if no participation was recorded. The outcome variable used is the log transformed total per capita 
income in adult equivalent units. Tables 5.1, 5.2 and table 5.1A in the appendix present the sample 
statistics of the variables used in the analysis, the mean separation test for participants and non-
participants and  their definitions respectively.  
<<INSERT TABLE5.1, 5.2 AND TABLE 5.1A ABOUT HERE>> 
Out of the 251 households in the data set, about 33% of the households were participants during 
the year 2009/10. The average age of sample households is 46.76 years and 85 % are male headed. 





participants. In addition participants seem to have significantly lower number of students and 
lower average grade of educational level than their counterpart non-participant households. The 
average land holding in tsimdi (=0.25 hectare) for participants is 3.75 while it is about 4.7 for non- 
participants, the difference is statistically significant. Moreover, households that are participating 
in forest commercialization are living far away from markets and are also prone to shocks such as 
weather and illness of a household member.  
5.4. Econometric   Model and Estimation Procedure 
Households who are involved in forest environmental resource commercialization are likely to 
differ from households who do not. A household may participate in forest resource 
commercialization if he/she anticipates that the decision to participate in forest commercialization 
is worthwhile rather than entering by random assignment.  Unobservable characteristics of 
households and their family may affect the participation decision in forest commercialization and 
the level of income, resulting in inconsistent estimates of the effect of participationon income (Di-
falco et al, 2010). Accordingly, we used a simultaneous equations model with endogenous 
switching by full information Maximum likelihood (FIML) to determine the counterfactual income 
of forest resource commercialization following Di-falco et al. (2010) as shown below.  
We specify the selection equation for participating in forest environmental resource 
commercialization as  
(5.1) 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖∗  = 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝛼𝛼 + 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖   with   𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 = �
1  𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓   𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖∗ > 0
0    𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 
 
That is, households will choose to participate in forest extraction (𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 = 1 ) if 𝐴𝐴∗ > 0, 0 otherwise, 
where 𝐴𝐴∗ represents the expected benefits of participating in forest extraction  with respect to not 





the decision to participate in forest commercialization or not.  To complete the system of 
simultaneous equations model for household income, conditional on participation in forest 
environmental resource commercialization, we specify two equations following Di-falco et al., 
(2010), where (1) participation of households in forest commercialization and (2) non-participation 
in forest commercialization are defined as follows:    
 (5.2a)   Regime 1:   𝑦𝑦1𝑖𝑖 = 𝑋𝑋1𝑖𝑖𝛽𝛽1  +  𝜀𝜀1𝑖𝑖              if  𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 = 1 
(5.2b)   Regime 2:  𝑦𝑦2𝑖𝑖 = 𝑋𝑋2𝑖𝑖𝛽𝛽1  +  𝜀𝜀2𝑖𝑖              if  𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 = 0 
Where 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 is the income and food security level in regimes 1 and 2, 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 represents a vector of 
explanatory variables mentioned above. 
Finally, the error terms are assumed to have a trivariate normal distribution, with zero mean and 






Where 𝜎𝜎𝑛𝑛2 is the variance of the error term in the selection equation (5.1), (which can be assumed 
to be equal 1 since the coefficients are estimable only up to a scale factor), 𝜎𝜎12 and 𝜎𝜎22 are the 
variances of the error terms in the income function (5.2a) and (5.2b) , and 𝜎𝜎1𝜂𝜂 and 𝜎𝜎2𝜂𝜂  represent 
the covariance of 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 ,𝜀𝜀1𝑖𝑖 and 𝜀𝜀2𝑖𝑖. Since 𝑦𝑦1𝑖𝑖 and 𝑦𝑦2𝑖𝑖 are not observed simultaneously the covariance 
between 𝜀𝜀1𝑖𝑖 and 𝜀𝜀2𝑖𝑖 is not defined (Maddala, 1983 cited inDi-falco et al., 2010)). An important 
implication of the error structure is that because the error term of the selection equation (5.1) 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 is 
correlated with the error terms of the income equation (5.2a) and (5.2b) (𝜀𝜀1𝑖𝑖 and 𝜀𝜀2𝑖𝑖), the expected 





𝐸𝐸[𝜀𝜀1𝑖𝑖|𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 = 1] = 𝜎𝜎1𝜂𝜂
ф(𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝛼𝛼)
Ф(𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝛼𝛼)
 =𝜎𝜎1𝜂𝜂𝜆𝜆1𝑖𝑖, and 𝐸𝐸[𝜀𝜀2𝑖𝑖|𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 = 0] = -𝜎𝜎2𝜂𝜂
ф(𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝛼𝛼)
1−Ф(𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝛼𝛼)
  =𝜎𝜎2𝜂𝜂𝜆𝜆2𝑖𝑖,  
Where ф(. )  andФ(. ) are the standard normal probability function, Ф(. ) the standard normal 
cumulative density function respectively, and 𝜆𝜆1𝑖𝑖= 
ф(𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝛼𝛼)
 Ф(𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝛼𝛼)
 , 𝜆𝜆2𝑖𝑖 = 
ф(𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝛼𝛼)
1−Ф(𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝛼𝛼)
. Thus, if the estimates 
of the associated coefficients to the inverse Mill’s ratios are found to be statistically different from 
zero, the hypothesis of the absence of sample selectivity bias can be rejected(Féres et al., 2007). 
This model is defined as a “switching regression model with endogenous switching” (Maddala and 
Nelson, 1975 cited in Di-falco et al., 2010). The full information maximum likelihood (FIML) is 
an efficient method to fit the endogenous switching regression model (Di-falco and Veroseni, 
2010; Linh et al., 2014). 
The logarithmic function given the previous assumption regarding the distribution of the error term 
as presented by Di-falco et al., (2010) is 
(5.3) ln 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 = ∑ 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=1 �lnф�
𝜀𝜀1𝑖𝑖
𝜎𝜎1
� − lnФ +  lnФ(𝜃𝜃1𝑖𝑖)�+(1 −  𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖) �lnФ�
𝜀𝜀2𝑖𝑖
𝜎𝜎2
� − ln𝜎𝜎2 + ln�1 −
Ф(𝜃𝜃2𝑖𝑖)��, 




 ,   𝑗𝑗 = 1,2, with 𝜌𝜌𝑗𝑗 denoting the correlation coefficient between the error 
term 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 of the selection equation (1) and the error term of 𝜀𝜀𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 of equation (5.2a) and (5.2b), 
respectively. 
 
5.4.1. Expected outcome and Treatment Effects 
The expected outcomes with and without participation in forest environmental resource 





5.3 shows the expected income and treatment effects of the household who have participated in 
forest environmental resource commercialization and those who did not. For  example, (a) and (b) 
in table 5.3 show the actual or observed income in the sample , while (c) and (d) show the expected 
income without participation in forest environmental resource commercialization and this 
represents the counterfactual income. The conditional expectations for income status of the 
households are presented following Di-falco et al., (2010) below:  
(5.4a)  𝐸𝐸(𝑦𝑦1𝑖𝑖| 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 = 1)  = 𝑋𝑋1𝑖𝑖𝛽𝛽1 + 𝜎𝜎1𝜂𝜂𝜆𝜆1𝑖𝑖 
(5.4b)  𝐸𝐸(𝑦𝑦2𝑖𝑖| 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 = 0)  = 𝑋𝑋2𝑖𝑖𝛽𝛽2 + 𝜎𝜎2𝜂𝜂𝜆𝜆2𝑖𝑖 
(5.4c)  𝐸𝐸(𝑦𝑦1𝑖𝑖| 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 = 1)  = 𝑋𝑋2𝑖𝑖𝛽𝛽2 + 𝜎𝜎2𝜂𝜂𝜆𝜆1𝑖𝑖 
(5.4d)  𝐸𝐸(𝑦𝑦1𝑖𝑖| 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 = 0)  = 𝑋𝑋1𝑖𝑖𝛽𝛽1 + 𝜎𝜎1𝜂𝜂𝜆𝜆2𝑖𝑖 
<< TABLE 5.3 ABOUT HERE >> 
In addition, following Heckman et al., (2001) and Di-Falco et al., (2011) we calculate the 
heterogeneity and treatment effects as shown in equations 5.5 – 5.8; thus we seek to determine 
whether the effect of participation in forest resources commercialization is smaller or larger for 
participants who actually participated and those who did not participate relative to their 
counterfactual case. The effect of participation in forest environmental resource commercialization 
for those households who actually participated is the “effect of treatment on the treated” (TT) and 
the effect of participation in forest environmental resource commercialization for those households 
who did not participate, but could participate defined as the “effect of the treatment on the 
untreated”(TU) is calculated as follows (Di-Falco et al., 2011; Di-falco and Veroseni;2010;Carter 





(5.5)  𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 = 𝐸𝐸(𝑦𝑦1𝑖𝑖| 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 = 1)- 𝐸𝐸(𝑦𝑦1𝑖𝑖| 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 = 0) = 𝑋𝑋1𝑖𝑖(𝛽𝛽1 − 𝛽𝛽2)+�𝜎𝜎1𝜂𝜂 − 𝜎𝜎2𝜂𝜂�𝜆𝜆1𝑖𝑖,  
(5.6) 𝑇𝑇𝑈𝑈 = 𝐸𝐸(𝑦𝑦2𝑖𝑖| 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 = 0)- 𝐸𝐸(𝑦𝑦2𝑖𝑖| 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 = 1) = 𝑋𝑋2𝑖𝑖(𝛽𝛽1 − 𝛽𝛽2)+ �𝜎𝜎1𝜂𝜂 − 𝜎𝜎2𝜂𝜂�𝜆𝜆2𝑖𝑖, 
The policy relevant treatment effects can also be distinguished from heterogeneity effects (Carter 
and Milon (2005). For example, those households who participated in forest environmental 
resource commercialization may have higher (lower) income regardless of their participation in 
forest environmental resource commercialization due to other  unobservable  factors that affect 
household income. This “base heterogeneity effect” (Carter and Milon, 2005; Di-falco and 
Veroseni, 2010;Di-Falco et al., 2011) for households that are actually participated in forest 
environmental resource commercialization and that did not is given in equations (5.7) and (5.8) 
respectively 
(5.7)𝐵𝐵𝐻𝐻1 = 𝐸𝐸(𝑦𝑦1𝑖𝑖| 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 = 1)- 𝐸𝐸(𝑦𝑦1𝑖𝑖| 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 = 0) = (𝑋𝑋1𝑖𝑖 − 𝑋𝑋2𝑖𝑖)𝛽𝛽1𝑖𝑖 + 𝜎𝜎1𝜂𝜂(𝜆𝜆1𝑖𝑖 − 𝜆𝜆2𝑖𝑖). 
(5.8)𝐵𝐵𝐻𝐻2 = 𝐸𝐸(𝑦𝑦2𝑖𝑖| 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 = 1)- 𝐸𝐸(𝑦𝑦2𝑖𝑖| 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 = 0) = (𝑋𝑋1𝑖𝑖 − 𝑋𝑋2𝑖𝑖)𝛽𝛽2𝑖𝑖 + 𝜎𝜎2𝜂𝜂(𝜆𝜆1𝑖𝑖 − 𝜆𝜆2𝑖𝑖). 
Moreover, the income of the households who have participated in forest environmental resource 
commercialization may be higher (lower) because of their participation in forest environmental 
resource commercialization that those who didn’t participate, if they had participated. This 
“transitional heterogeneity effect” (TH) (Carter and Milon, 2005; Di-falco et al, 2010;Di-Falco et 
al., 2011) is the difference between the effect of participation in forest environmental resource 
commercialization for the group of households who participated in forest environmental resource 





5.5. Results and Discussion 
Estimated parameters for income function with endogenous switching due to participation in forest 
environmental resource commercialization are presented in table 5.4.  For comparison, a single 
equation income function with no switching was estimated. A result from OLS estimates for the 
dummy variable (NTFC_C) equals 1 if the household participated in forest environmental resource 
commercialization or not is presented in the first column of table 5.4.The estimates of the selection 
equation (5.1) and for the income function for the group of households that have participated in 
forest environmental resource commercialization and those that did not participate is presented the 
last three columns of table 5.4.  
 
<<INSERT TABLE 5.4 ABOUT HERE >> 
Parameter estimates in table 5.4 revealed that the main factors that influence households’ decision 
to participate in forest environmental resource commercialization include  weather related shocks, 
sex of the household head being male, number  of adult household numbers in the household and 
access to private forest. This finding is in line with the forest and livelihoods literature. For 
example with more adult members in the household, households may have access to labour that 
could be involved in forest environmental resource commercialization. In addition our result 
indicated that male headed households participate more in forest environmental resource 
commercialization. Our finding is similar to Adhikari (2005) because households headed by a 
woman might be at a disadvantage to participate in some income generating activities (e.g., women 
might not be allowed to work in agriculture) but they might also be restricted in their access to 
natural resources (Lopez –Feldman et al., 2011). Similarly, when insurance markets are not 





covariate shocks. In this sense, it has been argued that environmental resources might provide 
households with a “natural insurance” (Pattanayak and Sills, 2001; Takasaki et al., 2004). Our 
finding also shows that households experienced with weather related shocks are more likely to 
participate in forest environmental resource commercialization. The positive sign in the variable 
distance to market also supports the hypothesis that households in isolated villages have less 
productive alternatives and are more likely to take part in low return activities like resource 
extraction and depend more on them as income generating activities (Lopez-Feldman et al., 2011). 
Conversely, variables such as education, access to wage income and own business, and access to 
more land are found to be negatively correlated with forest environmental resource 
commercialization. With more education, households may have access to a broad variety of 
livelihood activities, have higher opportunity cost of time (Adhikari et al., 2004) and may disregard 
the collection and sales of forest resources. Similarly households with more assets may easily 
access more profitable livelihood activities and may give less priority to environmental resource 
incomes which are often considered “employment of the last resort” (Angelsen and Wunder, 
2003). 
We now turn to the contribution of participation in forest environmental resource 
commercialization to the household income. The simplest approach to investigate the effect of 
forest resource commercialization on the household income is an estimation of the income function 
via OLS using the participation in forest environmental resource commercialization as an 
explanatory variable as shown in the first column of  table 5.4. The estimated result shows that 
participation in forest environmental resource commercialization affects household income 
positively though it is insignificant. However, this may be a misleading conclusion as OLS 





of households ( Di-falco and Veroseni, 2010)  that participated in forest environmental resource 
commercialization and the groups of households that did not. The likelihood ratio test indicates 
that the two equations are not independent (Prob> 0.00, table 2 bottom row)). 
The endogenous switching in the income function estimates is presented in column 3 and 4. As 
shown in the 2nd row from bottom of the same table, the parameter coefficients of the terms 𝜌𝜌𝑗𝑗 are 
statistically different from zero and have positive signs in the two equations implying (1) 
participation in forest environmental resource commercialization significantly increases income 
among participants; and (2)  income levels are significantly higher among non-participants. This 
implies that the decision to participate in forest environmental resource commercialization and the 
income of households given the participation decision is affected by observed and non-observed 
factors. Moreover, results also show that there is self-selection in the participation of forest 
environmental resource commercialization as shown by the significance of the coefficient of 
correlation between the participation equation and the income of households that  participated in 
forest environmental resource commercialization.  
Finally, the income function of households that participated in forest environmental resource 
commercialization and those that did not is significantly different at 1 % level of significance. This 
implies the presence of heterogeneity in the sample (refer to the last two columns of table 5.4)  
 
. <<INSERT TABLE 5.5 ABOUT HERE>> 
Table 5.5 presents the expected income per capita under the actual and counterfactual conditions. 
Considering  first the observed differences in the average household income per capita between 





households that participated earned 3,808.88(26.3%) Ethiopian Birr less, on average, than the 
group of households that did not participate in forest environmental resources commercialization. 
This simple comparison is misleading however because it does not account for other unobserved 
factors (Di-falco and Veroseni, 2010; Carter and Milon, 2005) that may have affected income.  
The treatment effect of participation in forest environmental resource commercialization is 
presented in the last column of table 5.5.  For the group of households that participated in forest 
environmental resource commercialization, the first entry in the last column indicates that the 
mean effect of participation in forest resource commercialization (TT in table 5.3 and equation 
(5.5)) was an increase in per income of 1619.062 (17.9%) Ethiopian Birr. Similarly, if the group 
that did not participate in the forest environmental resource commercialization had participated 
(TU in table 5.3 and equation (5.6)), the mean effect would be a decrease in per capita income of 
3630.48(25%) Ethiopian Birr. However, the effect of participation in forest environmental 
resource commercialization is larger for the group that did not participate in forest resource 
commercialization, resulting in a positive value of the transitional heterogeneity effect (TH in table 
5.3).  The estimated treatment effects indicate that both groups, if they participated in forest 
environmental resource commercialization, would decrease the contribution of participation in 
forest environmental resource commercialization to household income.  
The base heterogeneity which shows the differences in the expected income per capita among 
households who participated in forest environmental resource commercialization and those that 
did not is presented in the last row of table 5.5.  With the counterfactual condition that the non-
participant group of households participated in forest environmental resource commercialization 
(BH1 in table 5.3 and equation (5.7)), the group who actually participated in forest environmental 





average. However, this difference is not statistically significant. Similarly, with the counterfactual 
condition that the group of households that participated did not participate in forest resource 
commercialization (BH2 in table 5.3 and equation (5.8)), the group of participants would still 
significantly earn 5427.942 (37.5 %) Ethiopian Birr less per year. Under both counterfactual 
conditions, the group of households that actually participated in forest environmental resource 
commercialization would earn less. These differences reflect systematic sources of variation 
between the two groups that could not be fully accounted for in the observable determinants of the 
income model.   
5.6. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
This chapter investigates the factors affecting households’ decision to participate in forest 
environmental resource commercialization and how participation in forest environmental resource 
commercialization impacts on the income of rural households living along the peripheries of 
protected forests in northern highlands of Ethiopia. We use household level data from 251 sample 
households living along the margins of protected forests found in northern highlands of Ethiopia  
to estimate a without-participation counterfactual household income scenario, against which to 
compare actual with-participation income.  
Our results are interesting in a number of respects. First, they show that the choice of methodology 
can have a significant impact on the estimated impacts and conclusions made about the impact of 
participation in forest environmental resource commercialization on the welfare of rural 
households. We compare the estimated impacts using the counterfactual approach discussed 
above, with the more simplistic and more commonly used approach which treats forest income as 





forest environmental resource commercialization to the overall income is lower when the 
methodologically superior counter factual estimation is used.   
Second, the estimated heterogeneity effects revealed that, independent of participation, participant 
households would have less income on average than non-participants, implying that the group of 
farm households that participated in forest environmental resources commercialization has 
systematically different characteristics from the group that did not participate. This systematic 
difference in income between the two groups could not be explained with observable determinants 
of the income model and indicates a more complex relationship between participation in forest 
environmental resource commercialization and household income, which could not be taken into 
account by the estimation of OLS regression.  
Third, participation in forest environmental resource commercialization increases the income for 
the group of households who actually participated. However, the treatment effect analysis revealed 
the counterintuitive results that participation decreased income for non-participant groups in the 
counterfactual case they did participate. However, if this group of households had participated in 
forest environmental resource commercialization, they would have earned the same as the farm 
households that actually participated. Therefore, participation in forest environmental resource 
commercialization seems to be particularly important for the group of farm households most 
vulnerable to shocks, those who have no access to other high yielding activities such as off farm 
work or adequate land, by helping them to fill the income gap with the less vulnerable group of 
households in the same locality. While the result is surprising, it is consistent with the previous 
studies on the  forest – poverty nexus that the poor households are more dependent on forests than 
the rich (Jodha ,1986; Reddy and Chakravarty, 1999 ; Cavandish 2000; Mamo et al.,2007; and  





labour unit), are primarily used for subsistence and often to fill income gaps (Byron and Arnold, 
1999; Newmann and Hirsch, 2000). 
Finally, to the extent the results from this sample are representative of other areas and development 
policies, further research inquiries are also needed to evaluate the effects of policies that promote 
forest resource commercialization. In this regard, the distinction made by Fisher (2003) between 
low return forest resources (LRFR) and high return forest activities (HRFA) would be important.   
The results from this analysis particularly raise several issues for the forest-based livelihoods 
research and policies. First, predictions based on the assumption that participation in forest 
environmental resource commercialization increases income over all households living along the 
margins of forests may overestimate the impacts of forests’ contribution in the livelihood of 
people. In this regard public policies and participation of NGOs could help in providing alternative 
livelihood and income generating options and minimizing the dependence of households on forest 
environmental resources. The introduction of crop insurance and health related insurance are other 
possible policies. Providing access to off farm work and enhancing the existing productive safety 
net programs are paramount in order for households to take risks and invest in high risk and high 














         Total  Participants  Non-participants 
Mean  S. D Mean  S. D Mean S. D 
Dependent variables       
NTFP_C (1/0)       0.331         0.471         0.000   0.000 0.000 0.000 
Log_inc_aue       9.161         0.670         9.200   0.554 9.142 0.749 
Explanatory variables       
HH characteristics       
Hhh_sex       0.848        0.359 0.92  0.279 0.82 0.389 
Age_hh_1       46.76        12.52         44.08  11.56 48.1 12.79 
Family_size       5.745        2.114         5.843  2.334 5.964 2.002 
Edu_hhh       1.167        2.184         0.964  1.685 1.268 2.391 
Stu_number        1.509        1.435         1.12  1.334 1.71 1.445 
Average_g       4.212        2.388         3.488  2.297 4.578 2.355 
Adult_hhm       2.865        1.286         2.903  1.393 2.845 1.233 
Aware_cc       0.355        0.479         0.337  0.476 0.363 0.482 
Asset Holdings       
P_size _tsimdi       4.356        2.927        3.749  2.496 4.656 3.082 
Tlu       3.107        2.585        3.107  2.252 3.142 2.740 
Private_forest       0.450        0.499        0.482  0.503 0.435 0.497 
F_saving       0.251        0.412        0.193  0.397 0.226 0.419 
Access to factor market and inputs  
Wage_income     1844.1   2252.455       1533.9  1405.503 1997.5 2560.003 
Own_business       0.355         0.479         0.157  0.366 0.405 0.492 
Access_credit       0.375         0.485         0.373  0.487 0.375 0.486 
Access_irrigation       0.135         0.343         0.120  0.328 0.143 0.351 
Log _dis_market        1.243         1.335         1.777  1.083 0.978 1.370 
Log_dis_forests       1.708         0.828         1.637  0.786 1.742 0.847 
Shock dummies 
Weather_s       0.797         0.403         0.892  0.034 0.75 0.434 
Death_ill_s       0.227         0.420         0.289  0.456 0.196 0.398 
Price_s       0.323         0.468         0.349  0.479 0.309 0.464 
Loss_live_s       0.454         0.499         0.469  0.502 0.446 0.498 





Table 5. 2 Mean separation test of participants and non-participants 









Participants  Non-participants   
Mean  S. D. Mean  S. D   P-Value  
 
Income       
Log_inc_aue       9.200  0.608       9.142 0.058 0.5354 
Explanatory 
variables 
     
HH characteristics      
Hhh_sex        0.92            0.279       0.82  0.389      0.0373** 
Age_hh_1        44.08            11.56       48.1  12.79          0.0168** 
Family_size        5.843            2.334       5.964  2.002      0.6055 
Edu_hhh        0.964            1.685       1.268  2.391      0.3005 
Stu_number         1.12            1.334       1.71  1.445      0.0017*** 
Average_g        3.488            2.297       4.578  2.355                               0.0006*** 
Adult_hhm        2.903            1.393       2.845  1.233      0.7358 
Aware_cc        0.337            0.476       0.363  0.482      0.6898 
Asset Holdings      
P_size _tsimdi        3.749            2.496       4.656  3.082      0.0206** 
Tlu        3.107            2.252       3.142  2.740      0.7606 
Private_forest        0.482            0.503       0.435  0.497      0.4796 
F_saving        0.193            0.397       0 .226  0.419      0.5463 
Access to factor market and inputs  
Wage_income        1533.9            1405.503      1997.5  2560.003      0.1251 
Own_business        0.157            0.366      0.405  0.492      0.0001*** 
Access_credit        0.373            0.487      0.375  0.486      0.9816 
Access_irrigation        0.120            0.328      0.143  0.351      0.6277 
Log _dis_market         1.777            1.083      0.978  1.370      0.0000*** 
Log_dis_forests        1.637            0.786      1.742  0.847      0.3425 
Shock dummies 
Weather_s        0.892            0.034      0.75  0.434      0.0086*** 
Death_ill_s        0.289            0.456      0.196  0.398      0.0998*** 
Price_s        0.349            0.479      0.309  0.464      0.5269 
Loss_live_s        0.469            0.502      0.446  0.498      0.7268 






Table 5. 3  Definition of Expected income and treatment effects 
 








                 Decision Stage   
Treatment Effect  Participation Non Participation  
Households that participated  (a) 𝐸𝐸(𝑦𝑦1𝑖𝑖| 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 = 1) (c) 𝐸𝐸(𝑦𝑦2𝑖𝑖| 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 = 0)         TT 
Households that did not participate (d) 𝐸𝐸(𝑦𝑦1𝑖𝑖| 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 = 1) (b) 𝐸𝐸(𝑦𝑦2𝑖𝑖| 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 = 0)         TU 
Heterogeneity effects              𝐵𝐵𝐻𝐻1             𝐵𝐵𝐻𝐻2         TH  
Notes: (a) and (b) represent observed expected income;(C) and (d) represent counterfactual expected 
income  
𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 = 1 if the farm households participated in forest sales; 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖=0 if farm households did not participate 
𝑌𝑌1𝑖𝑖 : income if the household participate in forest resource commercialization  
𝑌𝑌2𝑖𝑖 : income if the household did not  participate in forest resource commercialization 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 : The effect of the treatment (i.e., participation) on the treated (i.e., farm households that 
participate 
𝑇𝑇𝑈𝑈 : The effect of the treatment (i.e., participation) on the untreated (i.e., farm households that did 
not participate) 
𝐵𝐵𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖 : the effect of base heterogeneity  for farm households that participate in forest resource 
commercialization (𝑖𝑖 = 1) , and did not participate (𝑖𝑖 = 2); 





Table 5. 4 OLS and Endogenous Switching Regression estimates 
                                                     
17Estimation of full information maximum likelihood at household level. 
         (1)    (2 )    (3)        (4) 











 Participation =1 
(farm households 
that participate in 
forest 
commercialization 
Participation = 0 ( if the 
households did not 
participate in forest 
commercialization) 
 







    1/0 
Annual Household 
income in Ethiopian 
Birr  
Annual Household 
income in Ethiopian 
Birr  
Participation 1/0 0.122 
(0.078) 
   
Sex of the household head (1if male 

























































































Number of Students in the hh  -0.205*** 
(0.075) 
  
Log distance o forest   -0.143 
(0.113) 
  







* ,** and *** denotes significant at 10%; 5%,   and  1 % respectively. 
 
Sample size: 251. 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖 denotes the square-root of the variance of the error terms 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 in the outcome 
equation (2a) and     (2b), respectively; 𝜌𝜌𝑗𝑗   denotes the correlation coefficient between the error 




Own Business   -0.746*** 
(0.243) 
  
Access to Private forest   0.586*** 
(0.195) 
  




















Adjusted R2  0.40    






Table 5. 5  Expected income and treatment effects 













Forest Commercialization  
Treatment Effect  Participation Non Participation  
Households that participated in forest 
commercialization 
(a) 10673.91 
      (568.001) 
(c)9054.848 
     (536.196) 
TT = 1619.062** 
          (394.436) 
Households that did not participate in 
forest commercialization 
(d) 10852.31 
      (612.223) 
(b)14482.79 
      (546.392) 
TU = -3630.48*** 
           (820.586) 
Heterogeneity effects   𝐵𝐵𝐻𝐻1 = -178.4 
      (874.212) 
𝐵𝐵𝐻𝐻2 = -5427.942*** 
       (952.636) 
TH = 5249.542*** 







Table 51AVariables definition 
 
  
Variable name                                                    Definition  
Dependent variables  
NTFP_C (1/0) Dummy  = 1 if the household participated in forest resource 
commercialization, 0 otherwise  
Log_inc_aue Log income per adult equivalent unit in Ethiopian Birr 
Explanatory variables 
HH characteristics  
Hhh_sex   = 1 if the head of the household  is male, 0 otherwise  
Age_hh_1  Household head’s Age in years  
Family_size Household size 
Edu_hhh Educational level of the household head in years  
Stu_number  Number of Students in the household  
Average_g Average educational grade level in the household  
Adult_hhm Number of adult household members  
Aware_cc Dummy = 1 if the household head is aware of climate change in his/her 
locality , 0 otherwise   
Asset Holdings  
P_size _tsimdi Plot size owned by the household in tsimdi (= 0.25 hectare ) 
Tlu Number of livestock owned in Tropical Livestock Unit (TLU) 
Private_forest Dummy = 1 if the household owned private forest , 0 otherwise  
F_saving Dummy = 1 if the household has financial savings  
Access to factor market and inputs 
 
Wage_income Amount of wage income earned by the household in Ethiopian Birr  
Own_business Dummy = 1 if the household engaged in his/her own business ,0 
otherwise  
Access_credit Dummy = 1 if the household has access to credit form micro finance 
0.otherwise  
Access_irrigation Dummy =1 if the household has access to irrigation , 0 otherwise  
Log _dis_market  Log transformed distance from home to market in minutes  
Log_dis_forests Log transformed distance from home to nearest forest in minutes  
Shock dummies  
Weather_s Dummy = 1 if the household experienced weather related shocks last 
year , 0 otherwise   
Death_ill_s Dummy =1 if the household experienced death or illness of a household 
member last year , 0 otherwise  
Price_s Dummy = 1 if the household experienced price related shocks last year 
, 0 otherwise  
Loss_live_s Dummy = 1 if the household experienced shocks related to loss of 









ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES, POVERTY AND INEQUALITY IN THE SEMI-ARID 
REGION OF TIGRAY, ETHIOPIA 
6.1. Introduction 
Poverty reduction is one of the international imperatives of the new millennium – an imperative 
stressed by the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable 
Development and, most recently, at the 2005 UN World Summit (Roe .D, and Elliot. J,, 2005). 
With rural poverty accounting for some 75% of world poverty, meeting this goal, together with 
the high levels of spatial concurrence between regions rich in biodiversity and the majority of the 
world’s poor, has compelled scholars and practitioners operating at the environment – 
development interface to seek solutions to poverty that include natural resource – based activities.   
The underlying reasoning of  poverty reduction through biodiversity conservation initiatives is 
multifaceted. One aspect is the premise that many tropical forests have a greater long-term 
economic value if they are left standing. Second, local forest communities will tend towards 
careful, sustainable management of the forest if they receive direct economic benefits from 





deforestation and environmental degradation. If poverty can be alleviated through the harvesting 
of forest resources, then deforestation pressures will be reduced (Newmann and Hirsch, 2000). 
A literature has grown rapidly in recent years focused on examining the potential for forest-based 
poverty alleviation. Among the key authors are: Byron and Arnold (1999); Cavendish (2000); 
Arnold (2001); Wunder (2001); Scherr et al. (2002); Angelsen and Wunder (2003);  
Lopez –Feldman (2007); Mamo et al., (2007) and Babulo et al. (2009). Views diverge on whether 
there should be grounds for optimism or pessimism for forest-based poverty alleviation. Scherr et 
al. (2002) can be viewed as leaning in the optimistic direction, whereas Wunder (2001) clearly 
favours a pessimistic view (Sunderlin and Thu, 2005).  A recurrent theme in this new literature is 
the need for additional research as there are many questions that remain to be answered (Angelsen 
and Wunder 2003).  
Reducing income inequality has also become a major public policy challenge among development 
agencies and poverty reduction experts. In this regard the impact of Non Timber Forest Products 
(NTFPs) on income distribution is another important aspect. For example Griffin and Ickowitz 
(1997) stated “the importance of natural capital in the total stock of capital tends to vary inversely 
with the level of income per head”. That is, the poorer the country, the more significant is natural 
capital likely to be in determining the overall distribution of wealth. 
Inequality is also important for poverty discussion in many ways. One aspect is that people living 
in and around forests, just like other people, do not only care about their own absolute 
incomes:their welfare perceptions also depend on their income status  “vis-a- vis “the joneses” – 
the individuals, households or communities of reference that they would like to keep up with” 
(Angelson and Wunder 2003). Second, it is also generally accepted that one of the causes of 





tend to over-exploit their resources. Third, where NTFPs already provide significant household 
incomes, the distribution of that income may be highly uneven and complex (Newman and Hirsch, 
2000). Fourth, levels of income inequality can also reflect inequalities in rights over assets and 
resources that are used to generate income (Anderson et al. 2006).  More research can elucidate 
these patterns, and in particular suggest how, why and under what circumstances inequality exists, 
and with what consequences to marginalized groups and individuals engaged in NTFP extraction.  
Yet, quantitative studies of the relationship between natural resources, poverty and inequality are 
scarce (Lopez 2007). With few exceptions, discussions about poverty reduction strategies and the 
role of forests often focus almost exclusively on income growth, neglecting the potential roles of 
income re-distribution and inequality. 
Jodha (1986) seems to be amongst the first stream of researchers who attempted to rigorously shed 
more light on the distributional implications of forest environmental income on poverty and 
inequality. He found that the Gini coefficient in dry regions in India increases by as much as 34 
percent when income derived from forest gathering is ignored in Gini estimation. Also in India 
Reddy and Chakravarty (1999) found that when forest income is set to zero in poverty calculations, 
poverty increases by as much as 28 percent. However, the inequality effect of ignoring forest 
income was very marginal. Similarly, Lopez-Feldman et al.(2007) in their study of rural Mexico 
and the Lacandona Rainforest community area of Mexico, observed  that when forest income is 
ignored in poverty calculations, the severity of poor people increases more at the regional and 
community levels (17.1% and 18.4% respectively), than at national level(10.8%). The headcount 
and poverty gap measures revealed a similar pattern of greater sensitivity of poverty at the regional 
and community levels than at the national level.  In their inequality calculations, it was also 





much as 0.36 and 0.11 percent, respectively, at the national and community levels. In the World 
Bank meta-study (Vedeld et al., 2004), the average increase in the Gini-coefficient when forest 
income was excluded was 0.13 (from 0.36 to 0.49). The same could be deduced from studies in 
Southern Malawi (Fisher 2004), Uganda (Aryal, 2002), Ethiopia (Mamo et al., 2007 and Babulo 
et al., 2009) and Nigeria (Fonta et al., 2011).  
However, although the above studies explored the role of forest income in reducing rural poverty 
and inequality and tried to establish empirical regularity about the poverty reduction and equalizing 
effect of forest income, they suffer from methodological shortcomings. Their method provides a 
direct and simple measure of how forest income contributes to the total income under the 
simplifying assumption that forest income is  exogenous and not a substitute for the participants’ 
labour earnings on-farm and in other works. The focus of their analysis was principally on the 
decomposition techniques and the estimation of inequality indicators, using household income 
including and excluding forest incomes, without considering the interdependency of forest 
extraction and other household activities. Indeed, not distinguishing this interdependency could 
lead to biased decomposition of poverty and inequality indicators and misleading policy 
implications. In other words, these earlier studies did not attempt to estimate the opportunity costs 
of labour participation in forest extraction; that is, what the household members who participated 
in forest extraction would have contributed to household income had they not been involved in 
forest extraction. Neither were the indirect effects of forest income on other sources of income 
included in the analysis. 
The implicit assumption of their approach is that forest income is an exogenous income transfer, 
which does not have any effect on labour supply, and other income sources of the household. This 





forest income raises total income by the same amount. This could be true if the participation in 
forest resource extraction was to compensate a short- term shock, such as a bad harvest or 
drought/flood. But, more often than not, participation in forest extraction is a long term alternative 
choice of participation in farm activities for households such as those in rural Tigray. In fact 
Gopalakrishnan et al., (2005) tested the hypothesis of competitive /complementary labour 
allocation between NTFP gathering and agriculture in their study of the Sinharaja rain forest region 
of SriLanka. The results of their analysis showed that labour requirement for tea production is 
negatively and significantly related to NTFP, implying that NTFP gathering and agriculture are 
competing for labour and that the household members’ time in forest commercialization would 
contribute to the household in alternative ways if they did not participate in forest 
commercialization. 
In addition the decision to participate in forest extraction and the subsequent income also affect 
the household’s exposure to income risks, as well as its investment and production decisions. For 
example, the income from forest extraction might provide insurance and relieve the household’s 
budget constraint which in turn might lead the household to adopt riskier or more costly production 
techniques with higher potential returns. On the downside, forest extraction might also affect the 
household’s labour participation and supply decision or forest extraction may lead to  deforestation 
which boosts the time allocated to fuel wood collection and thereby reduces agricultural output by 
shifting household members’ time away from agricultural work. 
 As a result, when the indirect effects of insurance, investment and liquidity prevail, the marginal 
impact of forest commercialization on the total household income is hypothesized to be greater 
than unity. In contrast when the disincentive effects prevail, the marginal impact will be less than 





forest income in productive assets, which then provide an additional contribution to households’ 
total income in subsequent years. 
The task of the research then is to estimate what households’ per capita income situation would 
have been in the absence of forest commercialization (due to restrictive policy such as area closures 
or resource depletion) – the counterfactual income level – and then to compare with the actual 
household per capita income with forest income included as part of total income. Previous studies 
on the areas of forest income and inequality elsewhere have neglected this issue, choosing instead 
to treat forest income as an addition to what the household would have otherwise earned. In other 
words, rather than estimating a counterfactual without forest extraction scenario, previous studies 
have simply compared actual income excluding forest income with including forest income. This 
could result in an overestimation of the impact of forest income on both the level of household 
income (and poverty alleviation) and the distribution of income. In this paper we will compare the 
results following both methodological approaches, in order to allow us a clear estimation of the 
extent of over-estimation or under- estimation of these impacts in previous works. 
Our results contribute a meaningful addition to the poverty-environment debate and Ethiopia’s 
current conservation policy in many respects: First, we show that the choice of methodology can 
have a significant impact on the estimated contribution of forests and conclusions made about the 
role of forests on poverty and distribution of income. Second, we find that the contribution of 
forests to reduce the incidence of poverty is considerably weaker, and might increase the severity 
of poverty when the counterfactual estimation method is used. Third, in relation to income 
distribution, we find that after using the counterfactual approach, the impact of forest income on 
distribution is negative as against a positive contribution in the conventional approach. Fourth, 





poverty and inequality indicators when we use the conventional approach, but has little or negative 
impact on poverty and inequality indicators under the counterfactual approach, could be explained 
by the fact that participation in forest activities might have a disincentive effect on incomes from 
other activities which are not captured when forest income is treated as an exogenous addition to 
the existing household income.  
The chapterr is outlined as follows: Section 6.2 provides an overview of forest management, 
poverty and distributional aspects in rural Tigray. Section 6.3 presents the data description and 
study sites. Section 6.4 outlines the econometric model and estimation procedure. Section 6.5 
presents the results and discussion while the final section provides concluding remarks and policy 
implications. 
6.2. Overview of Forest Management, Poverty and Distributional Aspects in Tigray 
As late as the 1950s, nearly half of Tigray region’s land area was covered in woodlands and forests, 
while less than 30 years later, in 1979 nine percent remained (Wolde-Giorgis, 1996 cited in 
Howard and Smith, 2006).Accelerated deforestation has led to severe soil erosion in regions where 
people are dependent on marginal, rain fed agriculture. Since 1991, the Ethiopian government has 
embarked on an economic development strategy known as Agricultural Development–Led 
Industrialization (ADLI), which places greater emphasis on agricultural development. 
Conservation programs also gained top priority in economic development in Tigray, which focuses 
on conservation of natural resources and community participation. Closing degraded land areas 
from human and livestock intervention to promote natural regeneration of plants, commonly 
termed as enclosures , is among the major constraint efforts practiced in the highland areas of 





In addition to enclosures, the regional government created restrictions on the use of certain tree 
species and the restrictions apply to all common land areas, regardless of whether they are open 
access or enclosed (FAO, 2006). This strategy is meant to benefit the environment and is a 
conservation effort that the community itself is operating (Gebrehiwot and van der Veen, 2010). 
The immediate positive environmental effects of the enclosures and the species restrictions are 
nearly universally acknowledged both by researchers and by local populations (Howard and Smith, 
2006) and the international community alike18. Nevertheless(Nedessa et al., 2005) called into 
question whether the results of the current conservation policy are effective or sustainable from an 
economic or environmental point of view. There is also a steadily growing body of literature 
questioning the impact of this policy in terms of its contribution to income and equity of 
distribution (Tesfay, 2006; Gebremedhin et al., 2004; ( Chisholm, 2000; and Nedessa et al., 2005). 
Local communities use woodlots/enclosures to cut and collect grass for animal feed and other 
purposes, to collect fruits and seeds, and to practice beekeeping .However, although these practices 
are widespread, they generate relatively small economic benefits (Gebremedhin et al., 2004), the 
economic benefits and costs of enclosures are distributed inequitably (Chisholm, 2000) and the 
rich households benefit triply (Nedessa et al., 2005). However, the arguments from both sides have 
been based essentially on qualitative narratives of the pros and cons of exclosure establishment 
and have not been backed up by quantitative reasoning and indicators (Babulo, 2007). For 
example, they evaluate the impacts of such policy on incomes and equity using only simple 
tabulations, without verifying if the reported regularities are significant using poverty and 
inequality decompositions. This indicates that there is untapped research potential to provide 
                                                     






clarity under which conditions   the current forest management contributes to poverty and 
distribution of incomes quantitatively. With the exception of (Babulo, 2007), current literature 
does not provide economic data that relates the contribution of the existing forest management to 
the distribution of income in the semi-arid region of Tigray.     
6.3. Data Description and Study Sites 
A household survey was conducted in 2010/11 on 254 households in Tigray region of northern 
Ethiopia. However, because of missing data on some key variables for 3 households, our final 
estimating sample consists of 251 households.  A two stage sampling design was made in the 
study. The primary sampling units (PSUs) were tabias. Sample tabias were selected on the basis 
of secondary information collected from all the Woredas along the margins of the two protected 
forests in the region. In selecting the sample tabias, a number of factors that affect socio economic 
condition such as nearness to market, geographical location, the availability of both rain fed 
agriculture and irrigation, size of tabias based on population etc were considered so as to make the 
sampled tabias representative. In this category, a total of ten tabias namely Arato, Derga _ajen, 
Hugumrda, Meswaeti, Kara_adishawo, WorebayuKal_amin, Kelisha_emni,andFelege_woini 
were selected for the survey. The tabias selected are representative of the three different agro-
ecological zones of the region identified on the basis of altitude. Areas with altitude ranging from 
1500- 2300 m.a.s.l. are locally termed as woinadougai.e midland areas, areas above 2300 m.a.s.l. 
are locally known as dougai.e. highland areas and areas with altitude less than 1500 m.a.s.l. are 
termed as kola i.e., lowland. To determine the extent to which households in rural Tigray use forest 
environmental resources for their livelihood, we follow (Narrain et al., 2008) to calculate the 





6. 4. Econometric Model and Estimation Procedure 
Households who are involved in forest activities are likely to differ from households who are not. 
A household may participate in forest extraction if he/she anticipates that the decision to participate 
in forest related activity is worthwhile rather than entering by random assignment.  Unobservable 
characteristics of households and their family may affect the participation decision in forest 
activities and the level of income, resulting in inconsistent estimates of the effect of participationon 
income (Di-falco et al, 2011). Accordingly, we used a simultaneous equations model with 
endogenous switching by full information Maximum likelihood (FIML) to determine the counter 
factual income of forest resource extraction following Di-falco et al., (2011) as shown below.  
The selection equation for participating in forest activities is specified as: 
(6.1)          𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖∗ = 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖𝛼𝛼  + 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 with𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 = �
1 𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖∗ > 0
0 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
 
That is, households will choose to participate in forest extraction (𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 = 1 ) if 𝐴𝐴∗ > 0, 0 otherwise, 
where 𝐴𝐴∗ represents the expected benefits of participating in forest extraction  with respect to non-
participation in forest related activities, Z is a vector of observed household characteristics or 
variables that are influencing the decision to participate in forest commercialization or otherwise.  
To complete the system of simultaneous equations model for household income, conditional on 
participation in forest environmental resource commercialization, we specify two equations 
following(Di-falco et al., 2011) where (1) participation of households in forest extraction and (2) 
non-participation in forest activity are defined as follows:    
(6.2a)   Regime 1:   𝑦𝑦1𝑖𝑖 = 𝑋𝑋1𝑖𝑖𝛽𝛽1  +  𝜀𝜀1𝑖𝑖              if  𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 = 1 





Where 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 represents the income and food security level in regimes 1 and 2, 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 represents a vector 
of explanatory variables mentioned above.   
Finally, the error terms are assumed to have a trivariate normal distribution, with zero mean and 






Where 𝜎𝜎𝑛𝑛2 is the variance of the error term in the selection equation (6.1), (which can be assumed 
to be equal 1 since the coefficients are estimable only up to a scale factor), 𝜎𝜎12 and 𝜎𝜎22 are the 
variances of the error terms in the income function (6.2a) and (6.2b) , and 𝜎𝜎1𝜂𝜂 and 𝜎𝜎2𝜂𝜂  represent 
the covariance of 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 ,𝜀𝜀1𝑖𝑖 and 𝜀𝜀2𝑖𝑖. Since 𝑦𝑦1𝑖𝑖 and 𝑦𝑦2𝑖𝑖 are not observed simultaneously the covariance 
between 𝜀𝜀1𝑖𝑖 and 𝜀𝜀2𝑖𝑖 is not defined (Maddala, 1983 cited inDi-falco et al, (2011)). An important 
implication of the error structure is that because the error term of the selection equation (6.1) 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 is 
correlated with the error terms of the income equation (6.2a) and (6.2b) (𝜀𝜀1𝑖𝑖 and 𝜀𝜀2𝑖𝑖), the expected 
values of 𝜀𝜀1𝑖𝑖 and 𝜀𝜀2𝑖𝑖 conditional on the sample selection are non zero: 
𝐸𝐸[𝜀𝜀1𝑖𝑖|𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 = 1] = 𝜎𝜎1𝜂𝜂
ф(𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝛼𝛼)
Ф(𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝛼𝛼)
 =𝜎𝜎1𝜂𝜂𝜆𝜆1𝑖𝑖, and 𝐸𝐸[𝜀𝜀2𝑖𝑖|𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 = 0] = -𝜎𝜎2𝜂𝜂
ф(𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝛼𝛼)
1−Ф(𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝛼𝛼)
  =𝜎𝜎2𝜂𝜂𝜆𝜆2𝑖𝑖,  
Where ф(. )  andФ(. ) are the standard normal probability function, Ф(. ) the standard normal 
cumulative density function respectively, and 𝜆𝜆1𝑖𝑖= 
ф(𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝛼𝛼)
 Ф(𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝛼𝛼)
 , 𝜆𝜆2𝑖𝑖 = 
ф(𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝛼𝛼)
1−Ф(𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝛼𝛼)
. Thus, if the estimates 
of the associated coefficients to the inverse Mill’s ratios are found to be statistically different from 
zero, the hypothesis of the absence of sample selectivity bias can be rejected(Féres et al., 2007). 
This model is defined as a “switching regression model with endogenous switching” (Maddala and 





an efficient method to fit the endogenous switching regression model (Di-falco et al, 2011; Linh 
et al., 2014). 
The logarithmic function given the previous assumption regarding the distribution of the error term 
as presented by Di-falco and Veroseni (2010) is 
(6.3) ln 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 = ∑ 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=1 �lnф�
𝜀𝜀1𝑖𝑖
𝜎𝜎1
� − lnФ +  lnФ(𝜃𝜃1𝑖𝑖)�+(1 −  𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖) �lnФ�
𝜀𝜀2𝑖𝑖
𝜎𝜎2
� − ln𝜎𝜎2 + ln�1 −
Ф(𝜃𝜃2𝑖𝑖)��, 




 ,   𝑗𝑗 = 1,2, with 𝜌𝜌𝑗𝑗 denoting the correlation coefficient between the error 




 6.4.1. Expected outcome and Treatment Effects 
The aforementioned endogenous switching regression model can be used to compare the expected 
income of the farm households that participate in forest extraction  (6.4a) with respect to the farm 
households that did not participate (6.4b), and to investigate the expected income in the 
counterfactual hypothetical case (6.4c) that the participant farm households did not participate. 
The conditional expectations for income status in the four cases are defined following Di-falco et 
al. (2011)  as follows: 
(6.4a)  𝐸𝐸(𝑦𝑦1𝑖𝑖| 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 = 1)  = 𝑋𝑋1𝑖𝑖𝛽𝛽1 + 𝜎𝜎1𝜂𝜂𝜆𝜆1𝑖𝑖 





 (6.4c)  𝐸𝐸(𝑦𝑦1𝑖𝑖| 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 = 0)  = 𝑋𝑋1𝑖𝑖𝛽𝛽2 + 𝜎𝜎2𝜂𝜂𝜆𝜆1𝑖𝑖 
Cases (6.4a) and (6.4b) represent the actual income expectations observed in the sample for 
participants and non-participants respectively while case (6.4c) represents the counterfactual 
income of participants in the hypothetical case that the participants did not participate in 
commercialization of forests.  Having simulated the income obtained if the household did not 
participate in forest commercialization, we can study the effect of forest income on rural 
households’ poverty and inequality. We calculate respectively poverty measured by class of  𝑃𝑃𝛼𝛼 
indices (Foster et al., 1984) and inequality measured by Gini Coefficient of: 
(1) Observed income, which is the sum of (6.4a) and(6. 4b) 
(2) Observed income, without forest income    
(3) Observed income for non–participants and the counter factual income for participants 
under the scenario of non-participation, which is the sum of (6.4b) and (6.4c ). 
If 𝑃𝑃𝛼𝛼 under (1) which is the actual income including forest income is lower than 𝑃𝑃𝛼𝛼 under (2) which 
is the observed income excluding forest income and  the counterfactual scenario (3), forest incomes 
reduce poverty, and vice versa. Following the same idea, we study the impact of forest income on 
inequality. Overall three basic scenarios are analysed as follows.  
In the first scenario- observed income without forest income – the indicators are estimated using 
observed income excluding forest income for all households. This scenario is used by all the 
previous studies in forest poverty analysis including those of Cavendish (2000); Botha (2003); 
Fisher (2004); Lopez-Feldman (2007) and Babulo et al (2009). This scenario treats forest income 





The second scenario – counterfactual income – uses the basic counterfactual methodology 
discussed in section 6.4.1 to estimate what the poverty indicators would be without participation 
in forest resource commercialization. The FGT indices are calculated using observed income for 
non-participants, and the counterfactual income for participants under the scenario of non-
participation.  
Finally, the third scenario uses the counterfactual methodology and the FGT index without forest 
income methodology to see whether previous studies such as those by Cavendish (2000); Botha 
(2003); Fisher (2004); Lopez-Feldman (2007) and Babulo et al (2009) were overestimating or 
underestimating the contribution of forest environmental resources on poverty and inequality. 
 6.4.2. Measuring Poverty 
To analyse the contribution of forest incomes to poverty and inequality, we start from the standard 
Foster–Greer-Thorbecke (FGT) class of measures that incorporates the three most common 
poverty indexes. If we let 𝑦𝑦 = (𝑦𝑦1,𝑦𝑦2 , … .𝑦𝑦𝑘𝑘) represent household income in increasing order and 
𝑧𝑧 > 0 denote the predetermined poverty line, the FGT poverty line is defined by:  





Where 𝑛𝑛 is the total number of households, 𝑞𝑞 = 𝑞𝑞(𝑦𝑦 ; 𝑧𝑧) is the number of poor households, 𝑔𝑔𝑘𝑘 = 𝑧𝑧 
- 𝑦𝑦𝑘𝑘 is the income short fall (the gap between the household’s income and the poverty line) of the 
k-th (poor) household, and 𝛼𝛼 is a parameter. 
Three variants of the FGT poverty index are used to estimate the impacts of income from forests 
on rural poverty: the head-count measure  𝛼𝛼 = 0, 𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻(𝑦𝑦 ; 𝑧𝑧) =
𝑞𝑞
𝑛𝑛
   measures the incidence of changes 





the poverty gap 𝛼𝛼 = 1, 𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺(𝑦𝑦 ; 𝑧𝑧) = 
1
𝑛𝑛𝑧𝑧
∑ 𝑧𝑧 − 𝑦𝑦𝑘𝑘
𝑞𝑞
𝑘𝑘=1   measures the depth of poverty, or how far below 
the poverty line the average poor household’s income falls; and finally , the squared poverty gap 
𝛼𝛼 = 2, 𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐺𝐺(𝑦𝑦 ; 𝑧𝑧) = 
1
𝑛𝑛𝑧𝑧2
∑ (𝑧𝑧 −  𝑦𝑦𝑘𝑘)2
𝑞𝑞
𝑘𝑘=1  measures the severity of poverty and is sensitive to changes 
in the distribution of income among the poor (Taylor et al., 2005).  
 6.4.3 Measuring inequality 
To explore the impact of forest income on rural income inequality, we use Gini indices. Although 
various indices that can be used to measure inequality exist, the Gini is probably the most intuitive 
and allows for decomposition by income sources (Taylor et al., 2005). If we let 𝑦𝑦 = (𝑦𝑦1 , … .𝑦𝑦𝐼𝐼) 
represent 𝐵𝐵 components of household income, and if we define total income as = ∑ 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖=1  , we can 
write the extended Gini coefficient for village incomes as a function of the covariance between 





where 𝑌𝑌� is the mean of total income Y and F(Y) is the cumulative distribution of total incomes in 
the village. If we use the properties of covariance, we can re-write equation (10) as: 
(6.7)𝐺𝐺𝑌𝑌 =






In equation (6.7), 𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 is the share of income from source 𝑖𝑖 in total income, 𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖= 𝑌𝑌�𝑖𝑖 𝑌𝑌�⁄ , 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 is the Gini 
correlation of income from source 𝑖𝑖 with the distribution of total income (CBO, 2011) , and 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 is 
the Gini index corresponding to the distribution of income from source 𝑖𝑖. 








In equation (6.7) the aggregate Gini coefficient 𝐺𝐺𝑌𝑌 that measures the total income inequality in a 
given population is expressed as the sum of the product’s 𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡ℎ income component in our case forest 
income, relative to its own Gini, and its correlation with the total income (Stark et al., 1986). One 
of the basic rationales for decomposing the total Gini to component income sources is to 
investigate how changes in a particular income source (in our case forest income) will affect the 
total income inequality, holding income from other sources constant. 
Taking household labour and production decisions as given, if we increase an income source 𝑗𝑗 by 




= 𝐵𝐵𝑗𝑗�𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗𝐺𝐺𝑗𝑗 −  𝐺𝐺𝑌𝑌� 
where 𝐵𝐵𝑗𝑗 , 𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗, 𝐺𝐺𝑗𝑗  and 𝐺𝐺𝑌𝑌 are measured prior to the marginal income change, and the relative effect 








If 𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗 which is the Gini correlation between forest income and total income is negative or zero, an 
increase in forest income would decrease inequality. However, if 𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗 is positive, then the impact of 
an increase in forest income on inequality depends on the sign of 𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗𝐺𝐺𝑗𝑗 − 𝐺𝐺𝑌𝑌. Inequality will 
increase if the inequality of forest income exceeds the inequality of the total household income: 





6.5. Results and Discussion 
 6.5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Out of the 251 households in the data set, about 33% of the households were participating in forest 
commercialization during the year 2009/10. The average age of sample households is 46.76 years 
and 85 % are male headed. There is also a significant difference observed in the age and gender of 
participants and non-participants. In addition participants seem to have significantly lower number 
of students and lower average grade of educational level than their counterpart non-participant 
households. The average land holding in tsimdi (=0.25 hectare) for participants is 3.75 while it is 
about 4.7 for non- participants and the difference is statistically significant. The average walking 
distance to nearby market is significantly higher for participants.   
<< INSERT TABLE 6.1.ABOUT HERE>> 
 6.5.2 Poverty and inequality Analysis 
Using the  conditional expectations and treatment effects discussed in section 6.4.1, we estimated 
the expected income of participants in the counterfactual hypothetical  case that the participant 
group of households did not participate. This counterfactual income, which assumes participation 
in forest-related activity to be zero, is used to calculate per capita household income adjusted by 
adult equivalent scales. For comparability purposes, we use the FGT poverty index for the poverty 
analysis, while the Gini coefficient is used as a measure of inequality as discussed in section 6.4.3. 
We set the income poverty line 2100 Birr (an inflation-adjusted poverty line of the official baseline 
(poverty line of Birr 1075 set in 1995/96) as a measure of welfare corresponding to some minimum 
acceptable standard of living in Ethiopia(MOFED, 2006). Further more, we undertook ordinal 
poverty comparisons using stochastic dominance tests to check the robustness of the poverty 





Tables 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4 present the results for the analysis of poverty indicators, which were 
estimated using the household level data weighted by household size. The tables show the 
estimated FGT indices under each scenario, as well as their percentage change when compared 
against each indicator obtained using actual household income, including forest income.  
A. Estimated Poverty indicators: Conventional vis-a-vis Counterfactual Scenario 
 Comparing the role of forest income in poverty and inequality indicators under each scenario 
shows some interesting similarities and differences with previous studies in Ethiopia (Babulo et 
al.,2009 and Mamo et al.2007) and elsewhere as discussed below. 
<< INSERT TABLE 6.2 ABOUT HERE >> 
Results from table 6.2 which uses the conventional approach of estimating the contribution of 
forests to poverty and distribution of income indicates that forest incomes lead to a decline in the 
incidence of poverty (𝑃𝑃0) from 61.6 % to 43.4%19, in the depth of poverty (𝑃𝑃1) from 28.6% to 
16.1 %  and in the severity of poverty (𝑃𝑃2) from 17.1% to 8.1%. The strong impact on the depth 
and severity of poverty suggests that participation in forest environmental resource 
commercialization reduces the income gap among the poor and the gains in poverty reduction due 
to participation in forest environmental resource commercialization go disproportionately to the 
poorest households. This finding is consistent with Reddy and Chakravarty (1999); Cavandish 
(1999); Fisher (2004); Lopez – Feldman (2007) and Babulo et al (2009). 
<< INSERT TABLE 6.3 ABOUT HERE >> 
                                                     
19In its five year (2010/11-2014/15) regional GTP, the regional government reported that the incidence of poverty 






Table  6.3, which uses the predicted income of households that participate in forest environmental 
resource commercialization under the condition that they did not participate – the counterfactual 
approach, indicates that participation in forest environmental resource related activities  still leads 
to a decline in the incidence of poverty (𝑃𝑃0) from 61.6 % to 53.4 %. These results provide strong 
evidence that participation in forest environmental resource commercialization and the subsequent 
income alleviate poverty in rural Tigray. However, under this scenario, the poverty headcount ratio 
decreases by 22.9 % while it declines by 44.2 % under the first scenario. Moreover, unlike the first 
scenario the depth of poverty (𝑃𝑃1) and the severity of poverty (𝑃𝑃2) increase from 15.8% to 16.1% 
and from 6.2% to 8.1% respectively. Even though it is not significant, the negative impact on the 
depth of poverty suggests that participation in forest related activities increases the income gap 
among the poor. And the negative impact on the severity of poverty, which assigns higher weights 
to the poorest of the poor, suggests that participation in forest activities did not improve the 
wellbeing of the poorest of the poor disproportionately. In other words, the gains in poverty 
reduction due to participation in forest environmental resource commercialization did not 
significantly go disproportionately to the poorest households. In this regard our finding differs 
from those of Reddy and Chakravarty (1999); Lopez – Feldman (2007)  and Mariara and 
Gachoki(2008), who found that forest income has  positive impacts on poverty, depth of poverty 
and severity and that the impact is greater in terms of lessening dire poverty than its effect in lifting 
poverty in India, Mexico and Kenya respectively. 
<< INSERT TABLE 6.4 ABOUT HERE >> 
Comparing the results of the counterfactual approach and the conventional approach in table 6.4, 
we observe that the contribution of forest income to poverty is substantially overestimated when 





used. The estimated contribution of forests is substantially lower when we use the more complex 
methodology in which forest incomes are assumed to be endogenous in the hypothetical, no 
participation in forest-related activity scenario. Using this counterfactual approach the contribution 
of forests to the incidence of poverty (𝑃𝑃0) is decreased by 0.0836, and the depth  (𝑃𝑃1) and Severity 
(𝑃𝑃2) of poverty by 0.1284 and 0.1086 respectively.  To check the robustness of our results we also 
compared the differences on poverty indexes between the conventional approach and the 
counterfactual approach vis-à-vis  the poverty indices including forest income as shown in figures 
6.1, 6.2 and 6.3. Our results unambiguously confirm that the contribution of forests to the incidence 
of poverty (𝑃𝑃0) is still positive but lower when we use the counterfactual scenario than the 
conventional without forest scenario regardless of the poverty line used. In contrast we observe 
that forests decrease the severity of poverty (𝑃𝑃2) if we use the conventional approach, while the 
severity of poverty (𝑃𝑃2)increases under the counterfactual approach. This is again robust 
regardless of the poverty line used. However, the difference on the contribution of forests to the 
depth of poverty(𝑃𝑃1)  between the two approaches shows that it is lower under the counterfactual 
approach, yet comparing the result to the poverty indices that include forest income we observed 
that the result is inconclusive and sensitive to the poverty line used. 
These results confirm that the choice of methodology for computing the contribution of forests on 
poverty has a significant impact on the results and the conclusions drawn, and that care should be 
taken to use appropriate methodology before reaching any conclusion and policy recommendations 
on the forest –poverty nexus.  
<< INSERT FIGURES 6.1, 6.2 AND 6.3ABOUT HERE >> 





<< INSERT TABLE 6.5 ABOUT HERE >> 
When forest incomes are excluded from the total household income, i.e. under the conventional 
approach shown in table 6.5 above, the average increase in the Gini coefficient is 0.05 (from 0.34 
to 0.39). This finding is again consistent with previous studies on the distributional impact of forest 
income in Zimbabwe (Cavendish 2000), Malawi(Fisher, 2004), Uganda (Aryal, 2002), Mexico 
(Lopez- Feldman 2007), Ethiopia (Babulo et al.2009 and Mamo et al.2007) and in the World Bank 
meta-study (Vedeld et al., 2004). 
<< INSERT TABLE 6.6 ABOUT HERE >> 
When the hypothetical counterfactual estimation method is used, the Gini coefficient shows a 
substantial decline by 0.06 (from 0.34 to 0.28) suggesting that forest income increases inequality, 
which is contrary to the findings of the conventional approach. Comparing the Gini index using 
both approaches as shown in table 6.7 below, we observed that the contribution of forests to income 
distribution is again overestimated under the conventional approach. Under the conventional 
approach, the Gini index is estimated to be 0.39 while the same index under the counterfactual 
approach is 0.28 shows a significant and substantial difference of 0.11. 
<< INSERT TABLE 6.7 ABOUT HERE >> 
The gap in the contribution of forests to income distribution when we use the conventional 
approach and counterfactual approach scenario, against which to compare actual with forest 
income, is further illustrated using the Lorenz curve in figure 6.4.   The figure shows that the 
addition of forest income to household income reduces measured income inequality. This result 





estimation technique that we use it shows that participation in forest-related activity increases 
inequality. 
<< INSERT FIGURE 6.4 ABOUT HERE >> 
Although it is based more on conjecture and not supported by inequality decomposition, Narain  
et al. (2009) cautioned that the distributional outcomes of forest extraction would be worse if we 
are to include biodiversity resources in our analysis of inequality. Moreover, our results are similar 
to Adhikari et al., (2004) and Sapkota and Oden (2008). 
These apparently contradictory findings, where forest income appears to reduce  substantially the 
poverty and inequality indicators when we use the  conventional approach that has been used in 
the forest-poverty nexus, but has little or negative impact on poverty and inequality indicators 
under the counterfactual approach, could be explained by the fact that  participation in forest 
activities might have a disincentive effect on incomes from other activities which have higher 
returns to labour, which are not captured when forest income is treated as an exogenous addition 
to household income. For example participation in forest commercialization might affect the 
household’s labour participation and supply decision or forest commercialization may lead to   
deforestation which boosts the time allocated to fuel wood collection and thereby reduces 
agricultural output by shifting household members’ time away from agricultural work. 
6.6 Conclusions and Policy Implications 
This research investigates the contribution of forest commercialization to poverty and income 
distribution in semi-arid region of the Tigray regional state, Ethiopia. We use household survey 
data to estimate without forest income and counterfactual household income scenario, against 





Our study contributes to the study of the Poverty –Environment nexus in many respects.First, it 
provides an overview of forest management, poverty and distributional issues in the  rural Tigray 
region of Ethiopia. Literature can be found on the measurement of poverty and inequality in 
relation to forests in Tigray but none has focused on the counterfactual income scenario.  
Second, our results show that the choice of methodology can have a significant impact on the 
estimated contribution of forests and conclusions made about the role of forests on poverty and 
distribution of income. We compare the estimated contribution of forests using the counterfactual 
approach discussed in section 6.4, with the simpler and more commonly used method which treats 
forest income as an exogenous addition to other sources of household income. We find that the 
contribution of forests on poverty measures is considerably weaker, and despite forests decreasing 
the incidence of poverty they might increase the severity of poverty when the counterfactual 
estimation method is used. This is a new finding that has not been documented in previous studies. 
However, it has important policy implications. If forests increase the severity of poverty and if this 
forest management policy is left unresolved, the poor remain poorer than their counterparts and 
will eventually be less able to escape from the poverty trap. Our finding is consistent with the 
previous studies and conclusions made that the existing conservation policy in Ethiopia, 
particularly in the region has only environmental benefits and that economic benefits are yet to 
emerge.  
Third, in relation to income distribution, we find that after using the counterfactual approach, the 
impact of forest income on distribution is negative as against a positive contribution in the 
conventional approach.  
Fourth, these apparently contradictory findings, where forest income appears to reduce 





little or negative impact on poverty and inequality indicators under the counterfactual approach, 
could be explained by the fact that participation in forest activities might have a disincentive effect 
on incomes from other activities which are not captured when forest income is treated as an 
exogenous addition to the existing household income. 
Over all, this study makes a meaningful addition to the poverty-environment debate and Ethiopia’s 
current conservation policy to better distribute resource rights, both property and procedural. The 
improved management of trees and forests cannot be pursued in isolation, through sectoral efforts 
and requires careful consideration of biological, economic, socio-cultural and institutional factors. 
Equally, policy should facilitate and strengthen linkages between agriculture and income 
diversification which provides alternative livelihood opportunities and pathways out of poverty. 
Finally inequality of access to natural assets must be addressed to warrant a win –win for 





Table 6. 1 Mean separation test of participants and non-participants 








 Households that did not 
participate   




           P- Value   
 
Mean  Std. Dev. Mean  Std. Dev. 
Log_inc_aue     9.142        0.749         9.200             0.554  0.5354 
Hhh_sex     0.82        0.389         0.92             0.279  0.0373** 
Age_hh_1     48.1        12.79         44.08             11.56  0.0168** 
Family_size     5.964        2.002         5.843             2.334  0 .6055 
Edu_hhh     1.268        2.391         0.964             1.685  0.3005 
Stu_number      1.71        1.445         1.12             1.334  0.0017*** 
Average_g     4.578        2.355         3.488             2.297  0.0006*** 
Adult_hhm     2.845        1.233         2.903             1.393  0.7358 
Aware_cc     0.363        0.482         0.337             0.476  0.6898 
P_size _tsimdi     4.656        3.082         3.749             2.496  0.0206** 
Tlu     3.142        2.740         3.107             2.252  0.7606 
Private_forest     0.435        0.497         0.482             0.503  0.4796 
F_saving     0.226        0.419         0.193             0.397  0.5463 
Wage_income    1997.5        2560         1534             1406  0.1251 
Own_business     0.405        0.492         0.157             0.366  0.0001*** 
Access_credit     0.375        0.486         0.373             0.487  0.9816 
Access_irrigation     0.143        0.351         0.120             0.328  0.6277 
Log _dis_market      0.978        1.370         1.777             1.083  0.0000*** 
Log_dis_forests     1.742        0.847         1.637             0.786  0.3425 
Weather_s     0.75        0.434         0.892             0.034  0.0086*** 
Death_ill_s     0.196        0.398         0.289             0.456  0.0998*** 
Price_s     0.309        0.464         0.349             0.479  0.5269 
Loss_live_s     0.446        0.498         0.469             0.502  0.7268 






Table 6. 2 Poverty decomposition: Scenario 1 
***,** and * represent 1, 5 and 10 percept level of significance respectively 
 
 
Table 6. 3  Poverty decomposition: Scenario 2 
***,** and * represent 1, 5 and 10 percept level of significance respectively 
 
 
Table 6. 4 Differences in poverty index under counterfactual and conventional scenarios 
***,** and * represent 1, 5 and 10 percept level of significance respectively 
 
 
 Without forest income      With forest income  
Estimates  S.E  Estimates  S.E  Difference t-value 
FGT (0) 0.6175 0.0307 0.4343 0.0314 0.1832 7.49*** 
FGT (1) 0.2864 0.0188 0.1606 0.0149 0.1258 11.6*** 
FGT (2) 0.1709 0.0143 0.0813 0.0098 0.0896 9.91*** 
 Counter factual income       With forest income  
Estimates  S.E  Estimates  S.E  Difference t-statistic 
FGT (0) 0.5339 0.0316 0.4343 0.0314 0.0996 3.06*** 
FGT (1) 0.1580 0.0122 0.1606 0.0149 -0.0026 -0.19 
FGT (2) 0.0623 0.0063 0.0813 0.0098 -0.0190 -2.23*** 
 Counter factual income        Without forest income 
Estimates  S.E  Estimates  S.E  Difference t-statistic 
FGT (0) 0.5339 0.0316 0.6175 0.0307 -0.0836 -2.68*** 
FGT (1) 0.1580 0.0122 0.2864 0.0188 -0.1284 -8.66*** 





Table 6. 5  Gini Index: Scenario 1 
***, ** and * represent 1, 5 and 10 percept level of significance respectively 
 
Table 6. 6  Gini Index: Scenario 2 
***, ** and * represent 1, 5 and 10 percept level of significance respectively 
 
 
Table 6. 7  Differences in Gini index under counterfactual and conventional scenarios: Scenario 3 



















1500 1700 1900 2100 2300 2500
Poverty line (z)
Without Forest Income With Counterfactual Income
With Forest Income
FGT Curves (alpha=0)
 Without forest income        With forest income 
Estimates  S.E  Estimates  S.E  Difference t-statistic 
Gini Index 0.3920 0.0198 0.3425 0.0164 0.04955 5.36*** 
 Counterfactual Income        With forest income 
Estimates  S.E  Estimates  S.E  Difference t-statistic 
Gini Index 0.2817 0.0139 0.3425 0.0164 0.0607 5.36*** 
 Counter factual income        Without forest income 
Estimates  S.E  Estimates  S.E  Difference t-statistic 





Figure 6. 1 FGT Curves for Incidence of Poverty
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 Figure 6. 3  FGT Curves for Severity of Poverty 
 
 







IMPACT OF THE PRODUCTIVE SAFETY NET PROGRAM (PSNP) IN ETHIOPIA IN 
CONSERVATION OF FORESTS 
7.1. Introduction 
Poor people often depend on biodiversityboth for their livelihoods and as a safety net againstdeeper 
poverty (IIED, 2010). In addition, of the 1.2 billion people estimated to live on less than US$ 1 a 
day (i.e. those that are the target of MDG1), 70% live in rural areas with a high dependence on 
natural resources for all or part of their livelihoods (Roe, D., 2003)..  Moreover, direct dependence 
on services from ecosystems is highest amongst people living in arid and semi-arid lands such as 
Tigray where alternative livelihood options areoften limited and environments are 
particularlyfragile and risky (MA 2005b cited in Shackleton et al.2008).  
 
However, this may constitute a poverty trap as a result of a tragedy of the commons (Hardin 
1968).Too many households in rural Tigray depend on these resources as part of their livelihood 
and the resources cannot provide enough to properly insure all the population. They face thus the 
classic poverty-environment nexus, where poor people depend on the environment, and over use 
it (Delacote, 2007). The resultant increased pressure often has a negative feedback on the capacity 
of the ecosystems to deliver these services and creates a downward spiral of increasing poverty 





Accordingly,finding synergistic solutions has been on local, national, and international agendas 
for decades, in the hope that humandevelopment and biodiversity conservation can be found to be 
less a zero-sum game of trade-offs and more a set of mutually reinforcing goals(Timmer, 2005).  
Yet there is little evidence that increasing incomes or poverty reduction affects the way in which 
poor people exploit naturalresources (Roe and Elliott, 2005).To this end research is needed under 
which win-win solutions can be found to advance poverty reduction and conservation biodiversity 
such as forest environmental resources. The objective of this paper is therefore to investigate 
whether the Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP) which is one of the largest social protection 
programs in Africa provides an appropriate framework to create synergies for poverty reduction 
and conservation of the environment.  
 
The Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP) is a development-oriented social protection program 
launched in Ethiopia in 2005 (Debela et al., 2014).The PSNP has a short term objective 
ofprotecting the poor against shocks (consumption smoothing) as well as a long term objective of 
poverty reduction, growth enhancement and natural resource conservation ( Nega et al., 2008). 
The PSNP operates as a safety net, targeting transfers to poor households in two ways, through 
Public Works and direct Support (Gilligan et al., 2008). 
Given the importance of the program at national level, a rigorous impact evaluation design has 
been followed since the very early stages of the program and lauded for its success in achieving 
its objectives such as reducing chronic and transient poverty (Fredu et al., 2010); consumption; 
food security and assets (Gilligan and Hoddinot 2007; Gilligan et al., 2008); livestock and tree 
holding (Andersson et al.,2011);  human capital formation and child labour (Woldehana 2010; 





program, however, there has not been any attention on the potential of the PSNP for exacerbating 
or mitigating forest pressure. On the one hand, the government explicitly states that the PSNP has 
a short term objective of protecting the poor against income shocks (income smoothing) as well as 
a long term objective of poverty reduction, growth enhancement and natural resource conservation. 
Therefore, the government clearly has an expectation that PSNP will result in improved 
environmental outcome. We focus here on forests as the environmental outcome of interest which 
is a key local resource and global public good.  
However, even if we limit the scope to the relationship between public safety nets and forests, 
previous empirical results are mixed. Alix –Garcia et al., (2010) investigate the impact of large 
income transfers in Mexico called Oportunidades. They find that the income transfer increases 
deforestation, at least in the population that is just below the poverty level required to be able to 
receive payments. On the other hand, Fisher and Shively (2005) find that household forest use 
responds negatively to a receipt of a positive income shock (technology assistance package)in 
Malawi. Moreover, many of the empirical literatures on income-deforestation links have been 
hampered by concerns about the endogenieity of income growth (Alix –Garcia et al., 2010). 
The objective of this study is therefore to analyse whether the interests of the global community, 
the Ethiopian government and local farm households can be reconciled through the PSNP. If the 
PSNP generates higher and more stable income while minimizing pressure on forests, it could be 
argued that such a program promotes conservation of forest biodiversity, i.e. renders development 
compatible with sustainability. The findings of this analysis bear implications for current 
discussions and initiatives seeking to promote “win-win” strategies for regions where poverty 
reduction and conservation of biodiversity are all high priorities and to the global efforts to limit 





Analysing Ethiopia’s PSNP allows us to make two contributions to the existing empirical 
literature. First, the implementation of the PSNP creates an exogenous source of variation in 
income, allowing for clean identification of causal effects that may be significant in predicting the 
impact of policy changes. Second, it contributes to the program evaluation literature by showing 
how a class of widely implemented public safety nets has important positive/negative 
environmental externalities. 
We use  propensity score matching methods to control the two important selection biases in the 
program20, i.e. targeting of the program to recipients based on the characteristics unobservable to 
the researcher and self-selection into the program by eligible receipts (Gilligan and Hoddinot, 
2007). 
The chapter is outlined as follows: section 7.2 presents a brief introduction of the PSNP in Ethiopia. 
Section 7.3 provides the theoretical framework used for the study. Section 7.4 presents the 
empirical strategy. Section 7.5 presents empirical results and discussions, while the final section 
presents concluding remarks and policy implications. 
7.2. Overview of the Productive Safety Nets Program (PSNP) in Ethiopia 
Chronic food insecurity has been a defining feature of the poverty that has been affected millions 
of Ethiopians for decades (Hoddinot et al., 2009). One of the most important and tenacious 
problems that is argued to either cause or aggravate the drought-poverty-famine nexus in the 
plough based cereal farming system in the highlands is severe natural resource degradation, 
particularly  manifest in soil erosion, deforestation, and degradation (Howard and Smith, 
                                                     
20The two most important sources of selection bias include “program placement” bias, resulting from effective 
targeting of the program to poor households, and self-selection bias, resulting from the fact that households that choose 






2006).These factors often interact with one another resulting in a reinforcing cycle of the “poverty, 
food insecurity and natural resource degradation trap”. This problem is most acute in Ethiopian 
highlands (where over 85% of the country’s population lives), which is affected by recurrent 
drought and famine affecting millions of people (FAO, 2003).  
Between 1994 and 2003, an average of five million Ethiopians were declared “at risk” and in need 
of emergency assistance every year (RHVP, 2007). As a result Ethiopia has been the largest 
recipient of food aid in Africa and one of the largest recipients in the world in the last two decades 
(Little, 2008 cited in Andersson et al., 2011). However, decades of large –scale food aid deliveries 
have done little to resolve the problem. Instead, dependency of food aid has steadily increased over 
time, as has the number of “chronically food insecure” Ethiopians. As a result, the number of 
individuals in need of emergency food assistance rose from approximately 2.1 million people in 
1996 to 13.2 million in 2003, before falling back to 7.1 million in 2004 (Gilligan et al., 2008). 
To address this problem of food insecurity and dependence on the previous system of emergency 
appeals, the Ethiopian government and a consortium of donors that include European 
Commission(EC), World Bank (WB), Development cooperation of Ireland (DCI),  United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID), Canada International Development Agency 
(CIDA) and the UK Department  for International Development (DFID)  launched a new social 
protection program called the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) in  2005.    
The main objective of PSNP is reducing household vulnerability, improving households’ resilience 
to shocks and breaking the cycle of dependence on food aid by bridging production deficits in 
chronically food insecure farming households, protecting household assets fromdistress sale and 





framework for predictable problems (RHVP 2007). With an annual budget of nearly US$ 500 
million, the PSNP is the second largest social protection program in Africa, reaching more than 7 
million Ethiopians (Gilligan et al., 2008).   
Food aid targeting in Ethiopia has a long history of relying on community-based targeting systems 
which have been seen as effective. The PSNP adopted this system while further refining the 
targeting criteria to capture chronic food insecurity—defined as a three months food gap or more 
and receiving food aid for three consecutive years. The PSNP uses a mix of geographic and 
community-based targeting to identify chronically food-insecure households in chronically food-
insecure woredas. After determining PSNP eligibility based on these criteria, households are 
assigned to public works or direct support: eligible households with able-bodied adults receive 
transfers for their participation in public works projects, while those households that cannot 
provide labor or other means of support receive unconditional transfers.  Most beneficiary 
households participate in public works (90% of all PSNP transfers); a much smaller proportion 
receives direct support. In 2008, the program operated in the 290 most food-insecure of the 
approximately 670 woredas in rural Ethiopia (Coll-Black et al, 2013). Despite some regional 
variations PSNP has superior targeting in comparison to any of the African safety net programs by 
international standards (Coady et al, 2004). Generally, the targeting principles laid out in the 
Project Implementation Manual (PIM) are being followed and households do not generally 
perceive that religious affiliation, ethnicity, or personal connections affect the likelihood of 
selection into public works, the one exception being Oromiya (Coll-Black et al, 2013). 
The PSNP operates as a safety net, targeting transfers to the poor households in two ways, thorough 
Public Works and Direct Support (Gilligan et al., 2008).Public works are labour intensive 





insecure people who have labour (MoARD, 2006), while the direct Support component provides 
assistance to households who are labour-poor and do not have reliable support (Woldehanna, 
2009).  Social transfers (direct support) contribute to risk coping and public works has elements 
of risk reduction, risk mitigation and risk coping, depending on what kinds of public work activities 
are undertaken (Devereux and Guenther 2007). 
There are several ways in which we expect the PSNP to reduce the risk of vulnerability. It can (1) 
reduce income fluctuations because it increases income irrespective of shocks and thus have the 
same insurance properties as a permanent income that allow participants to save for the future and 
bad times; (2) displace non- desirable coping strategies such as child labour, depletion of assets 
and depletion of forest ecosystems. However, while the impact of PSNP with regard to child labour 
and depletion of assets has been undertaken there is no systematic study on the impact of PSNP 
on forest ecosystem conservation.  In fact empirical studies on the role of public safety nets and 
forests have been mixed (see for example Monica and Shively, 2005 and Alix et al. 2010). 
7.3. Conceptual Framework for Labour Allocation 
The productive Safety Net Program (PSNP) combines a short term objective of protecting the poor 
against shocks (consumption smoothing) with a long term objective of poverty reduction, growth 
enhancement and natural resources conservation.  With the exception of minor direct benefits for 
some households, the overall design for the PSNP in Ethiopia is directly related to employment of 
adults in beneficiary households. This public work requirement means that the program is not 
neutral in terms of adult labour supply and work incentives. To investigate the impact of PSNP on 
forest use,  we draw on  a farm household model  and empirical studies of household labour 
allocation in developing countries (Abdulai and Delgado 1999; Jacoby 1993; Rosenzweig 1980; 





The model explicitly accounts for the fact that farm households in Ethiopia are both producers and 
consumers of agricultural and forest goods, and that markets for key factors and products are weak 
or absent. As a result, production decisions are influenced by consumption needs, and so 
production and consumption decisions in the model are assumed to be made jointly in response to 
changes in input and output prices.  
We assume households allocate family labour across four major activities: Agricultural 
production, forest use, PSNP, and self employment. The household seeks to maximize household 
utility: 
Max  𝑈𝑈 = 𝑈𝑈(𝐶𝐶,𝐹𝐹,𝑂𝑂, 𝐿𝐿;𝐻𝐻)                                                                                                         (7.1) 
Where utility is derived from consumption of a representative agricultural crop(𝐶𝐶), a composite 
forest product(𝐹𝐹), leisure (𝐿𝐿) and other goods(𝑂𝑂). We assume household and individual 
characteristics (𝐻𝐻) influence preferences. Utility is maximized subject to production functions for 
crop and forest products, a full income constraint, a time constraint, and non-negativity constraints: 
Q = Q[𝐿𝐿,𝑋𝑋,𝐴𝐴,𝐴𝐴(𝐿𝐿;𝐾𝐾; 𝐵𝐵)]                                                                                                           (7.2) 
Q = A(𝐿𝐿;𝐾𝐾, 𝐵𝐵) + f(𝐿𝐿 ;𝐾𝐾)                                                                                                           (7.3) 
Y = p (𝑄𝑄 − 𝐶𝐶) + p (𝑄𝑄 − 𝐹𝐹)+ 𝑝𝑝 𝐿𝐿 + 𝑝𝑝 𝐿𝐿 + 𝑅𝑅 – 𝑝𝑝 𝑂𝑂– 𝑝𝑝 𝑋𝑋                                                         (7.4) 
𝑇𝑇 – 𝐿𝐿  (7.5) 
𝐹𝐹,𝐶𝐶,𝑂𝑂,𝑋𝑋,𝑄𝑄,𝑄𝑄, 𝐿𝐿,≥ 0                                                                                                   (7.6) 
Equation (7.2) describes smallholder production of crops which is assumed to be a function of 





and additional land acquired through land clearing, represented by a function A(∗). Cultivated area 
in the model is endogenously determined. Note that crop production can occur either through 
intensification (𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎 𝑋𝑋) or extensification �𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎 𝐴𝐴(∗)� , or both. Although customary land 
ownership implies that land markets are generally absent in much of rural Ethiopia, land can be 
“purchased” by using labour (𝐿𝐿) and capital (𝐾𝐾), e.g. an axe to clear uncultivated  and possibly 
forested land. The existence of forest management institutions(𝐵𝐵) also enters as an argument in 𝐴𝐴 
reflecting the potential for institutions to restrain forest clearing. 
Equation (7.3) describes production of forest goods. The production function A(∗) illustrates that 
when forest is cleared for agricultural expansion, forest products arise as a joint product. The 
technology 𝑓𝑓(∗) describes forest “thinning” activities in which household labour is used to extract 
products from the forest, but land is not cleared in the process. Note that the existence of forest 
management institutions (𝐵𝐵) appears as an argument in A(∗) but not 𝑓𝑓(∗). This is consistent with 
the patterns of forest management in Ethiopia, which tends to be more effective at restraining forest 
clearing than limiting collection of forest products.    
Equation (7.4) defines the household’s full income. Prices and net hourly returns to labour are 
denoted by a vector of prices 𝑝𝑝. Households earn income from four sources: agriculture, forest use, 
PSNP and other non-/off-farm employment. Households also receive remittances(𝑅𝑅∗), defined 
here as money received from relatives. Households make expenditures on crops (C), forest 
products (F), other goods (O) and agricultural inputs (X). A positive (negative) sign for (𝑄𝑄 − 𝐶𝐶) 
and (𝑄𝑄 − 𝐹𝐹) indicates the household is a net-seller (net-buyer) of crop and forest products. 
Equation (7.5) describes the household’s time constraint. Finally, a set of non-negativity 





Two important assumptions inherent in the model should be noted. One, we assume that 
households sell but do not hire labour. Two, we assume that households do not engage in 
production of cash crops – beyond sales of surplus crop production. While the assumptions are 
strong, and not appropriate in the context of rural Ethiopia as a whole, they are reasonable within 
the context of the sample. Most sample households are net purchasers of food, constrained in both 
cash and crop and thereby rarely able to hire labour (often paid either with cash or in kind). Only 
a few sample households engaged in cash crop production during the sample period, partly because 
coffee, Ethiopia’s main cash crop, has historically been produced outside the study area.   
The Lagrangian for the household’s maximization problem is: 
𝐿𝐿 = 𝑈𝑈(𝐶𝐶,𝐹𝐹,𝑂𝑂,𝑇𝑇 – 𝐿𝐿 ;𝐻𝐻) 
−𝜆𝜆 �
𝑌𝑌 − 𝑝𝑝 {𝑄𝑄[𝐿𝐿 , ∶ 𝑋𝑋,𝐴𝐴,𝐴𝐴(𝐿𝐿 ;𝐾𝐾, 𝐵𝐵)] − 𝐶𝐶}
−𝑝𝑝 {[𝐴𝐴(𝐿𝐿 ;𝐾𝐾, 𝐵𝐵) + 𝑓𝑓(𝐿𝐿 ;𝐾𝐾)]−  𝐹𝐹}
−𝑝𝑝 𝐿𝐿 − 𝑝𝑝 𝐿𝐿 − 𝑅𝑅 + 𝑝𝑝 𝑂𝑂 + 𝑃𝑃 𝑋𝑋
�                                                             (7.7) 
After some rearrangement of terms, first-order conditions for the problem can be expressed as:  
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
 = λ𝑝𝑝 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
    (7.8a) 
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 = λ𝑝𝑝  (7.8f) 
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝐹𝐹
 = λ𝑝𝑝   (7.8g) 
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝐶𝐶
 = λ𝑝𝑝  (7.8h) 
Y = p (𝑄𝑄 − 𝐶𝐶) + p (𝑄𝑄 − 𝐹𝐹)+ 𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿 +𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿 + 𝑅𝑅 – 𝑝𝑝𝑂𝑂–𝑝𝑝𝑋𝑋(7.8i) 
Equations (7.8a) through (7.8d) indicate that, at the optimum, households allocate labour across 
activities so as to equate the marginal value of household leisure with that of time spent on each 
productive activity, i.e. value of marginal product or net hourly returns to labour. Equations (7.8e) 
thorough (7.8h) equate marginal values with prices. Equation (7.8i) recovers the full income 
constraint.  
Expressions of labour supply, input demand, and commodity demand can be derived as functions 





� = g (𝑝𝑝, 𝑝𝑝, 𝑝𝑝, 𝑝𝑝,𝐴𝐴,𝐻𝐻,𝐾𝐾, 𝐵𝐵,𝑇𝑇)                                                       (7.9) 
Consider the Slutsky equation relating a change in the net hourly returns from PSNP to the forest 
labour share. This is: 
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕




 𝐿𝐿                                                                                 (7.10) 
where the first term on the right hand side of equation (7.10) is a substitution effect and is 
unambiguously non-positive. The second term is an income effect. While 𝐿𝐿 is non- negative, the 





increase if leisure is a normal good, but for some reason the demand for forest products (𝐹𝐹) should 
also increase. More leisure should mean a lower forest labour share. However, higher consumption 
of forest products could imply an increase in the forest labour share. This would be the case, for 
example, if the household collected rather than bought additional forest goods. Such behaviour 
might be expected for a household that is a net seller of forest products. In sum, the net effect of a 
change in the returns to PSNP on forest labour share is ambiguous. A negative relationship 
whereby higher income from PSNP reduces forest pressure is plausible and could arise under 
several different scenarios: if forest products are inferior goods, if forest products are normal goods 
but the income – induced demand for leisure outweighs that for forest products, if forest products 
are normal goods but the household buys rather than collects forest products, or if a negative 
substitution effect dominates a positive income effect. A positive relationship between  𝑝𝑝  and 𝐿𝐿 
could arise if the income induced demand for forest goods outweighs that for leisure, the household 
is a net–seller of forest goods and the income effect dominates the substitution effect. The 
combination of these effects implies that the impact of PSNP on the pressure on forests is  
ambiguous from a theoretical point of view. The presence of any impact, and its direction, is 
ultimately an empirical question.  
7.4. Methodological Framework 
Let the impact of the PSNP on forest outcomes of interest  𝑌𝑌 for treated households be given by: 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇 -  𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶                                                                                                                      (7.11) 
Where 𝑇𝑇 refers to the outcome of treated households and 𝐶𝐶 denotes the counterfactual, the outcome 
for the same households had they been untreated. The above formalization assumes that each 





treatment (participation in PSNP) and 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶  for the outcome under comparison treatment (non- 
participation in PSNP).  
Since it is impossible to observe the household treatment effect – because we cannot observe both 
treated and untreated situations for the same household- we aim to infer the impact of PSNP 
through its average effect in the population. If data on the outcome(s) of interest are available for 
treated (participants in PSNP) and untreated (non- participants in PSNP), we can then use the 
differences in outcome of treated and untreated households to obtain a (naive) estimate of the 
program impact: 
𝐸𝐸�𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇 −  𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶�                                                                                                             (7.12) 
In this case, the average outcome of untreated households is intended to act as a substitute for the 
unobservable counterfactual. However, treated households are usually different in a set of 
observable household characteristics – such as income, food security, and asset- from those 
households who are not targeted to the programme. This problem will be magnified if households 
self-select into the programme (for instance, with the aim of securing additional income, or due to 
their social connectedness etc), meaning that unobservable factors such as motivation are a key 
determinantof treatment assignment. This makes it difficult to isolate the differences between both 
groups which are due to already existing distinctions before the treatment – the selection bias- 
from those which are due to solely to the program’s impact, as it can be seen by expanding equation 
(7.12) above: 
𝐸𝐸�𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇 −  𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶�   = 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇|𝑇𝑇] - 𝐸𝐸�𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶|𝐶𝐶� 





                       = 𝐸𝐸�𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇 −  𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶|𝑇𝑇� + 𝐸𝐸�𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶|𝑇𝑇� - 𝐸𝐸�𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶|𝐶𝐶�                                               (7.13) 
The first term in equation (7.13) represents the average treatment effect on the treated, usually the 
parameter of interest we want to isolate (which will be formally defined below). This parameter 
will only be defined if the selection bias, represented by the second and third terms above, equals 
zero; this in turn, will only happen if there are no systematic differences in the average untreated 
outcomes between treatment and comparison groups.  
Equation (7.13) guides us also regarding the direction of the bias. If households which participated 
in PSNP are on average more dependent on forests than their counterparts in the untreated group 
to begin with, then the selection bias term will be positive and the impact of PSNP on forest 
dependency will be overestimated. Conversely, if the comparison groups (untreated) households 
are more dependent on forests on average than those treated, then the selection bias term will be 
negative and the estimated treatment effect will underestimate the true impact of PSNP on forest 
dependency.  
An evaluation design in which the selection bias problem tends to disappear is that in which 
treatment and comparison groups are randomly selected from a large population of potential 
beneficiaries. In other words, it may be assumed that, on average, those treated by PSNP are not 
different from those who did not participate either regarding observable characteristics (food 
security, education, age) or unobservable ones. Consequently, any statistically significant 
difference in the outcome variable (forest dependency) can be reliably attributed to PSNP.  
In most real situations, nevertheless, public safety net programs such as the PSNP have been 
purposely implemented by governments – for instance by targeting households who are very poor 





programme by taking up the benefits. Various quasi-experimental and non-experimental methods 
have been used to address the bias problem (for details, see Heckman et al., 1998, Rosenbaum and 
Rubin, 1983 and Smith and Todd, 2001). One of the most commonly used quasi-experimental 
methods is Propensity Score Matching (PSM), which selects PSNP beneficiaries  and non-
beneficiaries who are as similar as possible in terms of observable characteristics expected to affect 
participation in PSNP as well as outcomes under certain assumptions. The differences in outcomes 
between the two matched groups can be  interpreted as the impact of the program on the 
beneficiaries (Smith and Todd, 2001).  These assumptions and the formal definitions of alternative 
matching estimators for investigating the impact of PSNP on forest dependency will be explained 




7.4.1. Definitions of Average Treatment Effects 
The empirical literature on program evaluation has traditionally focused on estimating three main 
average treatment effects that include the Average Treatment of the Treated (ATT) or the 
participation effect, the Average Effect of the Untreated (ATU) and the Average Treatment Effect 
(ATE) when assessing the impact of single treatment such as PSNP. Becker and Ichino (2002) 
indicate that the parameter of interest in the estimation of propensity score is the ATT. However, 
under the assumption of unconfoundedness, Titus (2007) argued that an appropriate approach of 
evaluating policy–relevant outcomes in a counterfactual framework is to examine not only the 





participate in PSNP. The definitions and identification conditions of each of these treatment effects 
will be discussed for the same context of evaluating the impact of PSNP on the outcome variable 
of interest for both participants and non-participants.   
Average Treatment of the Treated (ATT): This parameter represents the average impact of PSNP 
on the outcome variable of interest (forest dependency) for those households who have been 
targeted for it. Formally, it is defined as:  
𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 = 𝐸𝐸�𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇 − 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶|𝑇𝑇� = 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇|𝑇𝑇] - 𝐸𝐸�𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶|𝑇𝑇�                                                               (7.14) 
The second term after the last equality in equation (7.14) is the counterfactual to be estimated. The 
ATT is a measure of the average gain from PSNP to the treated households rather than to any 
households in the sample.  
Average Treatment Effect on the Untreated (ATU): This alternative estimation represents the 
expected average impact of PSNP on the outcome variable (forest dependency) among those who 
have not been treated. In formal terms  
𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑈𝑈 = 𝐸𝐸�𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇 − 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶|𝐶𝐶� = 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇|𝐶𝐶] - 𝐸𝐸�𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶|𝐶𝐶�                                                             (7.15) 
The first term after the last equality in equation (7.15) cannot be observed and must be estimated. 
The ATU parameter recovers the expected impact of PSNP on forest dependency on households 
randomly drawn from the sub-population of non-participants of PSNP, and is potentially useful to 
assess the impact of a program expansion to initially untreated households. 
Average Treatment Effect (ATE): This is the third treatment effect corresponding to the average 






𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸 = 𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 * 𝑃𝑃(𝑇𝑇) + 𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑈𝑈 * 𝑃𝑃(𝐶𝐶) 
𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸 = = 𝐸𝐸�𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇 − 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶|𝑇𝑇�* 𝑃𝑃(𝑇𝑇) + 𝐸𝐸�𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇 − 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶|𝐶𝐶�* 𝑃𝑃(𝐶𝐶)                                            (7.16) 
Where 𝑃𝑃(𝑇𝑇) and 𝑃𝑃(𝐶𝐶) are the probabilities of belonging to the treatment and comparison groups, 
respectively. In the sample these probabilities correspond to the sample frequencies of treated and 
untreated households. As can be seen, counterfactuals must now be estimated for both components 
of the  𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸. This parameter is relevant for poverty reduction interventions that could be universally 
expanded, addressing the question of what the treatment gain would be to  randomly selecvted 
households of the population.  
Estimation of the Average Treatment Effects using matching methods relies  on two key 
assumptions. The first is the conditional independence assumption (CIA), which  states that  
assignment to treatment group is independent of the outcomes but based on observable 
characteristics (selection on observables).  Matching on every covariate is difficult when the set of 
covariates is large. To solve this problem, we estimated the propensity score21 given as follows: 
𝑝𝑝(𝑋𝑋) = 𝑝𝑝(𝐷𝐷 = 1 |𝑋𝑋 = 𝑥𝑥) = 𝐸𝐸[𝐷𝐷|𝑋𝑋 = 𝑥𝑥]                                                                   (7.17) 
The second assumption is the common support or overlap assumption. The common support is the 
area where the balancing score has positive density for treatment and comparison groups. No 
matches can be made to estimate the Average Treatment Effects when there is no overlap between 
the treatment and control groups.  
                                                     
21The propensity score is defined as the conditional probability the household will participate in PSNP  conditional 





Several methods are possible for selecting matching observations. We used kernel matching 
method (using the normal density of Kernel), which uses a weighted average of “neighbours” 
(within a given range in terms of the propensity score) of a particular observation. Unlike the 
nearest–neighbour method, using a weighted average improves the efficiency of the estimator 
(Smith and Todd, 2011).    
 
7.5. Empirical Results 
 7.5.1. Descriptive Statistics 
A household survey was conducted in 2010/11 254 households in the Tigray region of northern 
Ethiopia. However, because of missing data on some key variables for 3 households, our final 
sample consists of 251 households (for details of the survey please refer section 2.4 of the thesis).    
The dependent variable used in the study is a dummy variable that takes the value of one, if the 
household participated in the Productive safety net Program, and a value zero, if no participation 
was recorded. The outcome variables used in this study are one binary indicator of whether the 
household participates in forest environmental collection or not (forest_ext), forest dependency, 
measured in terms of the ratio of forest income to the total household income (forest_dep)  and 
number of trips to forests by the household in the survey year (forest_trips). These outcome 
variables employed were chosen to be in line with those suggested in the literature (see for 
example, Vira and Kontoleon, 2010). 
<<< INSERT TABLE 7.1 ABOUT HERE >>> 
Descriptive statistics of the variables used in the analysis are also presented in table 7.1 and 7.2. 





did not participate. The survey also collected extensive information on several factors, including 
household characteristics, asset endowments, income and expenditure, household food security 
and vulnerability to shocks.  
In many of the variables, we observed non-participants to be in a better position than the participant 
households. For example, non-participants had an average higher number of months food stock 
available, higher income per adult equivalent, better access to irrigation and transfer than their 
participant counterparts. Conversely, participants were vulnerable to weather and health related 
shocks. This is not however surprising, given the objective of the program is to protect the poor 
against shocks (consumption smoothing) as well as a long term objective of poverty reduction.  
<< INSERT TABLE 7.2 ABOUT HERE>> 
With regard to the outcome variables, our descriptive statistics did not show significant difference 
between participants and non-participants. These findings suggest that PSNP may not have a role 
in the outcome variables, but given that there are two important sources of selection bias in the 
PSNP - i.e. targeting of the programme to recipients based on characteristics unobservable to the 
researcher and self-selection into the programme by eligible recipients (Gilligan and Hoddinot, 
2007) – a simple comparison of the outcome variables of the participants and non-participants has 
no causal interpretation. Therefore, we needed to conduct careful multivariate analysis to manage 
this econometric problem and test the impact of PSNP on the outcome variables.  
 7.5.2. Propensity Score Estimation Results 
The propensity scores which were estimated with a probit model are reported in table 7.3. 
Propensity scores help as a device to balance the observed distribution of covariates across the 





estimates is not undertaken in this study. However, the results shown in table 7.3 indicate that most 
of the variables included in the estimators have the expected signs.  
<< INSERT TABLE 7.3 ABOUT HERE>> 
The density distribution of the propensity score for participants and no participants in the program 
shows a good overlap (see figure 7.2) suggesting that the common support condition is satisfied. 
The bottom half of the graph shows the propensity score distribution for the non-participants 
(untreated), while the upper –half refers to participants (treated). 
<< INSERT FIGURE 7.2 ABOUT HERE>> 
Table 7.4 demonstrates how matching restricts the control sample in order to increase the similarity 
of the subsample of control cases that are directly compared with treated cases, in order to estimate 
the consequences of treatment. Table 7.4 presents the balancing information for the propensity 
scores and for each covariate before and after matching.  We used the standardized bias differences 
between treatment and control samples as a convenient way to quantify the bias between treatment 
and control samples. In many cases we found that sample differences in the unmatched data 
significantly exceed those in the samples of matched cases.  The process of matching thus creates 
a high degree of covariate balance between the treatment (participants in PSNP) and control groups 
(non participants) that are used in the estimation procedure.  
The imbalances between the treatment and control samples in terms of the propensity score had 
been more than 100 % before matching as shown in the table 7.4.  This bias was significantly 
reduced to a level of 3.1% after matching. The same table also shows that before matching, several 
variables exhibit statistically significance differences, while after matching the covariates are 





The low pseudo 𝑅𝑅2 and the insignificance likelihood ratio tests also support the hypothesis that 
both groups have the same distribution in covariates 𝑋𝑋 after matching (see table 7.5). These results 
clearly show that the matching procedure is able to balance the characteristics in the treated and 
the matched comparison groups. We therefore used these results to evaluate the impact of PSNP 
among groups of households having similar observed characteristics. This allows us to compare 
outcomes for participants with those of a comparison group showing a common support.  
 7.5.3. Average Treatment Effects 
The results of treatment effects (ATT, ATU and ATE) all estimated by Kernel matching method 
are presented in table 7.6. Starting from the ATT, the matching estimates reported in table 7.6 
generally indicate that participation in PSNP exerts negative and significant effect in all of the 
outcome variables. Specifically the ATT effect of 0.0438 indicates that participation in PSNP 
result in lowering the probability of households’ participation in forest environmental resource 
extraction (Forest _ext) by 4.38 %.   
<< INSERT TABLE 7.5 AND TABLE 7.6 ABOUT HERE>> 
The effect of PSNP on forest dependency was also found to be negative and statistically significant, 
again implying that PSNP helped in lowering the dependency of households by 11.8 %. Thus, 
PSNP appears to be crucial in minimizing the pressure on forest ecosystems.  The magnitude of 
the coefficients of the treatment effects indicate  that the average treatment effect of the treated 
(ATT) is higher than the Average treatment effect of the untreated (ATU) and the average 
treatment effect of the entire sample (ATE). This finding reveals that households that have a higher 
probability of participating in PSNP are able to reduce their dependency on forests over and above 





result is thus, the gains in terms of reducing forest dependency as the result of PSNP are higher for 
households with higher probability of participating PSNP than those of households with lower 
chances of involving in the program.Also presented in table (7.6) are the critical levels of gamma 
(Γ) called the Rosenbaum test obtained using Γ bounds command in STATA 10. The Rosenbaum 
test is proposed by Rosenbaum (2002) to test if our causal inference about the impact of PSNP on 
the outcome variables would be altered by unobservable factors that affect both treatment and 
outcome variables. The p-critical values represent the lower bound of the p-value. Given that the 
estimated treatment effect is negative, the upper bounds under the assumption that the true 
treatment effect has been overestimated were less interesting (Becker and Caliendo, 2007). As a 
result table 7.6 shows that the negative effect of PSNP is not sensitive to selection bias due to 
unobserved variables, even if we allow participants and non-participants to differ by as much as 
40 % in terms of unobserved covariates.  The critical value of  𝜞𝜞, at which point we would have to 
question our conclusion of a negative impact of PSNP, starts from 𝜞𝜞 = 1.4. However, Becker and 
Caliendo (2007) argued that these sensitivity results are worst case scenario. Overall the critical 
values in the table 7.6  clearly indicates that even unobserved heterogeneity would not alter the 
influence about the treatment effects, suggesting that the findings are generally insensitive to 
hidden bias. As a result we can conclude that the treatment effects estimate in table 7.6 are a pure 
effect of PSNP. 
7.6.Conclusions and Policy implications 
 
This paper investigates the links between the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) and 
pressure on forests in North highlands of Ethiopia. We estimated the propensity score matching 





both participation in PSNP and outcomes such as participation in forest environmental resource 
extraction, forest dependency and number of trips to forests that the household had.  
Results of the propensity matching score suggest a negative and significant effect of PSNP and the 
outcome variables. These findings are generally consistent with the widely held view that 
programs designed to reduce economic vulnerability of low income households can improve 
human welfare and reduce forest pressure. Our results are similar with the findings of Fisher and 
Shively (2005), that households who were involved in the Starter Pack program in southern 
Malawi had lower forest extraction as compared to households without the program.    
Our study complements a small amount of literature that highlights on the intended and unintended 
impacts of programmes designed for poverty reduction on conservation of forest ecosystems and 
biodiversity.  However, the need for further research is indisputable because households are likely 
to respond differently to income changes from poverty reduction programs that are perceived to 
be substantial and permanent versus small and temporary (Alex- Garcia et al, 2010). Further 
research is thus suggested using panel data spanning several years and in different geographical 
locations. If the results of our study are confirmed through additional analysis, then they indicate 
that the growing interest of policy makers in Ethiopia  in pursuing the twin goals of sustainable 
development – raising human living standards and conservation of forest biodiversity – are moving 
in the right direction. Moreover, our study has important implications for Reducing Emissions 
from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD) in developing countries using programs such 
as the Productive Safety Net program in Ethiopia.  
PSNP has elements of risk reduction, mitigation and risk coping; as a result it can reduce income 





properties as permanent income which allows beneficiaries to save for the future and bad times, 
and in the end displace non-desirable coping strategies such as depletion of forest ecosystems.  
Given that the poor households are most dependent on forest ecosystems as source of livelihood 
and coping mechanisms, which exerts pressure on common pool resources such as forest 
biodiversity and ecosystems, policy measures could target them to lower their dependency on 
forest environmental resources. Finally, a wider set of policies should aim to reduce poor 
households’ vulnerability to shocks and improve access to alternative livelihood strategies by 









         Total Sample  Participants Non-participants 
Mean  Std. Dev. Mean  Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Treatment Variable        
PSNP (1/0) 0.67 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Outcome Variables       
Forest_extraction(1/0) 0.85 0.36 0.86 0.34 0.81 0.40 
Forest_dependency 0.25 0.20 0.26 0.21 0.23 0.21 
Forest_trips 74.8 51.1 73.7 52.2 76.9 49.1 
Explanatory variables 
HH characteristics 
Hhh_sex 0.85 0.36 0.86 0.35 0.83 0.38 
Age_hh_1 46.7 12.5 45.2 11.6 50.0 13.8 
Edu_hhh 1.17 2.18 1.21 2.30 1.07 1.94 
Family_size 5.75 2.11 5.89 2.08 5.47 2.17 
Dep_ratio 0.48 0.20 0.49 0.18 0.46 0.24 
N_dep 2.88 1.59 2.30 1.51 2.66 1.72 
Asset Holdings and access to inputs and factor market 
P_size _tsimdi 4.36 2.92 4.20 2.87 4.68 3.04 
Tlu 3.11 2.59 2.97 2.38 3.39 2.96 
Private_forest 0.45 0.50 0.48 0.50 0.38 0.49 
Fooda_months 5.70 3.42 5.30 3.27 6.52 3.61 
Access_irrigation (1/0) 0.14 0.34 0.08 0.27 0.25 0.43 
M_hh_ext_pack 0.17 0.37 0.15 0.36 0.19 0.39 
Transfer (1/0) 0.30 0.46 0.25 0.43 0.42 0.50 



















T_asset_v 1316 2100 1323 1617 1301 2849 
I_per capita       
Dummy_own _b 0.32 0.47 0.34 0.47 0.29 0.46 
fol 0.50 0.50 0.52 0.50 0.46 0.50 
Shock Dummies  
Weather_s 0.80 0.40 0.84 0.37 0.71 0.46 
Death_ill_s 0.22 0.41 0.17 0.38 0.31 0.47 
Loss_live_s 0.45 0.50 0.46 0.50 0.43 0.49 










 Participants Non-participants  
Mean  Std. Dev. Mean  Std. Dev.   P-Value  
 
Forest_extraction(1/0) 0.86 0.34 0.81 0.40 0.200 
Forest_dependency 0.26 0.21 0.23 0.21 0.301 
Forest_trips 73.7 52.2 76.9 49.1 0.642 
Hhh_sex 0.86 0.35 0.83 0.38 0.593 
Age_hh_1 45.2 11.6 50.0 13.8 0.004*** 
Edu_hhh 1.21 2.30 1.07 1.94 0.629 
Family_size 5.89 2.08 5.47 2.17 0.148 
Dependency_ratio 0.49 0.18 0.46 0.24 0.309 
N_dep 2.30 1.51 2.66 1.72 0.127 
P_size _tsimdi 4.20 2.87 4.68 3.04 0.222 
Tlu 2.97 2.38 3.39 2.96 0.230 
Private_forest 0.48 0.50 0.38 0.49 0.149 
Fooda_months 5.30 3.27 6.52 3.61 0.008*** 
Access_irrigation (1/0) 0.08 0.27 0.25 0.43 0.000*** 
M_hh_ext_pack 0.15 0.36 0.19 0.39 0.449 
Transfer (1/0) 0.25 0.43 0.42 0.50 0.005*** 
T_asset_v 1323 1617 1301 2849 0.940 
I_per_aue 2059 1263 2513 1928 0.026** 
Dummy_own _b 0.34 0.47 0.29 0.46 0.426 
fol 0.52 0.50 0.46 0.50 0.327 

























Death_ill_s 0.17 0.38 0.31 0.47 0.011** 
Loss_live_s 0.46 0.50 0.43 0.49 0.649 





Table 7. 3  Estimation of propensity score: probit model 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%,   *** significant at 1 % 
 
Dependent Variable :  PSNP (1/0 ) 
Variable name Coefficient  Standard Error         P- Value  
Hhh_sex -0.246 0.292 0.933 
Age_hh_1 -0.014 0.008 0.075* 
Edu_hhh  0.045 0.049 0.355 
Family_size  0.198 0.108 0.066* 
Dep_ratio -0.673 0.927 0.469 
N_dep -0.186 0.195 0.339 
P_size _tsimdi -0.073 0.378 0.053* 
Livestock in Tlu -0.030 0.046 0.511 
Private_forest  0.518 0.216 0.016** 
Fooda_months -0.056 0.029 0.065** 
Access_ irrigation (1/0) -0.874 0.276 0.002*** 
M_hh_ext_pack -0.043 0.244 0.862 
Transfer (1/0) -0.442 0.196 0.024** 
T_asset  0.001 0.001 0.774 
I_per capita  0.001 0.001 0.774 
Dummy_own _b  0.180 0.215 0.399 
fol  0.134 0.186 0.473 
Weather_s  0.790 0.269 0.003*** 
Death_ill_s -0.526 0.239 0.027** 
Loss_live_s  0.058 0.206 0.777 
constant  0.309 0.696 0.657 
Number of observations  251   
Pseudo 𝑅𝑅2  0.18   
LR-chi-square  58.52***   






Table 7. 4  Propensity score and covariate balances 





               Mean      % reduction            t- test  
Treated  Control % bias |bias|      t p>|t| 
Propensity Score  Unmatched  0.7441 0.5178  108.5   8.42 0.000 
 Matched  0.7353 0.7287  3.1 97.1  0.33 0.740 
Hhh_sex Unmatched  0.8571 0.8313  7.1   0.54 0.593 
 Matched  0.8519 0.8508  0.3 96.1  0.03 0.980 
Age_hh_1 Unmatched  45.167 50.000 -38  -2.92 0.004 
 Matched  45.29 44.712  4.5  88  0.42 0.672 
Edu_hhh Unmatched  1.2143 1.0723  6.7   0.48 0.629 
 Matched  1.2284 1.4234 -9.2 -37.3 -0.81 0.417 
Family_size Unmatched  5.881 5.4699  19.3   1.45 0.148 
 Matched  5.8148 5.6328  8.6 55.7  0.78 0.434 
Dep_ratio Unmatched  0.4888 0.4613  12.9   1.02 0.310 
 Matched  0.4863 0.4812  2.4 81.2  0.23 0.816 
N_dep Unmatched  2.9881 2.6627  20.1   1.53 0.127 
 Matched  2.9506 2.8276  7.6 62.2  0.69 0.490 
P_size _tsimdi Unmatched  4.1971 4.6778 -16.3  -1.22 0.222 
 Matched  4.2603 4.6277 -12.3 24.2 -1.06 0.288 
Tlu Unmatched  2.9695 3.3859 -15.5  -1.20 0.231 
 Matched  2.9978 2.9916  0.5 98.5  0.02 0.981 
Private_forest Unmatched  0.4821 0.3855  19.5   1.45 0.149 
 Matched  0.4691 0.4457  4.7 75.7  0.42 0.673 
Fooda_months Unmatched  5.2976 6.5181 -35.4  -2.69 0.008 
 Matched  5.4136 5.7345 -9.3 73.7 -0.88 0.378 
Access_irrigation Unmatched  0.7738 0.2530 -48.4  -3.93 0.000 





M_hh_ext_pack Unmatched  0.1548 0.1928 -10.0  -0.76 0.450 
 Matched  0.1605 0.2178 -15.1 -50.7 -1.32 0.189 
Transfer Unmatched  0.2500 0.4217 -36.8  -2.81 0.005 
 Matched  0.2593 0.2386  4.4 87.9  0.43 0.668 
T_asset Unmatched  1322.6 1301.4  0.9   0.08 0.940 
 Matched  1328 1295  1.4 -58.0  0.13 0.895 
I_per capita Unmatched  2058.9 2512.7 -27.8  -2.23 0.026 
 Matched  2061.7 2254.5 -11.8 57.5 -1.21 0.228 
Dummy_own_b Unmatched  0.3393 0.2892  10.6   0.80 0.426 
 Matched 0.3272 0.3408 -2.9 72.9 -0.26 0.796 
fol Unmatched  0.5238 0.4578  13.2   0.98 0.327 
 Matched 0.5062 0.4901  3.2 75.7  0.29 0.774 
weather_shock Unmatched  0.8393 0.7108  31.0   2.40 0.017 
 Matched 0.8333 0.7811  12.6 59.4  1.19 0.235 
Death_ill_shock Unmatched  0.1726 0.3133 -33.1  -2.56 0.011 
 Matched 0.1790 0.1790  0.00 100  0.00 0.999 
Loss_livestock Unmatched  0.4643 0.4337  6.1   0.46 0.649 

















Table 7. 5  Other covariate balance indicators before and after matching 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%,   *** significant at 1 % 
 
Table 7. 6 Treatment effect and sensitivity analysis 






Indicator  Sample  
Pseudo R2 Unmatched  0.18 
 Matched  0.04 
LR X2  (p-value) Unmatched  59.35(0.000)*** 
 Matched  18.35 (0.685 
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Table 71ADefinition of Variables 
Variable name                                                    Definition  
Treatment Variable  
PSNP (1/0) Equals 1 if the household is  participating in  the Productive Safety Net 
Program (PSNP) , 0 otherwise  
Outcome Variables  
Forest_extraction (1/0) Dummy =1 if the household participated in forest environmental resource 
extraction, 0 otherwise  
Forest_dep Ratio of income from forest environmental resources to the overall 
household income   
Ftrips_year Number of trips to forests by the household during the survey year.  
Explanatory variables  
Sex _hhh (1/0) Equals  1 if the household head is male, 0 otherwise  
Age_hh_1 Household head’ age in years  
Edu_hhh Educational level of the household head in years  
Family_size Family size of the household  
Dep_ratio Dependency ratio in the household  
N-dep Number of Dependents in the household  
P_size _tsimdi Plot size owned by the household in tsimdi (= 0.25 hectare ) 
Tlu Number of livestock owned in Tropical Livestock Unit (TLU) 
Private_forest (1/0) Dummy = 1 if the household owned private forest , 0 otherwise  
Fooda_months Number of months in the year that the household had enough food stock  
Access_irrigation (1/0) Dummy = 1 if the household had access to irrigation, 0 otherwise  
M_hh_ext_pack Dummy =1 if the household is a beneficiary of the household extension 
package during the survey year , 0 otherwise  
Transfer (1/0) Dummy =1 if the household had access to transfer , 0 otherwise  







I_per capita Household income per adult equivalent in Ethiopia Birr 
Dummy_own _b Dummy = 1 if the household has his/her own business , 0 otherwise 
fol Dummy = 1 if the household is a member of any social group institution  , 
0 otherwise  
Weather_s Dummy = 1 if the household experienced weather related shocks last year , 
0 otherwise   
Death_ill_s Dummy =1 if the household experienced death or illness of a household 
member last year , 0 otherwise  
Loss_live_s Dummy = 1 if the household experienced shocks related to loss of livestock 







DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
8.1. Forest management, Shocks and Poverty reduction 
Poor people often depend on biodiversityboth for their livelihoods and as a safety net againstdeeper 
poverty (IIED, 2010).Moreover, direct dependence on services from ecosystems is highest 
amongst people living in arid and semi-arid lands such as Tigray, where alternative livelihood 
options areoften limited and environments are particularlyfragile and risky (MA 2005b cited in 
Shackleton et al., 2008).The resultant increased pressure often has a negative feedback on the 
capacity of the ecosystems to deliver these services and create a downward spiral of increasing 
poverty and ecosystem degradation (Shackleton et al., 2008) and this dependence of the poor on 
the fragile open access may confirm the suggestion in some recent literature (e.g. Angelsen and 
Wunder, 2003; Lavange, 2005; Delacote, 2007) of a resource based “poverty trap.” 
Accordingly,finding synergistic solutions has been on local, national, and international agendas 
for decades, in the hope that humandevelopment and biodiversity conservation can be found to be 
less a zero-sum game of trade-offs and more a set of mutually reinforcing goals(Timmer, 2005).In 
the same way Howard and Smith(2006) identified two over arching problems of  Common Pool 
Resources Management (CPR) in Tigray: the possibility to halt degradation and sustainably 
regenerate vegetative resources, and the need to generate livelihood resources that can help to 
alleviate poverty, food insecurity and continued degradation in the area (Howard and Smith, 2006).  
In line with the national development strategy framework known as Agricultural Development 





Agricultural Development Strategy (CBAD) since 1994. One of the major strategies of 
environmental rehabilitation includes area enclosures and establishment of community woodlots 
for ecological restoration. The immediate positive environmental effects of the enclosures and the 
species restrictions are universally acknowledged by researchers, local populations(Howard and 
Smith, 2006) and the international community as well. However, there is also a steady growing 
body of literature questioning the impact of such policy interventions in terms of economic benefits 
to farm households who are dependent on the forest resources for insurance and source of income, 
suggesting the gains in the conservation of forest biodiversity in the region require a corresponding 
focus on the economic and social issues of the intervention. To this end clarity is needed under 
which conditions the current forest management contributes to the livelihood of farm households 
in the region. 
This study has addressed five major issues of relevance to attaining  win –win solutions for human 
development and conservation of forest biodiversity in the region. The first issue examined how 
forest environmental resources provide a “natural insurance” for households affected by 
idiosyncratic health related shocks. It examines the difference in the number of trips to forests, 
forest sales and forest dependency between households that are affected by health related shocks 
and that were not, and the factors that explain households’ participation in forest environmental 
resources for coping with health related shocks.  
Refocusing on the role that forest plays in livelihoods and poverty reduction, Wunder (2001) and 
Angelsen and Wunder (2003) also argued that optimism about a win-win development and 
conservation outcome is unwarranted and that NTFP extraction is generally a low–return activity 
that may even lead to a “poverty trap”.  Thus, the second issue addressed in this research deals 





smallholder farming households in Tigray. It tries to explicitly focus on food security indicators 
as outcome variables to investigate the role of forest environmental resources on these indicators. 
In addition, this section also tries to identify whether a risk management strategy or diversification 
strategy explain households’ choice of participation in forest environmental resource extraction in 
rural Tigray.    
Full understanding of the links between forests and welfare of households requires the ability to 
make causal inferences about a counterfactual (CBD, 2010). The third issue of this study is 
therefore to investigate the welfare impact of forest environmental resource commercialization in 
rural Tigray using counterfactual income analysis. It tries to identify conditional expectations, 
treatment and heterogeneity effects of participation in forest environmental resource 
commercialization and its implication on the welfare of rural households in Tigray.  
Poverty in local forest communities is considered both a cause and result of deforestation and 
environmental degradation. If poverty can be alleviated through the harvesting of forest 
environmental resources, then deforestation pressures will be reduced. It is also claimed that the 
poorer the country, the more significant is natural capital likely to be in determining the overall 
distribution of wealth. Thus, the fourth issue that this study addressed is the contribution of forest 
environmental resources for poverty reduction and distribution of income in rural Tigray. 
Finally, as mentioned in section 8.1., the two overarching problems identified by researchers with 
the issue of Common Pool Resources (CPRs) in Tigray are the possibility to halt degradation and 
sustainably regenerate vegetative resources on the one hand, and the need to generate livelihood 
resources that can help to alleviate poverty, food insecurity and continued degradation on the area 
on the other (Howard and Smith, 2006).    Thus, the final issue addressed in this research is 





for reconciling conservation of the environment and poverty reduction. It identified some of the 
major problems in the program and policy inputs required to strengthen the role of the program to 
bring a win-win solution for conservation and poverty reduction.  
Discussion on the findings of each research issue and conclusions are presented in subsequent 
sections. Section 8.2 presents the findings and conclusions on the role of natural insurance for 
coping with idiosyncratic health related shocks. Section 8.3 presents the main findings and 
conclusions of forests-food security linkages and their impact on the long term livelihood 
outcomes of smallholder farming in Tigray. Section 8.4 presents the findings and conclusions on 
the welfare impact of forest environmental resources along with the conditional expectations, 
treatment and heterogeneity effects of participation in rural Tigray. Section 8.5 presents a 
discussion and conclusions on the contribution of forest environmental resources on poverty 
reduction and income distribution under the existing management system in rural Tigray. Section 
8.6 presents a discussion of the findings and conclusions on the role of the productive safety net 
program in providing win-win environmental conservation and poverty reduction. Finally, in 
section 8.7 the main policy implications of the overall research and further research needs are 
discussed.  
 8.1.1. Idiosyncratic Health Shocks and Forest Environmental Resources 
A typical household in rural areas of developing countries is exposed to covariate and/or 
idiosyncratic risks. Low and volatile incomes coupled with the absence of or poor development of 
financial and risk sharing institutions in such areas make consumption smoothing an important 
issue in both theoretical and empirical studies in development economics. In the absence of 





exposed to shocks (Dercon et al, 2005; Dercon & Krishnan, 2005). One of the emergent literatures 
in relation to consumption smoothing is the issue of “natural insurance” (Angelsen et al., 2007). 
However, much of the existing literature on  natural insurance deals with covariate shocks such as 
drought and flooding. Meanwhile, a growing body of empirical evidence suggests that 
idiosyncratic risk may be as important, or indeed may dominate covariate risks in rural Africa and 
Asia (Udry, 1990; Townsend, 1995; Deaton, 1997; Libbert et al., 2004; Morduch , 2004; Dercon, 
2005; Kaziange and Udry, 2006). In this research we investigated the role of “natural insurance” 
for coping with idiosyncratic health shocks in rural Tigray, both in the context of the region and 
in the light of the scholarly debate on the subject.  
Controlling for other factors, the empirical results revealed that participation in forest 
environmental resource extraction and number of trips to forests is positively and significantly 
associated with health related shocks in Tigray. In the same way, households who are affected by 
health related shocks are more dependent on forest environmental income.  This suggests that 
forest environmental resources play an important role as a safety net or provide “natural insurance” 
for the poor households affected by idiosyncratic health related shocks.   
 8.1.2. Forest-Food Security Linkages 
Since the last two decades NTFP-based development was born as a new development paradigm 
capable of accommodating many conflicting needs - of local livelihoods and of global markets;  of 
balancing regional developmental aspirations with that of national growth; and above all  of 
reconciling environment and  development. However, refocusing of the development agenda on 
poverty has led to recent reassessment of the role that bio-diversity plays in livelihoods and poverty 
alleviation. A profusion of new commentary has emerged. This poses many fresh questions, and, 





by providing a more subtle and complex picture of livelihood – biodiversity linkages (Shackleton, 
2006). For example, Neumann and Hirch (2000) present evidence from an array of studies that 
show that NTFP extraction is an activity of the poor, and Wunder (2001) and Angelsen and 
Wunder (2003) argue that optimism about a win – win development and conservation outcome is 
unwarranted, and that NTFP extraction is generally a low-income activity that may even result in 
a poverty trap. Similarly, Lavange et al., (2005 cited in CBD, 2010) claim that biodiversity 
resource dependence is a symptom of poverty, and it is only by “leaving the forest” that the poor 
can hope to escape poverty.A plausible alternative to the downward spiralscenarios is a pattern in 
which poor rural households convert natural capital into physical and human capital, and use these 
investments to gradually move out of poverty and reduce their reliance on destructive resource 
extraction (Angelsen et al., 2007). 
The general conclusion in the current literature is that the safety net and poverty trap aspects of 
NTFPs are linked, in as much as features that make forest products attractive to the poor also limit 
their potential for generating higher income and escaping their poverty (Shackleton, 2006).   
However, much of the existing arguments and conclusions made on the link between poverty and 
biodiversity suffer from an overload of conjectural and anecdotal assertion rather than evidence 
(Roy et al., 2010). Full understanding of the links between biodiversity and poverty require the 
ability to make causal inferences about the counterfactual (CBD, 2010; Vira and Kontoleon, 2010) 
– and none of the previous studies in the region do this. In a wide ranging review on the research 
done on the link between poverty and biodiversity, CBD, (2010); Vira and Kontoleon, (2010) also 
argued that if nature’s resources help to temporarily smooth consumption and incomes, their 





measure, instead of annualized income or consumption (in which these temporary contributions 
do not always feature as significant). 
In this research we investigated the role of forest environmental resources in food security 
outcomes of the households in rural Tigray and its implication for long term livelihoods. Three 
food security outcomes were considered in the analysis: (1) distress sale of assets for immediate 
consumption, (2) number of months that the household had enough food stock available during 
the survey year, and (3) total expenditure per adult household equivalent.  
The empirical findings show that controlling for other factors, higher educational level and age of 
the household head, access to off farm employment, and awareness of climate change in the 
locality decrease the probability of participation in forest environmental resource extraction, while 
vulnerability to shocks and gender of the household head being male increase the probability of 
participation in forest environmental resources. Second, we find that participants in forest 
environmental resource extraction in rural Tigray have significantly lower food security outcomes. 
Third, we find that the poor and non-poor households that are participating in forest extraction had 
lower distress sale of assets for immediate consumption  than non-participants in the same sample, 
enforcing the widely held view that forests are important as an  economic buffer in hard times. 
Fourth, households in rural Tigray are not driven into forest extraction by risks in farm output only 
but also by diversification strategy, suggesting that the problem for local communities has both 
the characteristics of portfolio analysis and the economics of insurance. 
Finally our findings support the widely held view that the poor appear to be linked with nature- 
based resource use, but these may serve to perpetuate poverty and food insecurity (CBD, 2010; 





 8.1.3. Forest commercialization and Household income 
In a wide ranging review, Roe et al. (2010) warned that case studies that reach conclusions about 
poverty-conservation mechanisms without reference to a counterfactual have to be treated 
cautiously because income (or any other welfare related measures) may have been affected by 
other confounding effects. In this section we investigate the contribution of forest environmental 
resource commercialization on the welfare of rural households in Tigray. We estimated a 
simultaneous equation model with endogenous switching to account for the heterogeneity in the 
decision to participate or not, and for unobservable household characteristics.  
Our empirical results show that education of the household head, access to wage income and own 
business enterprise, and higher size of land ownership were found to be negatively correlated to 
forest related activities, while higher distance to market, vulnerability to shocks and household 
head being male were found to be positively correlated.  Second, the estimated heterogeneity effect 
revealed that independent of participation, participant households would have less income on 
average than non-participants, implying the group of farm households that actually participated in 
forest environmental resource commercialization have systematically different characteristics than 
the group that did not participate. Third, the treatment effect analysis shows that participation 
decreased income for non–participant groups in the counterfactual case they did participate, while 
it improved the income of households who actually participated. This suggests that participation 
in forest related activities in rural Tigray seems to be particularly important for the group of farm 
households most vulnerable to shocks.  
 8.1.4. Forests income poverty and inequality 
Despite a wealth of case studies on the link between biodiversity conservation and poverty 





methods required to make reliable inferences about the actual impact of conservation initiatives 
on measurable poverty indicators (CBD, 2010). To appropriately answer these types of impact 
assessment questions, there is a need for greater use of counterfactual cases. Before and after 
assessments of conservation initiatives are not sufficient (Roe et al., 2010). In this section we 
estimated the poverty and inequality indicators using data from rural Tigray taking into account 
the counterfactual situation. The poverty and inequality indicators were also estimated using the 
traditional “conventional” approach in order to allow us a clear estimation of the extent of over-
estimation and/or underestimation of the impacts of forest environmental resources on poverty and 
inequality in previous works.  
 The empirical results show that the choice of methodology can have a significant impact on the 
estimated contribution of forests and conclusions made about the link between forest biodiversity 
and poverty reduction. Second, we find that the contribution of forests to reduce the incidence of 
poverty is considerably weaker, and might increase the severity of poverty when the counterfactual 
estimation method is used. 
Third, in relation to income distribution, we find that after using the counterfactual approach, the 
impact of forest income on distribution is negative as against a positive contribution in the 
conventional approach. Fourth, these apparently contradictory findings, where forest income 
appears to reduce substantially the poverty and inequality indicators when we use the conventional 
approach, but has little or negative impact on poverty and inequality indicators under the 
counterfactual approach, could be explained by the fact that participation in forest activities might 
have a disincentive effect on incomes from other activities which are not captured when forest 





 8.1.5. PSNP and forest pressure 
The findings of our previous sections revealed that forest environmental resources play an 
important role for households vulnerable to idiosyncratic and covariate shocks. Findings also show 
that it is the poor and vulnerable households in rural Tigray who are most dependent on forest 
environmental resources and forest environmental resources provide food security, enforcing the 
widely held view that forests provide a buffer during economic misfortunes for the poor. 
Meanwhile, our discussion in section 8.1.2 also warned that dependence of households on forest 
environmental resources as a” natural insurance” may serve to perpetuate poverty. This implies 
that forest environmental resources have both the advantage of offering the poor households an 
activity to survive, with the disadvantage of keeping them in poverty (Delacote, 2007). This 
suggests the potential existence of risk induced poverty traps, whereby those who can insure their 
consumption against income shocks can take advantage of the more profitable opportunities and 
possibly grow out of poverty, while others are stuck with low return, low risk activities, trapping 
them into poverty, even though their inherent risk preferences may fundamentally be the same 
(Dercon, 2007). Indeed common resource extraction may constitute a poverty trap as a result of a 
tragedy of the commons. Too many households are in need of insurance and the resource cannot 
provide enough to properly insure all the population. They face thus the classic poverty – 
environment nexus, where poor people depend too much on their environment, and over use it 
(Delacote 2007). 
An implication of the above cases and our findings from the previous chapters is that current 
consumption of households in rural Tigray is maintained through actions that seriously, sometimes 
irreversibly, compromise future livelihoods, actions that could have been avoided if households 





investigated whether social protection programmes such as the Productive Safety Net Programme 
(PSNP) in Ethiopia could provide a win –win for poverty reduction and conservation of forests in 
rural Tigray by reducing the pressure on forests.  
The empirical findings revealed that the PSNP decreases the pressure on the forest ecosystem by 
decreasing trips to forest environmental resource collection and forest dependency. The findings 
also show that those households that have a higher probability of participating in PSNP were able 
to reduce their dependency on forests over and above the households that have less probability of 
participating in PSNP. The implication of this result is thus, the gains in terms of reducing forest 
dependency as a result of PSNP are higher for households with higher probability of participating 
in PSNP than those of households with lower chances of involving in the program. These findings 
are generally consistent with the widely held view that programs designed to reduce economic 
vulnerability of low income households can improve human welfare and reduce forest pressure, 
.i.e. PSNP could help in promoting a win-win for poverty reduction and forest ecosystem 
conservation.  
8.2.   Policy Implications and Further Research 
 8.2.1. Policy Implications 
The issues addressed in this thesis are interrelated and can be seen within the context of bringing 
overall sustainable development in Tigray. The very nature of sustainable development emphasises 
the integration of its pillars – economic, social and environmental – and this implies a need not 
just to focus on one of its pillars to achieve sustainable development but, for example to consider 
how environment – and natural resource management – can be integrated across the other pillars 





equally to consider how progress towards the other pillars such as human health, poverty reduction 
and equity might impact on environmental sustainability).  
 One important policy implication of this study is that policy makers need to simultaneously 
address the issue of human and environmental health. In this regard, our specific  policy proposal 
to safeguard the forest resource-related needs of households affected by illness in a particular 
setting could include those that: ensure local values for forest resources (such as medicinal plants) 
are protected by forest management plans (Colfer et al., 2006) ; promote agro forestry as a means 
to assisting rural residents to establish and manage tree crops, particularly those possessing 
medicinal properties (Barany et al., 2000); and examine rural health delivery to determine the 
environmental consequences of access, or lack of thereof, to health services. Moreover, 
institutional support through access to credit and creating awareness to climate change could also 
play a role in minimizing the pressure on forests.  
Second, while it is agreed that forest resource conservation is critical, how it happens, what is 
conserved, and for whom, requires a complex set of trade-offs that the current conservation 
intervention could not achieve. Ensuring that the forest resources contribute to poverty reduction 
rather than exacerbating poverty implies a need to adopt different approaches to resource 
conservation that provide benefits for the poor people and to meet social justice objectives. The 
existing intervention does have the potential to contribute a win-win for conservation and poverty 
reduction, but provided that thorough impact assessment is undertaken with full participation of 
indigenous people and local communities to identify potential negative impacts, provision is  made 
for full and fair compensation or mitigation where appropriate,  mechanisms for including local 
values (based on utility) and global values are introduced in determining conservation priorities; 





requires balancing customary and formal norms of institutions, and recognizing historic tenure 
rights. Over all, government, policy-makers and natural resource managers need to acknowledge 
the livelihood safety-net role that forests play in rural livelihoods and recognize that environmental 
protection policies limiting or banning access and use of forest resources can deepen rural poverty, 
as the poor suffer more from the deprivation of these resources. Therefore, there is a need to invest 
in the development and promotion of  sustainable use forest management practices that allow the 
poor to utilize forest environmental resources to enhance their economic wellbeing with minimum 
adverse effects on forest ecological conditions. 
Finally, the policy implication that can be drawn from the study result is the importance of and the 
promotion of public safety nets such as the Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP) for the poor 
and the promotion of government programmes and policies that increase the productivity of 
agricultural production and support diversification into off-farm livelihood and income sources to 
provide positive incentives for forest conservation and sustainable use. This suggests that 
sustainable forest management has to be integrated with the broader framework of rural 
development programs aimed at reducing poverty in order to provide the necessary incentives for 
the poor to adapt sustainable resource management options.   
 8.2.2. Further Research 
Consideration needs to be given to dynamic elements and nature of the issues addressed in this 
study. For instance, the issue of forests as safety nets or poverty traps extends beyond one year. 
Poverty trap is a dynamic issue that needs longitudinal data and the poverty trap implications in 
the cross sectional analyses used here do not necessary imply a poverty trap in the long run.  
Moreover, our conclusion on the positive role of the PSNP in pursuing the twin goals of sustainable 





further research using longitudinal data, because households are likely to respond differently to 
income changes from poverty reduction programs that are perceived to be substantial and 
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HOUSEHOLD IDENTIFICATION NAME CODE 
Household  head 
 
  












Name of interviewee 
 
 Sex            1= Male 
                   2=Female 
Distance to DA office from home Distance to Nursery  Distance to Health post Distance to Veterinary  





 Distance to seasonal road Distance to School Distance to input distribution 
 
 
Distance to all weather road Distance to Forest  
Distance to local market    
Distance to Woreda Market     




































































































































times did the 
name face 
serious illness 
in the  past 
season for 























   
01             
02             
03             
04             
05             
06             
07             
08             
09             
10             
11             
12             
13             
14             
Code 
A2 1=female 2=male 





A4  1=Married 2=Widowed 3=Divorced 4= separated 5=Never married 
A6.3 0=none   1=std 1-4   2= std 5-8   3= Attend sec   4=MSCE   5=Techn. Colle   7=University 
A7 0=none 1= Farming 2=bussiness 3=ganyu (labour) 4=Salaried work 5=schooling 6=Unemployed 7=other (specify) 




B: Assets ownership 








































0=no   
 
If you were to sell them 






Metal or Wooden Bed               
Metal or Wooden Table               
Metal washing Pot (Tisti)               
Plastic Washing Pot (lastic 
Tisti) 
              
Stone Mills (Methan)               
Saddle (Korecha)               
Fanus (Betromakis)               
Gas Midija               
Blanket (Koberta)               
Wooden Box (satsun)               
Metal box (satsun)               
Bermel               
Jerikan               
Plowing Set (Mesarei)                
Mahresha               
Hoe + Af kutu (Mekuati)               
Spade (badela)               
Sickle (Meatsid)               
Hammer (Martello + 
Medosha) 
              
Axe + Fas (misar)               
Saw (megaz)               
Bunta               










C: NON-FARM ACTIVITIES AND INCOME 
C.1 EMPLOYMENT FOR WAGE 
 
1. In the last twelve months, did any of the household members work off the household's land either on someone else's land or in some other employment or 
against payment in cash/kind? If yes give the following details.              Yes ---- 1    No ----- 2  
ID C2. Kind of C3. Location 
C4. Did s/he 
need C5. Is it C6. Total days worked in each season 
C7. Total amount earned in 
Birr 
C8. What is 
the 
code of work of Qualification/ permanent       income from 
H.H [code a] employment Experience/ (=1) or       this activity 
Member  [code b] educational temporary       used for? 
   training (=2)       [code c] 
   [code i] work?       Multiple codes are possible 
-------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 1st  season 2nd  season 3rd season 1st 2nd 3rd ---------------- 
     (Jan-April) May- August Sept-December season season season  
            
            
            
            
            
            
Code (a) Type of employment 
Farm Worker (for pay) = 1; Traditional labor sharing = 2                                                                                                                                    
Professional (teacher, government worker, administration, health worker, clerical) = 3 
This kushet = 1; Other kushet in the same Tabia = 2; 
This Woreda = 3; This neighbouring Woreda = 4; Mekelle = 5;                                                                          
Migration to another zone = 6; Migration to another state = 7; 
Migration to foreign country = 8; 
Arebia               
Cart (Gari)               
Radio               
Tape               
Wrist Watch               
Silver (grms)               
Gold (grms)               





Other = 9, specify 
Code (b) Location of employment 
This kushet = 1; Other kushet in the same Tabia = 2; 
This Woreda = 3; This neighbouring Woreda = 4; Mekelle = 5; 
Migration to another zone = 6; Migration to another state = 7; 
Migration to foreign country = 8; 
Other = 9, specify 
Code (c)  Use of income 
General purchase for the household =1;          Invested into the business = 2; 
Personal purchases from the person who runs the business = 3;   Expenditure for the children = 4; 
Saved = 5;       Purchase livestock/other asset = 6; 
For payment of taxes and contribution = 7;     Payment for school = 8; 
For debt settlement = 9     purchase of fertilizer = 10 
Other = 11, specify 
C9.  If any member of your household gets additional daily work would s/he work?_________  (YES…..1 NO…..2) 
C10. If your answer to Q.9 is no, why did no member(s) seek other/more employment? Put according to their importance [code d]. 
       Reason 1: ___________; Reason 2: ___________; Reason 3: ___________ 
C11.  Would any of the household members like to work more for wages during planting time _____; weeding time ____ harvesting season ___;           
       Threshing season ________ (yes…..l; no…..2) 
C12, HOUSEHOLD MOTIVATION TO WORK ON FARM AND OFF FARM (Multiple codes are possible) 
      1.  Why did you choose to work only on the farm?_________________  [codes for the reason to work only on the farm code k] 
  2.   Why did you choose to work also on the farm and/or only off the farm? ___________[codes for the reason to work off the farm code L] 
 
 
Code (d) Reasons for not seeking other work 
No employment opportunities = 1 
Needed on farm = 2 
Jobs too far away = 3 
Wages too low for the kind of work = 4 
Just do not want to work off farm = 5 
Respect holidays = 6 
Others = 7, specify   
 
Code (k) codes for the reason to work only on the farm 
Because I don’t like and I am not interested working off the farm =1; Because I can not find any job off the farm = 2; 
Because off-farm work is less profitable than farm work = 3;  Because working on the farm allows caring for my family = 4 
Because I am retired = 5;     Because I need more labour for on farm work = 6; 







Code (L)codes for the reason to work off the farm 
 
Because no more labor is needed on farm =1;                                      Because my education is outside agriculture = 2; 
Because I do not have enough land to support family = 3;  Because I do not like/I am not interested to work on farm = 4 
Because of farm work is more profitable = 5;   Because farm work would be in sufficient for living  = 6; 
Because I can not buy additional land  = 7;    other = 8 
 
C13. Are you a beneficiary of Productive Safety Net Program? (PSNP)  1. Yes       2. No 
C14. If yes, in which component of PSNP are you involved?   1. Public works          2. Direct Support  
C15. If you are involved in public works program, how many of the household members are involved? --------------  
C16. Are you a beneficiary of household extension packages?   1. Yes    2. No 
C17. If yes what agricultural production development input supplies and technologies were you getting? 1. Fertilizer 2. Improved Seed  3. Improved  livestock  4.  
Modern Beehive 5. Irrigation technology 6. Credit services   7 Others, Please specify ----------------- 
C18.Did you use those inputs and technologies prior to the Household extension package program?   1. Yes   2. No 
C19. What is the amount of Credit you get from the household extension package? ------------------------ 
 
 
C21.     OWN BUSINESS ACTIVITIES 
 
1. Would like to ask you about your income earning activities such as craft, trades, or other business, carried out by any of the household members this year. 
If any of the household members are involved in such activities fill the following.                    




what is the 
income usually 
used for 
General purchase for the household 
=1;   Invested into the business = 2; 
Personal purchases from the person 
who runs the business =3; 
Expenditure for the children = 4; 
Saved = 5; Purchase 
livestock/other asset = 6; 
For payment of taxes and 
contribution = 7; Payment for 
school = 8; For debt settlement = 
9purchase of fertilizer = 10 
Other = 11, specify 
______________ 
Activities HH How much has the household earned net? If given 
in kind, change to cash and include it as payment 
[tirfi Tirah] and put it in Birr earned in each 
season 
Total days worked by the HH 
  member    
  responsible      
  [ID code]      
           
           
   1
st season 
(Jan-April) 

















Weaving (shimena)            







           
           
Trade in            
grain/general            
Trade in livestock            
Traditional healer/            
Religious teacher            
Transport (by pack            
animal)            
Selling Tela, Arequi,            
Teii, Kolo, and 
iniera            
            
Other, specify            
            
 
 
C26.     OWN BUSINESS ACTIVITIES 
 
1. Would like to ask you about your income earning activities such as selling fuel wood and charcoal, carried out by any of the household members this year. 
If any of the household members are involved in such activities fill the following.                    




what is the 
income usually 
used for 
General purchase for the household 
=1;   Invested into the business = 2; 
Personal purchases from the person 
who runs the business =3; 
Expenditure for the children = 4; 
Saved = 5; Purchase 
livestock/other asset = 6; 
For payment of taxes and 
contribution = 7; Payment for 
school = 8; For debt settlement = 
9purchase of fertilizer = 10 
Other = 11, specify 
______________ 
Activities HH How much has the household earned net? If given 
in kind, change to cash and include it as payment 
[tirfi Tirah] and put it in Birr earned in each 
season 
Total days worked by the HH 
  member    
  responsible      
  [ID code]      
           
           
   1
st season 
(Jan-April) 

















Selling Honey            
Selling Cactus            





Fuel Wood            
            
Charcoal            
Leaves             
Crop Residue            
Selling Wood             
animal)            
Other, specify            








C31.  TRANSFERS (REMITTANCE AND AID)  
C31.1. Has the household received any other income (such as remittance, gifts or other transfers) this year?            Yes ---- 1 (Give details)  No -- 2  
C31.1 
Type of receipt  
 
Remittance.. 1;  
Food Aid … 2; 
Gift ……… 3; 
Inheritance.. 4; 
Dowry …… 5; 














The person who 
send the transfer 
 
Non residence household 
member .. 1; 
Relatives of household 
member .. 2; 
Friends …… 3; 
Gov’t/organization.. 4; 
NGO …. 5; 
Other …. 6 
Specify _____ 
C34 
Amount received ° If it is 
given in kind change it to 
cash 







What was this income mainly used for 
 
General purchase for the household =1;   Invested into the business = 2; 
Personal purchases from the person who runs the business =3; Expenditure for the 
children = 4; Saved = 5; Purchase livestock/other asset = 6; 
For payment of taxes and contribution = 7; Payment for school = 8; For debt 
settlement = 9purchase of fertilizer = 10 
Other = 11, specify ______________ 
 
 
     
     
C36: MIGRATION AND INCOME 
           1. Has any member left the household to seek work this year?             Yes ….. 1 (Give Details)      2. No      





 C37 C38 C39 C40 C41 C42 C43 C44 How much 
did you bring 
back when 
you returned 




Did the HH have 
C46 
did you come 
ID code where date of 
Date of 
return 
(if s/he has 
returned) 
did s/he get Type of How How much land allocated away back to avoid 
Of HH did s/he departure work? work much s/he s/he while this person is losing land 
member go Day/month/ Yes… 1; [code a] earn? send back? away? if so how [yes=l, no=2] 
 [code b] year No…..2  (in Birr) (in Birr) many tsemdies?  
       [yes=l, no=2]  
           
           
a) Type of employment 
Farm Worker (for pay) = 1; Traditional labour sharing = 2                                                                                                                 b) Where did she/he go or migrate 
Professional (teacher, government worker, administration, health worker, clerical) = 3                                                                       Regional City (Mekelle= 1; Humera/shire =2 
Labourer (skilled i.e. builder, thatcher, hair cutting or dressing) = 4                                                                                                      Addis Abeba = 3; other region in Ethiopia = 4; 
 Trader =5 ; soldier = 6 ; driver/Mechanic= 7 ; unskilled worker = 8                                                        
 Domestic servant = (yebet agelgay) = 9; Food for work = 10;  Others = 11 Specify                                                                             Foregib country = 5; Other = 6  specify 
C47. Availability of Food During each month last year (2009/10) 
C47.1. During which month of the last year ,did your household had enough or shortage of food  
 
No Month Jan Feb March April May June July August Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. 
1 enough             
2 Not -enough             
C47.2. Did you sell assets for immediate consumption during 2009/10 ?   1. Yes     2. No                   if  yes  Please specify ? --------------- 
 
L. FOOD CONSUMPTION AND EXPENDITURE 
L.1. How many meals per day did your household eat in the last four weeks? _________________ 
L.2.We would like to ask you about all the food that was bought for consumption and/or was consumed from your own stock, in    
    this year. Please do not include food bought for resale, even after processing (the sum from the different sources should be   
    equal to the total amount consumed). 









Consumed from gift or 
L7 
Consumed from other 
 consumed  [KG, Birr]  purchased own harvest food aid  sources  
   Amount Value Amount Value Amount Value Amount value Amount Value [Birr] 





Cereals Teff            
 Barley            
 Wheat            
 Maize            
 Sorghum            
 Finger            
 millet            
 Karka’eta            
Pulses Lentils            
 Faba Bean            
 Field peas            
 Chick peas            
 Guaya            
Oil crops Linseed            
 rape seed            
 sesame            
 sun/sufI            
 flower            
 Nug            
 
 








Consumed from other 
 consumed  consumed [KG, purchased own harvest gift or food aid source  
   Birr]          
   Amount value Amount value Amount value Amount value Amount Value 
   [KGl [Birr] [KG] [Birr] [KG] [Birr] [KG] [Birr] (KG] (KG] 
Milk and 
animal milk/yogurt,            
products cheese            
 beef meat            





 meet            
 Chicken            
 eggs            
             
Beverage 
(liters) Tella            
 Arequi            
 Teji            
 Birra            
 Soft drink            
             
 Coffee            
 Honey            
 Sugar            
 Tea            
             
 Salt            
 Cooking oil            
 karialberbere            
 Onion            
 garlic            









Consumed from own 
L6 
Consumed from gift or 
L7 
Consumed from other 
 consumed  [KG, Birr]  purchased  harvest  food aid  source  
   Amount Value Amount Value Amount Value Amount Value Amount Value 
   [KG] [Birr] [KG] [Birr] [KG] [Birr] [KG] [Birr] [KG] [Birr] 
 Bread            
 Macaroni            





 Sweet potato            
             
Vegetables Green leaf            
 
L8. Has the household purchased any prepared foods, or eaten elsewhere against payment in the year? 
      [Yes…. 1; no….2]______       If yes, total expenditure in this year [in Birr]________ 
L. Non – Food Expenditure  
Which of the following items 










pay for it? 
L1b 
Which of the following items 
did you buy or pay for in the last month? 
 
L2a 





did you pay 
for it? 
L2b 
shoes, fabric for ADULTS (MEN AND 
WOMEN) 
  Soap, Omo 
  
Clothes/ shoes, fabric for CHILDREN 
(BOTH BOYS AND GIRLS) 
  Linens (sheets, towel, blankets) 
  
Cosmetic (butter) for MEN, WOMEN, 
BOYS AND GIRLS 
  Furniture and Lamp/torch 
  
Entertainment by MEN   Transport materials   
Entertainment by WOMEN   Building material for house   
Entertainment by BOYS and GIRLS   Ceremonial expense   
Kitchen equipment (cooking pots, Medija)   Contribution to EDIR   
Energy consumption (Kerosene, Fuel wood, 
charcoal, match)  
  Contribution to Associations (women, youth, 
farmers association) 
  
Modern medical treatment and medicine   Donation to organization (TDA, TPLF etc)   
Traditional medical treatment and medicine   Donation to Community church/Mosque   
School fees   Taxes and contributions to Tabia   
 
 
















What is the 
general texture 
of the soil? 
What is 
the slope 
What is the 
general 
How did you 
acquire this 
plot? 
Is the plot 
titled? (1= 
yes, 2= No) 
What was the primary 































Belg2001 and Meher 
2002 
F10 
1           
2           
3           
4           
5           
6           
7           
8           









 2-average  
3-not fertile 
  1= annual crops 
2= permanent crops 
3= grazing land  
4=left fallow  5= other  
       
       
Codes F8= 1=granted by local leaders, 2=Inherited from mothers side (wife) , 3=Inherited from fathers side(wife), 4=Inherited from mothers side (husband) , 5=Inherited from fathers side(hasband) ,6=Rented, 7=purchased , 8=farming as 






SEEDS PESTICIDES FERTILISER 
























               G4 
Cost 
 






         G14 
1                  
                  
                  
2                  
                  
                  





G9;1=CAN 2= Urea, 3=23:21:0, 4=20:20:0, 5=D compound, 6= super D, 7= SA, 8= others (specify 
 
 




Plot name  Did you apply any 






What was the type of 
manure? 
                G16 
Amount of manure 
                   G17 
Source of manure 
            G18 
If bought 
how much 
did it cost 
(MK) 
         G19 
How many 
days did it 




        G20 
Quantity Unit    
1         
2         
3         
4         
5         
6         
7         




5= tobacco stems 
6=others 







9= lichelo ( basin) 
9=others 
1 self made (compost) 
2 own animal manure 




9      
10      
11      
      



































What factors are taken into account in 
making decision on what crops to grow 
on each plot or leaving the plot fallow? 
(in order of priority starting with the 
most important) 
What major reasons did the household 
have for monocropping or mixed 
cropping?  
















1              
2              
3              
4              
5              
6              
7              
8              
9              
10              
11              
12              
 Crop codes 0 fallow 
1 Maize Hybrid 
2 Compost Maize (OPV) 
3 Maize Local 
4 Beans Dry 
5 Beans Green (Zitheba) 
6 Peas 
7 Ground nuts 
8 Tobacco 
9 Cassava 
10 Pigeon peas 
11 Irish potato 
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1= Land availability 
2= Labour availability 
3= Prevailing market prices 
4= Seeds, fertiliser, availability 
5= Meeting household basic consumption needs Credit  
6= Past crop performance (in previous seasons  
7= Expected rainfall patterns. 
8= Crop rotation 
9= Other (specify) 
 
1= Maximise revenue from land 
2= Allow positive complementarity efects among crops (e.g. N-fixing, ) 
3= Save time and labour in crop management 





















Labor use on plots 
For each of the plots and crops cultivated by the household indicate how many man-days did household member work in the 














 No of 
members 
No of days No of 
members 
No of days No of 
members 
No of days No of 
members 
No of days No of 
members 
No of days 
1           
2           
3           
4           
5           
6           
7           
8           
 
 
Hired Labor  
Plot 
ID 
Plot Name  Did you hire 
any labor to 
work on this 
plot?( 1=Yes, 
2=No) 
          G28 
Why did you 
hire in labor 
on this plot? 
      G29 
For how many man 
days did you hire the 
labor 
G30 
How much did you pay for the labor? 
 
G31 




Cash In kind 





3        
4        
5        
6        
7        






H. Harvest  
How much did you harvest last season (2009/10)  
 Crop code Harvest 2009/2010 Indicate the major reasons for the change 







































1             
2             
3             
4             
5             
6             
7             
8             
9             
10             
11             





 Use Crop codes 
 
  










Ys:Forest Products, Sales and markets 



























Did you sell  your 
























































































































                
                
                
                
                
                
                
                
                
                
                
 





Ys4 1= basket, 2= oxcart  3=pail  4=wheeelbarrow 5=bags (50kg) 6=bags (90kg) 7=headload 8=others 
Ys6 Walking 5 Km/hrs   Oxcart 4km/hr    Bicycle 15km/hr 
Ys71= Forest-gate, 2= Local (primary) markets, 3= District Assembly markets, 4= Urban markets, 5 = Other (specify) 
Ys91=home consumption  2=lack of market   3=other (specify) 
Ys12 1=Head load, 2 Ox cart, 3 Bicycle, 4 Vehicle, 5 Wheel barrow, 6 others 









H. Marketing. (For each crop that was sold, please ask) 
 
 What was 





What was the 
cost of 




When did the 






Why did the 
household opt to 




If they stored, what 
kind of storage 










Did you incur 
any problems 
when you stored 













      
            
            
            
Use crop 
code 
1 Head load 
2 Ox cart 
3 Bicycle 
4 Vehicle 
5 Wheel barrow 
6 others 
 1= Immediately after harvest 
2= They stored and sold at 
later date 
3=Sold some after harvest 
but stocked some for sale at 
later period 
4= Other 
1=Household needed an immediate 
source of income 
2=To take advantage of prevailing 
high prices at the time 
3=Lacked storage place/ mechanism 
4= Wanted to wait for better prices 
after harvest season 
5=Others (specify) 
1=Granary (Nkhokwe) 







2= Loss of quality 
3=Destruction by pests 
4= Prices never went up 
5= Other (specify) 
 




FO: Farmer Organizations 
Fo1: Do you belong to a farmer farming organisation? 1=Yes  0=No         
 





What kind of 
organisation is it? 
 
Fo2 




Why did you join the organisation? 
 
Fo4 
What 3 important functions does the FO carry out? 
 
Fo5 
 Years Months     
       
       
1= Farmer cooperative 
2=Farmer club 
3=Association 
4= Others (specify) 
  0= Nothing 
1=Helps farmers  access inputs on loan 
2=Markets produce for farmers 
3=Provides extension advice 
4=Others (specify) 






















What is the 
estimated price 




Did you buy any during the last 
four Months? 









































bulls/oxen            
Cows            
Sheep            
Goats            
Camels            
Donkey/mul
es/horse 
           
Chicken            
Bees            
Others            
 
Livestock Expenditure and Income  
During the last four months , have 
you had expenditure related to 








Gross income from the 
sale of household’s animal 




Did you sale 











Total revenue obtained  
L2d 
Type of Expenditure  Type       
Labor for herding   Meat      
Feed, including salt  Hides and skins     
Veterinary services/Medicine   Butter /cheese      
Transport of animal feed  Milk /Cream     





Other expenses(specify)  Chicken     
  eggs     
 
E2. Proportion of Labor allocated to the different activities in a Year (Out of 20 matchsticks, how many would you give in terms 

































       
 
E.28. Indicate distance (in km) from home to forest thinning or forest clearing area:________ 
E.29. Indicate distance (in km) from home to firewood collection area:________ 
E.30. Indicate distance (in km) from home to forest based area of wage……… 
E.31. Wage per hour of forest based wage work……………… 
M. Forest Resources and Tenure  
M.1. Do you have private woodland or grass land ?  1. Yes    2. No 
If  yes , Please state your total collection of non – timber forest products from natural forest (Private forest) 








Total time spent per trip  Average time to go to Natural Forest  
    AM AF YM YF  Adults Young 
Resins and gums           
Honey           
Cactus           
Fuel wood           
leaves           
Crop residues           
Medicinal herbs           
Thatching grass            
Fruit /nuts           





Other, specify           
Am= Adult male, AF = Adult Female, YM = Young male, YF = Young Female 
 
M.1.  How much income did you generate from sale of the non- timber forest products obtained from your private woodlot ? ------------------ 
M.2. Assuming that all the benefits you obtain and use it  from your private woodland/grass were obtained through purchase, how much would you incur /pay  
month ? ------- 
 
 
Please state your total collection of non – timber forest products from natural forest other than private forest  








Total time spent per trip  Average time to go to Natural Forest  
    AM AF YM YF  Adults Young 
Resins and gums           
Honey           
Cactus           
Fuel wood           
leaves           
Crop residues           
Medicinal herbs           
Thatching grass            
Fruit /nuts           
Timber            
Other, specify           
Am= Adult male, AF = Adult Female, YM = Young male, YF = Young Female 
 
 
M.3. How much income did you generate from sale of the non- timber forest products obtained from other forests? ------------------ 
M.4. Assuming that all the benefits you obtain and use it from other forests obtained through purchase, how much would you incur /pay month? ------- 
 
 
N. Climate change Related Issues  
 
N.1. Have you noticed any long –term changes in climate over the last 20 years?   1. Yes    2. No 
 
N.2. If yes what are the manifestations of change in climate change (multiple answers possible) 1. Increase in temperature   2. Decrease in Temperature   3. 
Increase in Rainfall 4. Decrease in Rainfall   5= other , specify  
 
N.3. Do you have access to information related to climate change 1. Yes    2. No  
 
N.4. How many times did you encounter complete crop failure due to climate change? ----------------- 





N.6. If yes , what adjustments related to farming, livestock and forests have you made to the change in climate  
 
No  Farming Practice  Livestock  Forests  
    
    
    
 
 
RS.Recent shocks to household welfare 
 
Has this household experienced ANY major shock since 2006? 
 
GO THROUGH THE ENTIRE LIST 
Did you 
experience 















































value of loss 
 





What did you do in 
response to this shock to 
try to regain your 





1- Lower yields due to drought or flood  
2-Crop disease or crop pests  
3-Livestock dies or were stolen  
4-Large fall in sale prices for crops  
5-Household buisness failure  
6-Loss of salaried employment  
7-Non-payment of salary  
8-End of regular assistance, aid, or 
remittances from outside HH  
9-Large rise in price of food  
11-Death of HH head  
12-Death of working members of the 
HH  
13-Illness or accident of household 
member  
14-Death of other family member  





1         
 2         
 3         
  
2007/8 
1         
 2         
 3         
  
2008/9 
1         
 2         





1      
 
  
 2         
 3         
  
 





R3: 1=Own HH only 2=Some other HHs too 3=All HHs in community 
R5: 1=Reduction in income 2=Reduction in assets 3=Both 4=Nothing 
R7: 0=Nothing               8=Removed children from school to work                                
      1=Spent cash savings                   9=Sent children to live with relatives     
      2=Sold assests (tools etc)     10=Went elsewhere to find work for more than one month     
      3=Sold forest products              11=Borrowed money (relatives, bank, local money lender) 
      4=Sold animals                 12=Received help (governent, NGO, etc)     
      5=Sold more crops          13=Reduced  food consumption (smaller proportions, fewer meals per day) 
      6=Worked more (incl. other HH members, )                   14=Diversify food consumption (Wild foods, meal sharing, no meat or fish) 
      7=Started a new buisness     
 
 
S. Social capital and welfare perceptions 
 Questions Answers Codes 
S1 All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life over the past 12 
months? 
 1=very unsatisfied; 2=unsatisfied; 3=neither 
unsatisfied or satisfied; 4=satisfied; 5=very satisfied 
S2 Has the household’s food production and income over the past 12 months been 
sufficient to cover what you consider to be the needs of the household?  
 0=no  1=yes  2=reasonable (just about sufficient)  
 
S3 Compared with other households in the village (or community), how well-off is 
your household? 
 1=worse-off   2=about average  3=better-off 
S4 How well-off is your household today compared with the situation 5 years ago? 
If 1 or 3, go to S5. If 2, go to S6. 
 1=less well-off now 2=about the same  
 3=better off now 
S5 If worse- or better-off: what is the main reason for the change? 
 
Please rank the most important responses, max 3. 
 1=off farm employment 
2=land holding (e.g., bought/sold land) 
3=forest resources  
4=output prices (forest, agric,…) 
5=outside support (govt., NGO,..) 
6=remittances 
7=cost of living (e.g., high inflation) 
8= civil strife, unrest 
9=conflicts in village (non-violent) 
10=change in family situation (e.g. loss of family 
member/a major bread-winner) 
11= illness 




S6 Do you consider your village (community) to be a good place to live?   0=no 1=yes  2=partly 





S8 Can you get help from other people in the village (community) if you are in need, 
for example, if you need extra money because someone in your family is sick?  
 1=Definitely  2=Probably   3=Probably not   
4=Definitely not 
S9 About how many friends do you (HOUSEHOLD HEAD) have in your 
community these days? These are people you feel at ease with, can talk to about 
private matters or call on for help. 
 
S10 About how many friends do you/does your SPOUSE have in your community 
these days? These are people she/he feels at ease with, can talk to about private 
matters or call on for help. 
 
S11 In the past 12 months, how many people with personal problems have turned to 
you for any form of assistance? 
 
 
W. Credit, Saving and Extension Services  
 







Loan source  
W2 
Original reason for taking out 
loan 
W3 
(Multiple answers possible) 







Amount need to 
be repaid 
W6 
What was the loan money 
actually used for? 
W7 
(Multiple answers possible) 




1. Bureau of Agriculture 




4. Partner (tirf yegara) 
5. Bank 
6. DECSI (DEDEBIT) 
7. Cooperatives 
8. Other (specify) 
1. To buy livestock  
2. To buy food 
3. To buy/have agricultural inputs 
(fertilizer, seed, irrigation) 
4. Health expenses 
5. Educational expenses 
6. Housing materials expenses 
7. To pay for hired labor 
8. To start new business 






(Indicate birr or 
value in birr) 
 
 
(Indicate birr or 
value in birr) 
 
 
1. To buy livestock  
2. To buy food 
3. To buy agricultural inputs 
4. Health expenses 
5. Educational expenses 
6. Housing materials expenses 
7. To pay for hired labor 
8. To start new business 
9. Other (specify) 
10. Has not used loan yet 
 
 
LOAN 1 30.1  31.1  32.1  33.1  34.1  35.1  36.1  
LOAN 2 30.2  31.2  32.2  33.2  34.2  35.2  36.2  








W9.  Did you have any financial savings in the Bank?   1. Yes    2. No 
W10.  If yes how much did you save in Birr ?  ---------------- 
W11. Did you have visits from extension staff last year?      1. Yes     2. No 
W12.  If yes how many times? --------------------- 
W13. Is the extension advice you get in the last 5 years teach about climate change ?    1. Yes     2. No 
 
 
 
